

Department of Defence Intelligence & Security

Australian Government Information and Communications Technology Security Manual

ACSI 33

Defence Signals Directorate

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Foreword

The Australian Government Protective Security Manual sets out the policies, practices and procedures that provide a protective security environment that is not only fundamental to good business and management practice, but also essential for good government. This is complemented by the policies and guidance provided in this Australian Government Information and Communications Technology Security Manual, which are designed to enable government agencies to achieve an assured information technology security environment. The publication of such a manual ensures that there is a minimum standard for information and communication technology security that can be applied consistently across government agencies.

The move to greater sharing and exchange of information between and within agencies, and the greater electronic interaction with the public and industry, pose new risks to Australian Government information. These risks need to be managed carefully and in a consistent way across government. This manual provides guidance to government departments, agencies and commercial service providers for managing those risks.

I encourage the users of this manual to provide feedback to the Defence Signals Directorate on its utility and content to assist in its future development. In this way we can ensure that policies and guidance evolve to meet the new and emerging business requirements of government departments and agencies.

Stephen Merchant Director Defence Signals Directorate This page is intentionally blank.

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Part 1 ACSI 33 and ICT Security

Overview			
Introduction	1.0.1. This part contains important information about this manual relates to the security of Australian Government information and communications technology (ICT) systems.		
Authority	1.0.2. The Australian Government Protective Security Manual (PSM) sets out the policies, practices and procedures required to achieve an appropriate security environment within the Australian Government. The PSM requires agencies to comply with this manual for the protection of information held on information and communications systems.		
Compliance	1.0.3. Agencies MUST be compliant with the manual released no more than two years previously.		
	DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies maintain compliance with release of the manual.	the current	
	Important: In some cases, DSD may make a determination that a newly introduced policy requirement is of particular importance, and that agencies will be required to meet the new policy within a shorter time frame.		
Contents	1.0.4. This part contains the following topics:		
	Торіс	See page	
	Using ACSI 33	1-2	
	The High-Level Process of ICT Security	1-9	
	About ICT Systems	1-10	
	Other References	1-12	

Using ACSI 33

Introduction 1.0.5. The information in this topic will help you to use this manual more effectively.

Classification of 1.0.6. This manual comes in two versions as shown in the table below. **ACSI 33**

	The ACSI 33 version	Covers the following system
	marked as	classifications
	UNCLASSIFIED	• UNCLASSIFIED,
		• IN-CONFIDENCE,
		RESTRICTED, and
		• PROTECTED.
	SECURITY-IN-	As per the UNCLASSIFIED version plus:
	CONFIDENCE	HIGHLY PROTECTED,
		• CONFIDENTIAL,
		• SECRET, and
		• TOP SECRET.
Block classifications	been marked with the approp treated as UNCLASSIFIED.	ng information that is not UNCLASSIFIED have oriate classification. Any unmarked blocks may be SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE version is shown
Block numbering	are ordered as follows:Part numberChapter numberBlock number	t of several fields separated by full stops. The fields IED version will notice that in places the numbering
	is non-sequential. This is inte	entional and indicates that the missing text relates to ope of the version being read.
Block applicability and system classifications	caveat reference, shown with	some block titles include a system classification or hin square brackets. Block titles that do not include t the block applies to all ICT systems, unless lock text.
		Continued on next page

Releasability of classified version	 1.0.10. DSD authorises access to the SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE version to those with a need-to-know, in accordance with the provisions of the PSM. This may include agency security staff and commercial organisations contracted to or seeking to support Australian Government agencies. Note: Those individuals or organisations that do not deal with HIGHLY PROTECTED information or nationally classified information of CONFIDENTIAL and above are not considered to have a need-to-know. The document MUST NOT be made available, directly or indirectly, to the public, or to persons not considered to have a need-to-know, unless approved by DSD.
	Continued on next page

Updates 1.0.12. This manual is updated regularly. It is therefore important that agencies ensure they are using the latest release.

The table below provides the websites from which the latest releases of this manual will be available.

ACSI 33 version		Location
UNCLASSIFIED	•	DSD's Internet website
		URL: www.dsd.gov.au/
	•	Defence Restricted Network
SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE	•	OnSecure members area
		URL: www.onsecure.gov.au/
	•	Defence Restricted Network

Feedback 1.0.13. DSD welcomes feedback about this manual. To suggest improvements, or advise of inaccuracies or ambiguities, please contact DSD.

See: 'Contacting DSD' on page 2-3.

Target audience

- 1.0.14. The target audience for this manual is:
 - IT Security Advisers (ITSAs),
- Agency Security Advisers (ASAs),
- agency ICT security administrators, system administrators, and network administrators,
- agency security policy staff,
- Infosec Registered Assessors (under the Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP)),
- technical personnel with some ICT security responsibilities, and
- security personnel with some understanding of and responsibility for ICT security.

Terminology	1.0.15. This manual is consistent with the terminology used in the PSM. In
	particular it adopts the following terms:

The term	Covers information that is
National security	classified RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL,
	SECRET or TOP SECRET.
Non-national security	classified IN-CONFIDENCE, PROTECTED or
	HIGHLY PROTECTED.
Classified	security classified as either national security or
	non-national security.
	Important: Classified information does not
	include information deemed to be
	UNCLASSIFIED.
UNCLASSIFIED	assessed as not containing any material that
	warrants a security classification. Australian
	Government employees must, however, have
	authorisation prior to releasing this information
	to members of the public.
Public domain	authorised for unlimited public access or
	circulation, such as agency publications and
	websites.
Official	classified, UNCLASSIFIED, or public domain.
CABINET-IN-	prepared for consideration by Cabinet, including
CONFIDENCE	during preparation.

Treatment of1CABINET-IN-CCONFIDENCEF

1.0.16. The *Cabinet Handbook* states that the **minimum** protection given to Cabinet documents is to be equivalent to information marked as PROTECTED. References in this manual to IN-CONFIDENCE **do not** include CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE.

Treatment of	1.0.17. The classification marking of information defines the minimum
AUSTEO and	protection required. Information that is also marked with the AUSTEO or
AGAO	AGAO caveat may require additional protection in some areas, as detailed in this
	manual.

How to use ACSI 33

1.0.18. The table below contains suggestions for using this manual.

If you	Then read
are a new user of ACSI 33,	Part 1 of this manual for an overall picture
	of ICT security for Australian Government
	agencies.
need to complete a specific	the 'The High-Level Process of ICT
ICT security administrative	Security' table to determine the applicable
task,	stage and relevant topics or sections.
Example: Writing a System	See: 'The High-Level Process of ICT
Security Plan.	Security' on page 1-9.
need to know a specific	the table of contents or index to identify the
security standard,	appropriate topic.
Example: What are the	See:
requirements for sanitising a	• Table of Contents.
RESTRICTED hard disk?	• Index on page I-1.
are unfamiliar with a term or	the list of abbreviations or the glossary.
abbreviation,	See: 'Abbreviations, Glossary and Index'
	on page A-1.

Keywords for	1.0.19. The table below defines the keywords used within this manual to indicate
requirements	the level of requirements. All keywords are presented in bold, uppercase format.

Keyword	Interpretation	
MUST	The item is mandatory.	
	See: 'Waivers against "MUSTs" and "MUST	
	NOTs''' on page 1-7.	
MUST NOT	Non-use of the item is mandatory.	
	See: 'Waivers against "MUSTs" and "MUST	
	NOTs''' on page 1-7.	
SHOULD	Valid reasons to deviate from the item may exist in	
	particular circumstances, but the full implications	
	need to be considered before choosing a different	
	course.	
	See: 'Deviations from "SHOULDs" and "SHOULD	
	NOTs" on page 1-7.	
SHOULD NOT	Valid reasons to implement the item may exist in	
	particular circumstances, but the full implications	
	need to be considered before choosing this course.	
	See: 'Deviations from "SHOULDs" and "SHOULD	
	NOTs''' on page 1-7.	
RECOMMENDS	The specified body's recommendation or	
RECOMMENDED	suggestion.	
	Note: Agencies deviating from a RECOMMENDS	
	or RECOMMENDED are encouraged to document	
	the reason(s) for doing so.	

Waivers against "MUSTs" and "MUST NOTs"	1.0.20. Agencies deviating from a " MUST " or " MUST NOT " statement in this manual MUST provide a waiver in accordance with the requirements of Part A of the <i>PSM</i> .
	In addition, agencies MUST advise DSD of the decision.
Deviations from "SHOULDs" and "SHOULD NOTs"	 1.0.21. Agencies deviating from a "SHOULD" or "SHOULD NOT", MUST document: a. the reasons for the deviation, b. an assessment of the residual risk resulting from the deviation,

- c. a date by which to review the decision,
- d. the ITSA's involvement in the decision, and
- e. management's approval.

DSD **RECOMMENDS** that ITSAs retain a copy of all deviations.

Legislation and	1.0.22. Compliance with the requirements of this manual must be undertaken	
other	subject to any obligations imposed by relevant legislation or law	
Government	(Commonwealth, State or local) and subject to any overriding Commonwealth	
policy	Government policy instruction. While this manual does contain examples of	
	when some laws may be relevant for agencies, there is no comprehensive	
consideration of such issues. Accordingly, agencies should rely on their of		
	inquiries in that regard.	

The High-Level Process of ICT Security

About the process	1.0.23. ICT security is an ongoing process. Stages within the process are inter- related, with each stage building on the results of the previous stage.
Starting the process	1.0.24. The best outcome for ICT security is achieved when security is considered to be an integral part of the system. DSD therefore RECOMMENDS that the high-level process of ICT security be considered during the analysis and design of a system.
_	

Process 1.0.25. The table below describes the stages that DSD **RECOMMENDS** agencies follow to implement the appropriate ICT security measures for each system.

Stage	Major tasks	See
1. Policy development	 Identify any existing relevant policies. Develop new policies, as required, to cover the requirements of each system. 	Chapter 3 – Identifying and Developing an ICT Security Policy on page 2-17
2. Conduct risk management	Identify the scope of the system to be protected.Develop an initial RMP.	Chapter 4 – Risk Management on page 2-22
3. Plan development	 Develop a high-level ICT security plan for use across related systems. Develop or amend an SSP, possibly based on the high-level ICT security plan, to cover each system. 	Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP on page 2-35
4. Implementation	 Implement the SSP(s), including the purchase of hardware and software. Develop and document the SOPs. 	Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs on page 2-38
5. Certification	 Determine what needs certifying. Obtain certification from the relevant person or organisation. 	Chapter 7 – Certifying and Accrediting ICT Systems on page 2-45
6. Accreditation	Obtain accreditation from the relevant authority.	
7. Maintenance	 Implement change control procedures. Perform integrity checks. 	Chapter 8 – Maintaining ICT Security and Managing Security on page 2-58
8. Review	Review and revisit each stage of this process annually.	Chapter 9 – Reviewing ICT Security on page 2-74

About ICT Systems

Definition: ICT 1.0.26. For the purposes of this manual, an ICT system is considered to be a system related set of hardware and software used for the communication, processing or storage of information, and the administrative framework in which it operates. This definition includes, but is not limited to: computers, including laptops and stand-alone PCs and their peripherals, • other communication equipment, • communication networks and other telecommunication facilities used to link • such equipment together, the software used on all such equipment, • the procedures used in the maintenance and administration of the equipment, • the information, • the people, and • the physical environment. • **Definition: ICT** 1.0.27. The classification of an ICT system is the highest classification of system information for which the system is accredited. classification See: 'About Certification' on page 2-46. *Continued on next page* **System modes** 1.0.28. An ICT system may operate in any one of the modes described in the table below.

See: 'System Users' on page 2-9 for more detail about system users, and 'Chapter 6 – Logical Access Control' on page 3-60 for more detail about system access.

Mode	Description
System High	 All users with access to the system MUST: hold a security clearance at least equal to the system classification, have received any necessary briefings, and have a need-to-know some of the information processed by the system, with need-to-know access control enforced by the system.
Dedicated	System High applies except that all users have a need-to- know all of the information processed by the system.
Compartmented	 All users hold a security clearance at least equal to the system classification but not all users are formally authorised to access all compartments of information processed by the system. Access control to the compartmented information is enforced by the system.
Multilevel	 Information at two or more classifications is processed and some of the users with system access are not security cleared for some of the information processed by the system. Within each security level of the system, users MUST: hold a security clearance at least equal to the classification of that level, and have a need-to-know some of the information within that level.

Other References

Further 1.0.29. The table below identifies the location of further information contained in other documents. To obtain copies of these documents, please contact the indicated organisation.

For further information on	See	Available from
AGAO	PSM 2005, Part C, Information Security	AGD
AUSTEO	Section 3 of the Inter-Agency Security Supplement to the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual Note: This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.	AGD
business continuity,	HB 221:2004 Business Continuity Management	Standards Australia
CABINET-IN- CONFIDENCE information security	<i>Cabinet Handbook</i> , Chapter 7, Security and Handling of Cabinet Documents	PM&C
classification labelling,	PSM 2005, Part C, Information Security	AGD
clearances,	PSM 2005, Part D, Personnel Security	AGD
information handling procedures,	PSM 2005, Part C, Information Security	AGD
information security management,	 AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006 – Information technology – Code of practice for information security management, and AS/NZS ISO/IEC 27001:2006 – Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management systems – Requirements 	Standards Australia
information security responsibilities,	PSM 2005, Part A, Protective Security Policy	AGD
information security risk management,	HB 231:2004 Information Security Risk Management Guidelines	Standards Australia
information technology security management,	AS 13335:2003 Information technology – Guidelines for the management of IT Security	Standards Australia
key management - commercial grade,	AS 11770.1-2003 Information technology – Security techniques – Key management	Standards Australia

Other References, Continued

Further information (continued)

For further information on	See	Available from
management of electronic records that	HB 171:2003 Guidelines for the Management of IT Evidence	Standards Australia
may be used as evidence,		
physical security requirements,	PSM 2005, Part E, Physical Security.	AGD
reporting of security incidents,	<i>PSM</i> 2005, Part G, Guidelines on Security Incidents and Investigations.	AGD
risk management,	 AS/NZS 4360:2004 <i>Risk Management</i>, and HB 436:2004 <i>Risk Management Guidelines</i> 	Standards Australia
storage and archival of	Archives Act 1983	National
Government		Archives of
information,		Australia

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Part 2 ICT Security Administration

ntroduction	2.0.1. This part contains information about the way ICT security implemented and documented.	is managed,
Contents	2.0.2. This part contains the following chapters:	
	Chapter	See page
	Chapter 1 – ICT Security Roles and Responsibilities	2-2
	Chapter 2 – Security Documentation	2-10
	Chapter 3 – Identifying and Developing an ICT Security Policy	2-18
	Chapter 4 – Risk Management	2-22
	Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP	2-35
	Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs	2-38
		2-45
	Chapter 7 – Certifying and Accrediting ICT Systems	
	Chapter 7 – Certifying and Accrediting ICT Systems Chapter 8 – Maintaining ICT Security and Managing Security	2-58

Chapter 1 – ICT Security Roles and Responsibilities

Overview

Introduction	2.1.1. This chapter contains information relating to ICT security roles and responsibilities.	
System specific responsibilities	2.1.2. Information relating to the system-specific roles and responsibilities of IT security advisers, system managers, system administrators and system users SHOULD be included in the documentation produced for each system.	
Contents	2.1.3. This chapter contains the following topics:	
	Торіс	See page
	DSD	2-3
	Other Organisations	2-4
	Appointing an IT Security Adviser (ITSA)	2-5
	IT Security Adviser Responsibilities	2-6
	System Manager	2-8
	System Users	2-9

DSD's role	 2.1.4. The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) is required under the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to perform various functions including the provision of: material, advice and other assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities on matters relating to the security and integrity of information that is processed, stored or communicated by electronic or similar means, and assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities in relation to cryptography, and communication and computer technologies. In addition, DSD plays an important role working with industry to develop new 	
	Within DSD, the Information Security Group performs these roles.	
Contacting DSD	 2.1.6. Agencies should contact DSD for advice and assistance through their ITSA or ASA. ITSAs and ASAs should address ICT security questions to Information Security Group's Client Services Team, which can be contacted via: Email assist@dsd.gov.au Phone 02 6265 0197 Fax 02 6265 0328 URL www.dsd.gov.au/ 	

Other organisations 2.1.7. The table below contains a brief description of some of the other organisations that have a role in the security of government systems.

Organisation	Services
Protective Security	Risk management and general protective security.
Coordination Centre –	
Attorney-General's	The PSCC's Training Centre provides protective
Department	security training.
	URL:
	www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/pscctrainingcentre.nsf
T4 Protective Security	Protective security risk reviews and advice, and
Section – Australian	equipment testing.
Security Intelligence	URL: www.asio.gov.au/work/content/protect.html
Organisation	
National Archives	Advice and guidelines on archives legislation and
	its application to ICT systems.
	URL: www.naa.gov.au
Australian Government	Development, coordination and oversight of
Information	Government policy on electronic commerce, online
Management Office –	services and the Internet.
Department of Finance	URL: www.agimo.gov.au
The Office of the	Advice on how to comply with the Privacy Act and
Federal Privacy	related legislation.
Commissioner	URL: www.privacy.gov.au
Department of Foreign	Policy and advice for security overseas.
Affairs and Trade	URL: www.dfat.gov.au
Australian National	Performance audits and "Better Practice" guides for
Audit Office	areas including information security.
	URL: www.anao.gov.au
High Tech Crime Centre	Law enforcement in relation to e-crime and other
– Australian Federal	high tech crimes.
Police	URL: www.ahtcc.gov.au
Australian Computer	Computer incident prevention, response and
Emergency Response	mitigation strategies.
Team	URL: www.auscert.org.au

Appointing an IT Security Adviser (ITSA)

Requirement for ITSA	 2.1.8. Agencies MUST appoint a person to the role of ITSA. Where the agency is spread across a number of geographical sites, DSD RECOMMENDS that a local ITSA be appointed at each site. However, the agency ITSA retains overall responsibility. See: 'IT Security Adviser Responsibilities' on page 2-6.
Appointing an ITSA	 2.1.9. The ITSA MUST have: a. ready access to and full support from line management, b. familiarity with information and/or ICT security, and c. a general knowledge of and experience in information processing systems used by the agency.
	The ITSA SHOULD have a detailed knowledge of and experience with the particular systems in use, especially the:d. operating systems,e. access control features, andf. auditing facilities.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that the ITSA have no other roles or duties.
	Where an agency has outsourced its ICT, the ITSA MUST be independent of the outsourcer.Important: The agency retains ultimate responsibility for the security of its ICT systems, regardless of what roles or functions are outsourced.
Clearance and briefing status	 2.1.10. The ITSA MUST be: a. cleared for access to the highest classification of information processed by the agency's ICT systems, and b. able to be briefed into any compartmented material on the agency's ICT systems.
	ITSAs and administrative staff may have unrestricted access to large volumes of classified information. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies consider clearing these staff to a higher clearance than that of the system classification.

IT Security Adviser Responsibilities

Primary responsibility	2.1.11. The ITSA is responsible for overseeing ICT security within an agency.		
Allocation of ITSA functions	2.1.12. The ITSA role is assigned to an individual. However, the functions of the ITSA may be performed by several individuals or teams.		
	Regardless of how the functions are allocated, responsibility for their effective execution remains with the appointed ITSA.		
Administrative responsibilities	 2.1.13. The ITSA is responsible for: identifying and recommending security improvements to systems, ensuring security aspects are considered as part of the change management process, coordinating the development, maintenance and implementation of all security-related system documents, in conjunction with the System Managers, and investigating and reporting security incidents to DSD, in conjunction with the ASA. 		
Technical security advice and training responsibilities	 2.1.14. The ITSA is responsible for: providing technical security advice involved with information system: development, acquisition, implementation, modification, operation, support, architecture, and managing the information system security training program. 		
Reviewing responsibilities	 2.1.15. The ITSA is responsible for the regular review of: system security, system audit trails and logs, and the integrity of the system configuration. 		

IT Security Adviser Responsibilities, Continued

SOPs	 2.1.16. The ITSA SHOULD be familiar with all SOPs relating to the operation of the system, including those relating to the roles of the: a. ITSA, b. System Manager, c. System Administrator, and d. System Users.
Certification and accreditation responsibilities	 2.1.17. The ITSA is responsible for assisting System Managers to obtain and maintain security accreditation of their systems. See: System Manager: 'Certification and accreditation responsibilities' on page 2-8 for more detail.

System Manager

System Manager, ITSA and ASA	2.1.18. The ITSA and ASA SHOULD assist the System Manager in the performance of the System Manager's security-related responsibilities.	
<i>PSM</i> reference: protection of resources	2.1.19. Paragraph C4.8 of the <i>PSM</i> states that "Agency security personnel are not, however, responsible for making the decisions about what requires protection and what type of protection is most appropriate. This remains the responsibility of the manager with functional control of the resource."	
Documentation responsibilities	 2.1.20. The System Manager is responsible for the development, maintenance and implementation of the following system documentation: RMP, See: 'Chapter 4 – Risk Management' on page 2-22. SSP, See: 'Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP' on page 2-35. SOP, See: 'Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs' on page 2-38. 	
Certification and accreditation responsibilities	 2.1.21. The System Manager is responsible for obtaining and maintaining security accreditation of the system by: ensuring that the system complies with the relevant ICTSP and SSP, ensuring that the impact of system modifications or additions on security mechanisms is managed properly, identifying any system changes that may imply a need for recertification and reaccreditation, ensuring that documentation is complete, accurate and up-to-date, and obtaining all necessary certifications. See: 'Chapter 7 – Certifying and Accrediting ICT Systems' on page 2-45 for	
SOPs	 more detail. 2.1.22. The System Manager SHOULD be familiar with all SOPs relating to the operation of the system, including those relating to the roles of the: a. ITSA, b. System Manager, c. System Administrator, and d. System Users. 	
Ensuring adherence to procedures	2.1.23. The System Manager is responsible for ensuring that procedures recorded in security documentation are followed.	

System Users

Types of system users	 2.1.24. This topic explains responsibilities for: general users, including all users with general access to the information system, and users with administrative privileges. 	
Responsibilities of general users	2.1.25. Agencies SHOULD ensure that general users comply with the relevant policies, plans and procedures for the systems they are using.	
Requirements: privileged access	 2.1.26. As a minimum, all privileged users MUST: a. comply with the relevant policies, plans and procedures for the system they are using, b. possess a security clearance at least equal to the highest classification of information processed on a system, c. protect the authenticators for privileged accounts at the highest level of information it secures, Example: Passwords for root and administrator accounts. d. not share authenticators for privileged accounts without approval, e. be responsible for all actions under their privileged accounts, f. use privileged access only to perform authorised tasks and functions, and g. report all potentially security-related information system problems to the ITSA. 	
Management of privileged access	 2.1.27. Agencies SHOULD: a. restrict privileged access to a minimum, and b. closely audit privileged access. See: 'Chapter 7 – Active Security' on page 3-67. 	

Chapter 2 – Security Documentation

Overview

Introduction 2.2.1. A documentation framework is essential for organising all the required ICT security documentation in a manner that allows for easy creation, reference and maintenance of the information.

Contents 2.2.2. This chapter contains the following topics:

Торіс	See page
Requirements for ICT Security Documentation	2-11
The Documentation Process	2-14
Classifying ICT Security Documents	2-16
Templates	2-17

Not included 2.2.3. The following subjects are covered elsewhere:

Subject	See
Documenting ICT security	'Chapter 3 – Identifying and Developing an
policies	ICT Security Policy' on page 2-18
Documenting risk	'Chapter 4 – Risk Management' on page 2-22
management	
Documenting system	'Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP' on page 2-35
security plans	
Documenting standard	'Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining
operating procedures	Security SOPs' on page 2-38

Requirements for ICT Security Documentation

Document requirements	 2.2.4. Agencies MUST have security risk assessments, policies and plans that cover ICT systems. These documents SHOULD be consistent with each agency's high-level security documents: a. Agency Security Policy, b. Agency Security Risk Assessment, and c. Agency Security Plan. Further information on these documents is contained in the <i>PSM</i> .
Information and Communi- cations Technology Security Policy	 2.2.5. Agencies MUST have an ICT Security Policy (ICTSP) document. The ICTSP may form part of the Agency Information Security Policy which, in turn, may form part of the overall Agency Security Policy. See: 'Chapter 3 – Identifying and Developing an ICT Security Policy' on page 2-18.
Risk Management Plan for ICT systems	 2.2.6. Agencies SHOULD ensure that every system is covered by a Risk Management Plan (RMP). Depending on the documentation framework chosen, multiple systems may be able to refer to or build upon a single RMP. See: 'Chapter 4 – Risk Management' on page 2-22.
System Security Plans	 2.2.7. Agencies SHOULD ensure that every system is covered by a System Security Plan (SSP). Depending on the documentation framework chosen, some details common to multiple systems may be consolidated in a higher level SSP. See: 'Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP' on page 2-35.
SOPs	 2.2.8. Agencies SHOULD ensure that SOPs are developed for every system. Depending on the documentation framework chosen, some procedures common to multiple systems may be consolidated into a higher level SOP. See: 'Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs' on page 2-38.
	Continued on next page

Requirements for ICT Security Documentation, Continued

Using higher level documents to avoid repetition	2.2.10. Where there is some commonality between systems, DSD RECOMMENDS that higher level documents describing the common aspects be created. System-specific documents may then refer to the higher level documents, rather than repeating the information.
	 Possible areas of commonality include: geographical location, classification, system functionality, common technical platform, and management boundaries.
Using a documentation framework	 2.2.11. DSD RECOMMENDS that an over-arching document describing the agency's documentation framework be created and maintained. This document should include a complete listing of all ICT security documents, show the document hierarchy, and define how agency documentation is mapped to the requirements described here. Where agencies lack an existing, well-defined documentation framework, DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies use the document names defined in this chapter.
	Continued on next page

Requirements for ICT Security Documentation, Continued

Documentation	2.2.12. Agencies SHOULD ensure that the agency's RMPs, ICTSPs, SSPs and
content:	SOPs are logically connected and consistent for each system.
summary	

An ICTSP contains high-level policy objective. An RMP identifies the risks and appropriate treatments. An SSP documents the means for implementing the treatments in accordance with the policies. SOPs document the means by which the ITSA, system manager, administrator and user will comply with the SSP.

The table below contains examples of statements that may be found in each of these document types.

	Purpose	Example
ICTSP	Provides high-level	Malicious code must not be introduced into
	policy objectives.	the agency.
RMP	Identifies controls needed to meet agency policy	 Implement gateways on all agency connections to the Internet. Install anti-virus software on all agency systems.
		• Disable removable media drives on workstations.
SSP	Actions for implementing RMP controls.	 Configure the firewall to deny all unknown connections. Scan email for viruses. Install floppy locks on all floppy drives.
SOP	Instructions for complying with SSP.	Procedure: how to update virus signature files.

The Documentation Process

Need for new documents	 2.2.13. New documents may be required for many reasons, including to: meet the documentation requirements for accrediting a new system, remove repetition from system-specific documents into a higher level document, address gaps in existing policy, develop new policy for new technologies or business requirements, and develop new SOPs in response to identified training requirements. See: 'Requirements for ICT Security Documentation' on page 2-11.
Develop the content	2.2.14. DSD RECOMMENDS that ICT security documentation be developed by people with a good understanding of both the subject matter and the agency's business.
	When documentation development is outsourced, agencies SHOULD:a. review the documents for suitability,b. retain control over the content, andc. ensure that all policy requirements are met.
	Depending on the agency's documentation framework, some new documentation requirements may be met by referencing or modifying existing documents.
Obtain formal signoff	2.2.15. All ICT security documents SHOULD be formally approved and signed off by an appropriate person.
	 DSD RECOMMENDS that: a. all high level ICT security documents be approved by the security executive, senior executive manager or agency head, and b. all system-specific documents be approved by the owner of the system, the senior executive manager, and/or the security executive.
	Note: The role of the security executive is defined in paragraph A4.9 of the <i>PSM</i> .

Documentation	2.2.16. Agencies SHOULD develop a schedule for reviewing all ICT security
maintenance	documents at regular intervals.

DSD **RECOMMENDS** that:

a. the interval between reviews be no greater than twelve months,

- b. reviews be performed in response to significant changes in the environment, business or system, and
- c. the date of the most recent review be recorded on each document.

Classifying ICT Security Documents

Purpose		Frequently contains information that could systems to which it relates, if someone with ation.
	Agencies MUST classify their ICT s Part C of the <i>PSM</i> .	ecurity documentation in accordance with
General guidance	2.2.18. DSD RECOMMENDS that documentation at the same level as the analysis of the applicable risks may appropriate.	
	at a level other than the classificationserver configuration information	t may be appropriate to classify documents n of the system to which they refer are: for a web server hosting an agency's public CURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE, and system may be classified as
Document classification	2.2.19. Agencies SHOULD apply th to ICT security documentation.	e following classifications, as a minimum,
	Exception: Agencies SHOULD classify security documentation that contains specific security configuration details at the level of the system to which it refers.	
	System classification	Documentation classification

System classification	Documentation classification
• public domain,	UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED	
• IN-CONFIDENCE,	SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE
PROTECTED	
RESTRICTED	• SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE or
	RESTRICTED
	RESTRICTED

Templates

References 2.2.21. The table below provides references for templates that may assist agencies with the development of their security documentation.

Note: A reference for a template for SOPs is not given, due to the diversity of SOP requirements.

Туре	Publication Title	Available from	Notes
ICT Security	AS/NZS	Standards Australia	Annex A contains the basis of an
Policy	7799.2:2003		Information Security Policy which
(ICTSP)	Information	URL:	is slightly broader than an
	Security	www.standards.org.au	Information and Communications
	Management -		Technology Security Policy.
	Part 2		
Risk	HB 231:2004	Standards Australia	Section 5 discusses documentation.
Management	Information		
Plan	Security Risk	URL:	Note: This document is based on
(RMP)	Management	www.standards.org.au	AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk
	Guidelines		Management, now replaced by
			AS/NZS 4360:2004, which is also
			available from Standards Australia.
System	NIST 800-18	National Institute of	This document is quite lengthy.
Security	Guide for	Standards and	However, an appendix contains a
Plan	Developing	Technology (US)	template that could be used in
(SSP)	Security Plans		isolation from the rest of the
	for Federal	URL:	document.
	Information	csrc.nist.gov/publicatio	
	Systems	ns/nistpubs/index.html	Note: This is a US document and
			it contains references to US
			agencies, legislation and policies.

Chapter 3 – Identifying and Developing an ICT Security Policy

Overview

Introduction	2.3.1. This chapter contains information about ICTSPs.		
	An ICTSP may also be known as an Information System Securit or Information Technology Security Policy (ITSP).	y Policy (ISSP)	
Template	2.3.2. See: 'Templates' on page 2-17.		
Contents	2.3.3. This chapter contains the following topics:		
	Торіс	See page	
	About ICTSPs	2-19	
	Developing an ICTSP	2-20	

About ICTSPs

2.3.4. An Information and Communications Technology Security Policy is a high-level document that describes how an agency protects its ICT resources. It allows management to provide direction and show commitment to ICT security.	
An ICTSP is normally developed to cover all agency ICT systems. It may exist as a single document or as a set of related documents.	
See: 'Requirements for ICT Security Documentation' on page 2-11.	
2.3.5. An ICTSP should describe the ICT security policies, standards and responsibilities of an agency, and set any specific minimum requirements, which will then feed into the development of RMPs.	
 2.3.6. The key Australian Government ICTSP documents to be considered when developing agency policy documents are the: <i>PSM</i>, and this manual. 	
2.3.7. Agencies SHOULD contact DSD if any apparent inconsistencies between the national ICTSP documents require clarification.	

Process 2.3.8. The table below describes the process an ITSA may follow when developing an ICTSP for an agency.

Further details are supplied in the following blocks.

Stage	Description
1	Gain management support for the development of an ICTSP.
2	Determine the overall scope, objectives and structure of the ICTSP.
3	Identify all existing applicable policies and standards and record them in the ICTSP.
4	Compare the identified objectives with the existing policies and standards to identify policy gaps.
5	Write policy statements to address each gap, and record them in the ICTSP.
6	Identify general and specific responsibilities for ICT security management.
7	Gain management approval and signoff.
8	Publish and communicate the ICTSP to agency staff.

Identifying
existing policies
and standards2.3.9. Existing applicable policies and standards may include, but are not
limited, to any or all of the following:
DSM

- *PSM*,
- this manual,
- AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006,
- AS/NZS ISO/IEC 27001:2006, and
- agency-specific policies.

Other applicable policies and standards may be available from:

- ASIO T4 Protective Security Group,
- Commonwealth Law Enforcement Board,
- Information Security Group, DSD,
- National Archives of Australia,
- Department of Finance (Australian Government Information Management Office),
- The Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, and
- Attorney-General's Department.

Developing an ICTSP, Continued

Policy questions	 2.3.10. Policy may be structured to answer the following questions. What are the policy objectives? How will the policy objectives be achieved? What are the guidelines, legal framework and so on under which the policy will operate? Who are the stakeholders? What resourcing will be supplied to support the implementation of the policy? What performance measures will be established to ensure the policy is being implemented effectively?
Organising policy statements	 2.3.11. Once the overall policy has been defined, it may be used to produce a more detailed policy framework. This framework may include: agency accreditation processes, responsibilities, configuration control, access control, networking and connections with other systems, physical security and media control, emergency procedures and incident management, change management, and education and training.
Writing policy statements	2.3.12. Write appropriate policy statements, leaving the selection of controls to be addressed by the RMP, and implementation details to be addressed in SSPs and SOPs.Example: Proposed changes to a system must go through a formal change control process prior to implementation.

Chapter 4 – Risk Management

Overview

Introduction	2.4.1. Risk management is a methodology for comprehensively and systematically managing risks in an organisation.
	This chapter contains information about developing and using an RMP to manage risk affecting ICT systems in compliance with the requirements of the ICTSP.
	Once an agency has a clear picture of its risk environment, it can then determine whether the minimum measures given in this manual are sufficient to address the identified risks, or whether additional measures will be required to provide an appropriate security environment.
ICT security risk management	2.4.2. ICT security risk management follows the same principles and procedures as general risk management but the threats and risks are specific to ICT security.
Consistency with standards	 2.4.3. The risk management process used in this manual presents a risk assessment and treatment strategy that is consistent with the risk management guidelines in the: <i>PSM</i>, Part B - Guidelines on Managing Security Risk, Australian Standard AS/NZS 4360:2004 '<i>Risk Management</i>', HB 436:2004 '<i>Risk Management Guidelines</i>', and HB 231:2004 '<i>Information Security Risk Management Guidelines</i>'.
Development and maintenance	2.4.4. The System Manager is responsible for the development and maintenance of the RMP for that system.
	Where higher level, multi-system or agency-wide RMPs are used, the ITSA is responsible for their development and maintenance.See: 'Using higher level documents to avoid repetition' on page 2-12.
Outsourcing	2.4.5. An agency whose ICT infrastructure is outsourced remains accountable for the security of the agency and its assets.
Template	2.4.6. See: 'Templates' on page 2-17.
	Continued on next page

Торіс	See page
The Process of Developing a Risk Management Plan	2-24
Stage 1: Establishing the Context	2-26
Stage 2: Identifying the Risks	2-28
Stage 3: Analysing the Risks	2-29
Stage 4: Assessing and Prioritising Risks	2-33
Stage 5: Developing a Risk Treatment Plan	2-34

The Process of Developing a Risk Management Plan

Important	2.4.8. This topic contains practical assistance for developing an RMP. DSD RECOMMENDS it be used in conjunction with chapter 4 of HB 231:2004 <i>'Information Security Risk Management Guidelines'</i> .		
Determining the scope	 2.4.9. The scope of the RMP should be defined to meet a specific set of objectives, which may be strategic or operational in nature. An RMP may be developed for many reasons, including to: manage risks to a system, manage risks to a site, manage risks to an organisation, determine the impact of a proposed change, or focus on an identified high risk area. See: 'Using higher level documents to avoid repetition' on page 2-12.		
Appropriate level of detail	2.4.10. The level of detail provided in an RMP should be appropriate to the scope to be covered. In some cases, it may be sensible to omit some steps. Additional steps in accordance with chapter 4 of HB 231:2004 ' <i>Information Security Risk Management Guidelines</i> ' may be required for larger or more detailed plans, or where increased security requirements exist.		
Process	2.4.11. T	The table below describes the process for developing an RMP.	
	Stage	Description	
	1	Establish the context of the RMP.	
	1	See: 'Stage 1: Establishing the Context' on page 2-26.	
	2	Identify the risks for each asset.	
		See: 'Stage 2: Identifying the Risks' on page 2-28.	
	3	Analyse the identified risks.	
		See: 'Stage 3: Analysing the Risks' on page 2-29.	
	4	Assess and prioritise the risks.	
		See: 'Stage 4: Assessing and Prioritising Risks' on page 2-33.	
	5	Determine appropriate controls for each risk.	
	-	See: 'Stage 5: Developing a Risk Treatment Plan' on page 2-34.	
	6	Collate the information gathered in stages 1 - 5 to produce the	
		RMP. See: (Producing an PMP' on page 2.25	
		See: 'Producing an RMP' on page 2-25.	

The Process of Developing a Risk Management Plan, Continued

Producing an RMP	2.4.12. Following a risk management process allows you to gather the information required to produce an RMP. This document comprises:
	• an executive summary, derived from Stage 1,
	• risk assessment documentation, derived from Stages 2, 3 and 4,
	• a Risk Treatment Plan (RTP), derived from Stage 5, and

• risk worksheets, included as an annex.

Stage 1: Establishing the Context

Executive2.4.13. The information documented as a result of completing this stage formssummarythe executive summary for an RMP.

Further detail 2.4.14. See 'Establish the Context' in chapter 4 of HB 231:2004 '*Information* Security Risk Management Guidelines' for further detail regarding establishing the context.

Procedure 2.4.15. DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies follow the steps in the table below to establish the context for an RMP.

Step	Context	Answer these questions	
1	Risk	• Who is going to conduct the process?	
	management	• What are the objectives of this risk management	
		process?	
		• What are the boundaries for this risk	
		management process?	
2	Strategic	• What are the strengths and weaknesses?	
		• What are the priorities?	
		• Who are the stakeholders?	
		• What are the major threats and opportunities?	
		• What are the external drivers?	
3	Organisational	• What are the objectives of the ICT system(s) concerned?	
		• What are the internal drivers?	
		• What is the key to the success of the ICT	
		system(s)?	
		• Are there shared risks with other agencies?	
		• What resources are available?	
		• How does the ICT system contribute to the	
		agency's wider goals and priorities?	
4	Evaluation	• Are there legal requirements?	
	criteria	• What are the financial, human resource, and/or	
		operational implications?	
		• What are the costs and benefits of actions?	
5	Structure	What level of risk is acceptable?	
3	Suuciure	 What are the assets involved? How are the assets to be used? 	
		 How are the assets to be used? What are the phases (time) or elements 	
		• What are the phases (time) or elements	
		(structure) of any activities?	

Next stage 2.4.16. The next stage in the process of conducting an RMP is to perform a risk assessment, starting by identifying the risks.

See: 'Stage 2: Identifying the Risks' on page 2-28.

Stage 2: Identifying the Risks

Prerequisite	2.4.17. Before commencing this stage, Stage 1 of the process of developing an RMP, 'Establishing the Context' needs to have been completed.			
	See: 'Stage 1: Establishing the Context' on page 2-26.			
Further detail	2.4.18. See 'Risk Identification' in chapter 4 of HB 231:2004 ' <i>Information Security Risk Management Guidelines</i> ' for further detail regarding identifying risks.			
Procedure	 2.4.19. For each asset identified in step 5 of Stage 1: Establishing the Context, identify all possible risks and record on a separate worksheet for each risk: what the risk is, how it can occur, and the consequences of the risk occurring. 			
Next stage	2.4.20. The next stage in the process of conducting a risk assessment is to analyse the risks.See: 'Stage 3: Analysing the Risks' on page 2-29.			

Stage 3: Analysing the Risks

Prerequisite	2.4.21. Before commencing this stage, Stage 2 of the process of developing an RMP, 'Identifying the Risks' needs to have been completed.See: 'Stage 2: Identifying the Risks' on page 2-28.				
Aim	 2.4.22. The aim of analysing the risks is to: separate the acceptable risks from the unacceptable risks, and provide data for the evaluation and treatment of risks. 				
Further detail	2.4.23. See 'Risk Analysis' in chapter 4 of HB 231:2004 'Information Security Risk Management Guidelines' for further detail regarding analysing risks.				
Procedure	2.4.24. Follow the steps in the table below for each risk worksheet created during Stage 2: Identifying the risks.				
	Note: Record these steps on the risk worksheet.				
	11010111	word these steps on the fisk worksheet.			
	Additional information for each step is detailed in the following pages.				
	Step Action				
	1	Determine the consequence of the risk.			
	2	Determine the likelihood of the risk and document the source of			
		information or logical justification used to determine the			
		likelihood.			
		Example: Results of audit analysis.			
	3	Determine the overall level of risk using a risk matrix.			
Next stage		The next stage of the process for developing an RMP is 'Assessing and ng Risks'.			
	See: 'Sta	ge 4: Assessing and Prioritising Risks' on page 2-33.			

Consequence determination

2.4.26. The table below describes the consequence ratings given as an example in the *PSM*. Agencies performing a risk assessment may use this table, or develop their own agency-specific table.

If the consequences include	Then an appropriate consequence rating is
• critical injuries or death,	catastrophic.
• critical financial loss,	
• key agency functions or service delivery significantly	
compromised for more than one day,	
• national or international adverse publicity causing serious	
embarrassment to Government or complete loss of	
stakeholder confidence, or	
• Government closes or significantly restructures the agency,	
• serious injuries requiring hospitalisation,	major.
• very high financial loss,	
• key agency functions or service delivery significantly	
compromised for up to one day,	
• wide-spread adverse publicity causing embarrassment to	
Government or serious loss of stakeholder confidence, or	
ministerial intervention,	
• injuries requiring hospital treatment but not admission,	moderate.
• high financial loss,	
• key agency functions or service delivery significantly	
compromised for up to one hour,	
• substantial adverse publicity or loss of stakeholder	
confidence, or	
top management intervention,	
• minor injuries treated at scene,	minor.
• medium financial loss,	
• key agency functions or service delivery compromised for up	
to 30 minutes,	
• some adverse publicity or loss of stakeholder confidence, or	
management review of current policies and procedures	
instigated,	
• no injuries,	insignificant.
• low financial loss,	
• key agency functions or service delivery not affected,	
• no adverse publicity or loss of stakeholder confidence, or	
 managed by existing policies and procedures, 	

Document Consequence Table	2.4.27. 7 the RMF	-	ce Table used in an RMP S	HOULD be documented in
Likelihood determination	2.4.28. The table below contains ratings that can be selected to show how likely it is that a risk will occur. Agencies performing a risk assessment may use this table, or develop their own agency-specific table.			
		If a	ı risk	Then an appropriate likelihood rating is
	is expect	ted to occur in	most circumstances,	almost certain.
	-		most circumstances,	likely.
	might oc	cur at some tir	ne and may be difficult to ternal influences,	possible.
	could oc	cur some time	,	unlikely.
			eptional circumstances,	rare.
Likelihood Table Risk matrix		A risk matrix u	1	elihood of a risk to determine ix below to determine the risk
Legend			-	risk levels used in the matrix.
	-	s performing a specific table.	risk assessment may use th	is table, or develop their own
	Level	Descriptor	Expla	nation
	Е	Extreme	Requires detailed research	e
			planning at an executive le	
	Н	High	Requires senior manageme	
	Μ	Moderate	Can be managed by specif procedures.	ic monitoring or response
	L	Low	Can be managed through a	routine procedures.

Stage 3: Analysing the Risks, Continued

Matrix 2.4.32. The matrix below, in conjunction with the legend, may be used to determine the risk level. Agencies performing a risk assessment may use this matrix, or develop their own agency-specific matrix.

Consequences					
Cata-	Cata- Major Moderate Minor Insignifi-				
strophic				cant	
E	Е	E	Н	Н	
E	Е	Н	Н	М	
E	Е	Н	М	L	
Е	Н	М	L	L	
Н	Н	М	L	L	
	strophic E E E	Cata- strophicMajorEEEEEEEEEH	Cata- strophicMajor ModerateEEEEEEEEHHEHM	Cata- strophicMajorModerateMinorEEEHEEHHEEHMEEHMEHML	

Documentation 2.4.33. The risk matrix and its associated legend **SHOULD** be documented in the RMP.

Stage 4: Assessing and Prioritising Risks

Prerequisite	2.4.34. Before commencing this stage, Stage 3 of the process of developing an RMP, 'Analysing the Risks', needs to have been completed.		
	See: 'Stage 3: Analysing the Risks' on page 2-29.		
Aim	 2.4.35. The aim of assessing and prioritising risks is to determine risk management priorities by comparing the level of risk against: predetermined standards, target risk levels, and/or other criteria. 		
Further detail	2.4.36. See 'Risk Evaluation' in chapter 4 of HB 231:2004 ' <i>Information Security Risk Management Guidelines</i> ' for further detail regarding assessing and prioritising risks.		
Acceptable risks	2.4.37. The risks deemed acceptable will invariably differ amongst agencies and will generally be based on their corporate objectives.		
Procedure	2.4.38. The table below describes the steps taken to assess and prioritise identified risks and create a risk register.		
	Step Action		
	Image: step Action 1 Document in a risk register the predetermined standards, target risk levels and/or other criteria that determine what is an acceptable or unacceptable risk.		
	2 Assess each worksheet against the criteria recorded in step 1 to determine whether the risk is acceptable or unacceptable. If the risk is acceptable , record the risk in the risk register as acceptable.		
	3 Use the criteria recorded in step 1 to prioritise the unacceptable risks and record them in the risk register.		
Next stage	2.4.39. The next stage in the process of developing an RMP is to determine the appropriate controls.See: 'Stage 5: Developing a Risk Treatment Plan' on page 2-34.		

Stage 5: Developing a Risk Treatment Plan

Prerequisite	2.4.40. Before commencing this stage, Stage 4 of the process of developing an RMP, 'Assessing and Prioritising Risks', needs to have been completed.See: 'Stage 4: Assessing and Prioritising Risks' on page 2-33.				
Definition: Risk Treatment Plan	2.4.41. A Risk Treatment Plan (RTP) documents how risk treatment controls should be implemented.A risk treatment control is a measure that is taken to minimise risks, by reducing the likelihood and/or the concentration of the risk processing.				
Aim	 the likelihood and/or the consequence of the risk occurring. 2.4.42. The aim of developing an RTP is to identify controls and implementation strategies that will reduce the residual risk for risks identified in the risk register as being unacceptable. 				
Further detail	2.4.43. See 'Risk Treatment' in chapter 4 of HB 231:2004 'Information Security Risk Management Guidelines' for further detail regarding determining appropriate controls and their implementation.				
Procedure	2.4.44. The table below describes the steps taken to determine appropriate controls and develop an RTP.				
	Step Action				
	1 Write the unacceptable identified risks from the risk register in				
	 priority order in a control register. 2 Record one or more appropriate controls for each risk on the risk worksheet. 				
	3	Perform a cost/benefit analysis and write 'accept' or 'reject' against each control in the risk worksheet.			
	4 Calculate the residual risk rating taking into consideration the effect of the accepted control(s).				
	5	See: 'Stage 3: Analysing the Risks' on page 2-29.Assess the residual risk rating according to the criteria recorded on the risk register and update the risk register.See: 'Stage 4: Assessing and Prioritising Risks' on page 2-33.			
	6	Record the accepted controls in the control register. Develop the RTP by defining responsibilities, timetable and monitoring methods for the implementation of each accepted control.			

Overview		
Introduction	2.5.1. This chapter contains information about developi	ng SSPs.
Template	2.5.2. See: 'Templates' on page 2-17.	
Contents	2.5.3. This chapter contains the following topics.	
	Торіс	See page
	About SSPs	2-36
	Developing an SSP	2-37

About SSPs

 2.5.4. A System Security Plan (SSP) is a document that: is a means for implementing the ICTSP and the outcomes of the RMP, and details the high-level security architecture and specific policies that are to be enforced: within the system, and for each interconnection.
2.5.5. The purpose of an SSP is to indicate how all the relevant security requirements identified in the ICTSP and RMP will be met in a given information systems context.The SSP MUST provide the Accreditation Authority with sufficient information to assess the security of the system.
See: 'ICTSP contents' on page 2-19.
2.5.6. The System Manager is responsible for the development and maintenance of the SSP for that system.
Where higher level, multi-system SSPs are used, the ITSA is responsible for their development and maintenance. See: 'Using higher level documents to avoid repetition' on page 2-12.
 2.5.7. There may be many stakeholders involved in defining the SSP, including representatives from the: project, who must deliver the secure capability (including contractors),
 owners of the information to be handled by the system, users for whom the capability is being developed, management audit authority, information management planning areas, Accreditation Authority, and infrastructure management (building and/or communications infrastructure).

Developing an SSP

Procedure:2.5.8. The System Manager follows the steps in the table below to develop an
SSP.SSPSSP.

Note: The contents of the SSP should be appropriate for the size and importance of the system. It may be appropriate to add or omit information.

Step	Action
1	Review the RMP, ICTSP, and any higher level SSPs that may be relevant.
2	Develop the strategies required to implement the identified policies and controls. Note: Consult with stakeholders if necessary.
3	Record the strategies in the appropriate section of the SSP.
4	Obtain all necessary certifications and insert them in the appropriate section of the SSP.

Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs

Overview

Introduction	2.6.1. This chapter contains information about developing and related SOPs.	using security-
Excluded material	2.6.2. This chapter contains information specifically about Sec ICT system related SOPs are not covered in this chapter.	curity SOPs. Other
	Example: The SOP for using Word Processing software is ou this chapter.	tside the scope of
Contents	2.6.3. This chapter contains the following topics.	
	Торіс	See page
	Developing Security SOPs	2-39
	SOP Contents	2-41

Developing Security SOPs

Definition: SOPs	2.6.4. Security Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are instructions to all system users, administrators and managers on the procedures required to ensure the secure operation of a system.
SOP roles	 2.6.5. Security SOPs SHOULD be developed for each of the following roles: a. ITSA, b. System Manager, c. System Administrator, and d. System Users. The ITSA, System Manager and System Administrator roles may have some overlap.
	The ITSA and System Manager SHOULD be familiar with all SOPs.
Relationship between SSP and SOPs	2.6.6. The primary function of SOPs is to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the SSP.
	Agencies SHOULD ensure that SOPs are consistent with all relevant SSPs.
	See: 'Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP' on page 2-35.
Maintenance	2.6.7. The System Manager SHOULD ensure that SOPs are maintained and updated. This may be done as:
	 a. a response to changes to the system, and See: 'Managing Change' on page 2-60. b. part of a regular review of documentation. See: 'Chapter 9 – Reviewing ICT Security' on page 2-74.

Procedure 2.6.8. The table below describes the procedure a System Manager follows to develop SOPs for a system.

Where higher level, multi-system SOPs are used, the ITSA is responsible for their development and maintenance.

See: 'Using higher level documents to avoid repetition' on page 2-12.

Action	
Locate the SSP.	
Working with one strategy in the SSP at a time, allocate the	
responsibility for adhering to that rule to:	
• the ITSA,	
• the System Manager,	
• the System Administrator, and/or	
• System Users.	
Write each rule or procedure in full in the appropriate section of	
the SOP.	

SOP Contents

Introduction 2.6.9. The information in this topic may be used as a checklist for the contents for the SOPs written for each role.

Depending on the size and structure of the agency, there may be some overlap or shifting of procedures between roles defined here.

ITSA SOPs 2.6.10. The table below describes the minimum procedures that **SHOULD** be documented in the ITSA's SOPs.

Торіс	Procedures SHOULD be included for	
User education	instructing new users to comply with ICT security	
	requirements.	
Audit logs	reviewing system audit trails and manual logs,	
	particularly for privileged users.	
System integrity	• reviewing user accounts, system parameters and	
audit	access controls to ensure that the system is secure,	
	• checking the integrity of system software,	
	• testing access controls, and	
	• inspecting equipment and cabling.	
Data transfers	• managing the review of removable media	
	containing data that is to be transferred off-site,	
	and	
	• managing the review of incoming media for viruses	
	or unapproved software.	
Asset musters	labelling, registering and mustering assets, including	
	removable media.	
Security incidents	reporting and managing security incidents, including	
	involvement in physical security incident management	
	where the incident could impact on ICT security.	

System2.6.11. The System Manager is responsible for the technical and operational
effectiveness of the system.

The table below describes the **minimum** set of procedures that **SHOULD** be documented in the System Manager's SOPs.

Торіс	Procedures that SHOULD be included	
System maintenance	Managing the ongoing security and functionality of	
	system software and hardware, including:	
	a. maintaining awareness of current software	
	vulnerabilities,	
	b. testing and applying software patches/updates,	
	c. applying appropriate hardening techniques, and	
	d. updating anti-virus software.	
Hardware	Managing the destruction of unserviceable	
destruction	equipment and media.	
User account	Authorising new system users.	
management		
Configuration	Approving and releasing changes to the system	
control	software or configuration.	
Access control	Authorising access rights to applications and data.	
System backup and	Recovering from system failures.	
recovery		

System2.6.12. The System Administrator is responsible for the day-to-day operation of
the system.SOPs2.6.12. The System Administrator is responsible for the day-to-day operation of
the system.

The table below describes the **minimum** set of procedures that **SHOULD** be documented in the System Administrator's SOPs.

Торіс	Procedures that SHOULD be included	
System closedown	Securing the system out-of-hours.	
Access control	Implementing access rights to applications and data.	
User account	• Adding and removing users.	
management	• Setting user privileges.	
	• Cleaning up directories and files when a user	
	departs or changes roles.	
System backup and	• Backing up data, including audit logs.	
recovery	• Securing backup tapes.	
	Recovering from system failures.	

SOP Contents, Continued

tem Users	2.6.13. System Users S to abide by the System	SHOULD sign a statement that they have read and agreed users' SOP.
System Users SOPs	2.6.14. The table below documented in the Sys	w describes the minimum information that SHOULD stem Users' SOPs.
	Торіс	Information that SHOULD be included
	Roles and responsibilities	Who is responsible for what aspects of security.
	Warning	A warning that:
		a. users' actions may be audited, and
		b. users will be held accountable for their actions.
	Passwords	Guidelines on choosing and protecting passwords.
	Need-to-know	Guidelines on enforcing need-to-know on the
		system.
	Security incidents	What to do in the case of a suspected or actual security incident.
	Classification	The highest level of classified material that can be processed on the system.
	Temporary absence	How to secure the workstation when temporarily absent.
	End of day	How to secure the workstation at the end of the day.
	Media control	Procedures for controlling and sanitising media, including requirements for the ITSA or delegate to vet all incoming and outgoing media.
	Hardcopy	Procedures for labelling, handling and disposing of hardcopy.
	Visitors	Preventing overview of data by visitors.
	Maintenance	What to do for hardware and software maintenance.

User guidance 2.6.15. Agencies **MUST** provide guidance to users on their responsibilities relating to ICT security, and the consequences of non-compliance.

DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agency guidance to users include the following:

- a. only access data, control information, and software to which they have authorised access and a need-to-know,
- b. immediately report all security incidents and potential threats and vulnerabilities involving information systems to the ITSA,
- c. protect their authenticators and report any compromise or suspected compromise of an authenticator to the appropriate ITSA,
- d. ensure that system media and system output is properly classified, marked, controlled, stored, and sanitised,
- e. protect terminals from unauthorised access,
- f. inform the user support section when access to a particular information system is no longer required, and

Example: User completes a project, transfers, retires, or resigns.

g. observe rules and regulations governing the secure operation and authorised use of information systems.

Improper use of general	2.6.16. Agencies SHOULD advise users not to attempt to:	
access rights	a. introduce malicious code into any information system,	
	b. physically damage the system,	
	c. bypass, strain, or test security mechanisms,	
	Exception: If security mechanisms must be bypassed for any reason, users	
	MUST first receive approval from the ITSA.	
	d. introduce or use unauthorised software, firmware, or hardware on an	
	information system,	
	e. assume the roles and privileges of others.	

- f. attempt to gain access to information for which they have no authorisation, or
- g. relocate information system equipment without proper authorisation.

Chapter 7 – Certifying and Accrediting ICT Systems

Overview		
Introduction	2.7.1. This chapter contains information about certifyin, security of ICT systems. Certification and accreditation and data owners with an assurance that the information in accordance with the SSP and other relevant document	provides management system has been secured
	Certification is a prerequisite for accreditation.	
Clarification of policies and standards	2.7.2. From the start of the certifying and accrediting pr have ongoing discussions with the Certification and Acc for clarification of, and guidance concerning, the releva This liaison should also continue throughout the life of	creditation Authorities nt policies and standards.
Contents	2.7.3. This chapter contains the following sections:	
	Торіс	See page
	About Certification	2-46
	Gateway Certification	2-50
	Comsec Certification	2-53
	About Accreditations	2-54
Not included	 2.7.4. This chapter does not include the standards on what accreditation processes are based. See: 'Part 3 – ICT Security Standards' on page 3-1. 	hich the certification and

About Certifications

Definition: Certification Authority	2.7.5. A Certification Authority is an entity with the authority to assert that ICT systems comply with the required standards.
Definition: certification	 2.7.6. Certification is the assertion by a Certification Authority that compliance with a standard has been achieved, based on a comprehensive evaluation. It may involve: a formal and detailed documentation review, a physical review, and/or testing.
Definition: provisional certification	2.7.7. Provisional certification may be granted by a Certification Authority when the system is lacking compliance in some non-critical aspect(s) of the design, policy or management.
	It is issued to indicate that full certification can be expected, subject to successful completion of the provisions identified in the certification report.
Withdrawal of provisional certification	2.7.8. The certifier SHOULD include the timeframe for the completion of the provisions in the certification report. Failure to meet the provisions within the specified timeframe SHOULD result in the provisional certification being withdrawn.
Reviewing certification reports	2.7.9. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies review certification reports, including the chosen release date, when determining the risks associated with connecting to other certified systems. Particular attention to the details of the certification report may be required if the system has only provisional certification.
	Example : An agency choosing a service provider to supply gateway services may decide to give preference to a gateway certified against a more recent release.
	Continued on next page

Certification to Australian Government standards	2.7.10. For the purposes of ICT system certifications to Australian Government standards, agencies MUST ensure that all certifications are performed against the latest release of this manual.
	If the certifier identifies aspects of a system that do not comply with the current release, but do comply with policy released within the last 24 months, certification may still be granted if the overall integrity of the system is not significantly compromised by the lack of compliance with the current release.
	Certifiers MUST identify in the certification report all instances of non- compliance with the current release.

What is
certified?2.7.11. The table below describes what may be certified and the Certification
Authorities for areas related to ICT security.

Note: The degree of assurance provided by a certification may vary depending on who performs the certification; self-certification of gateways and ICT Systems by an agency ITSA is not the same as independent third-party certification by DSD or an I-RAP assessor. Policy for some interagency systems (e.g. Fedlink) may mandate independent certification.

See: 'Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP)' on page 2-78 for information on the program.

Certification of	Is undertaken by
the physical security	• the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
of sites,	(DFAT) for systems located at overseas posts,
	• ASIO T4 for TOP SECRET systems, and
	• the ASA for all other systems.
	See:
	• 'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2
	for physical security standards, and
	• 'Guidance on the physical protection of
	security classified information and other
	official resources' in Part E of the PSM.
Gateways,	• DSD,
	• an I-RAP Assessor, or
	• the ITSA.
	See: 'Gateway Certification' on page 2-50 for
	more detail.
products approved for	DSD.
Government use listed	See: 'Evaluated Products List' on page 3-20 for
on the Evaluated	more detail.
Products List (EPL),	
ICT systems,	the ITSA.
	Note: The ITSA's certification may be based on
	reviews performed by DSD or an I-RAP Assessor.
Comsec,	• the Comsec Custodian, or
	• the ITSA.

Certification 2.7.12. The table below describes the five stages of the certification process. **process**

Stage	Review the	To verify
1	ICTSP,	that policies have been developed or identified by the agency to protect their information assets.
2	RMP,	 that the RMP is in accordance with the security requirements, and the comprehensiveness and appropriateness of the identified controls. See: 'Chapter 4 – Risk Management' on page 2-22.
3	design documentation,	 that the documents have been developed and meet the standards required. Design documents required for certification may include the: Logical/Infrastructure Diagram, Concept of Operations, List of Mandatory Requirements, Risk Based Requirements, and List of Critical Configurations.
4	SSP and SOPs,	 that they meet the required standards and include: security administrative tasks, proactive security checking tasks, proactive security auditing tasks, and a contingency plan. See: 'Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP', on page 2-35, and 'Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs' on page 2-38.
5	current system configuration,	 the configuration checking of critical components, and that the tools in use meet the requirements and are functional.

Purpose of gateway certifications	2.7.13. Gateways, which provide secured connections between networks, perform an important role in the protection of agency systems.
	The combination of high availability requirements and high threat environment frequently leads to a need for a high level of assurance that the gateway is securely managed.
	 Gateway certification is a process that provides Australian Government agencies with some assurance that their gateway, or their service provider's gateway, has: been configured and managed to Australian Government standards, and appropriate controls implemented and operating effectively.
	This assurance will provide clients using the gateway services with a level of trust in the service provided.
Types of gateway certification	2.7.14. Gateways, as with all ICT systems, may be certified by the agency ITSA. However, the security status of an agency-certified gateway may not be accepted outside the scope of that agency.
	Gateways may also receive an independent third-party certification from DSD or I-RAP stating that the gateway environment meets Australian Government policies, standards and guidelines. This form of certification offers a level of independent assurance.
	Connections to certain interagency systems (e.g. Fedlink) may require independent certification from DSD or an I-RAP assessor as a prerequisite to system specific accreditation. Such requirements need to be obtained from the interagency system managers prior to determining the type of certification a gateway will undergo.
	See: 'Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP)' on page 2-78 for information on the program.
Gateway Certification Guide	2.7.15. DSD publishes a separate document, the " <i>Gateway Certification Guide</i> ", which defines the standards required to meet Australian Government and industry best practice for gateways. All gateway certifications undertaken by DSD and I-RAP assessors are performed against the <i>Gateway Certification Guide</i> .
	DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies certify their gateways against the standards contained in the <i>Gateway Certification Guide</i> .
	URL: www.dsd.gov.au/library/infosec/gateway.html
	Continued on next page

Gateway Certification, Continued

Gateway certification standards	2.7.16. All gateways SHOULD undergo certification.Agencies connecting to other agencies SHOULD ensure that the gateway has received DSD or I-RAP certification prior to establishing the connection.			
Independent gateway certifications	 2.7.17. DSD RECOMMENDS that independent DSD or I-RAP assessors perform the gateway certifications for agencies developing gateways that: a. will connect to public networks, or b. will not connect to public networks, but where the level of risk warrants a certified gateway. 			
	Agencies SHOULD ensure that any companies contracted by them to provide gateway services have received a gateway certification from DSD or an I-RAP assessor.			
	Note: Commercial organisations wishing to provide gateway services should contact DSD to discuss the proposal and to confirm certification arrangements.			
What is looked for in a review?	 2.7.19. As part of the review, the reviewer will specifically look for: inconsistencies, indications that minimum standards have been met, mapping of the results of the RMP to the design and operation of the gateway, and realistic and achievable plans and procedures. 			
Provisional gateway certification	 2.7.20. Provisional gateway certification can be awarded to: agencies or companies whose gateway is lacking compliance in some non-critical aspect(s) of the design, policy or management, or companies whose gateway is assessed as meeting the relevant requirements, but who have yet to connect any Government customers. 			
	Provisional gateway certification does not preclude the gateway from operating, but does mandate that the provisions identified in the certification report be corrected within a specified timeframe.			

Recertification

2.7.21. Recertification **SHOULD** be undertaken on all certified gateways at least every 12 months or at initiation of a major change. A major change can include:

- change of ownership,
- significant redesign of gateway architecture,
- significant change in access policy,
- significant upgrade of hardware or software,
- installation of additional services,
- change of service providers, and
- addition of clients.

As part of the recertification process, the gateway certifier **SHOULD** review the effectiveness of change management procedures.

Note: Policy for some interagency systems (e.g. Fedlink) may mandate regular recertification.

Comsec Certification

Definition: Comsec certification	 2.7.22. Comsec certification: is a process undertaken in support of the accreditation process, and specifically targets the Comsec environment, including: the overall cabling installation, emanations security, and keying material management issues. 			
Granting Comsec certification	2.7.23. Comsec certification SHOULD only be granted if/when all requirements, including those given under provisional Comsec certification, have been finalised and certified by the relevant authority.			
Site/Floor cabling diagram	 2.7.24. A site/floor cabling diagram or equivalent specifications SHOULD be provided for Comsec certification. The diagram SHOULD: a. be updated on a regular basis as cabling/conduit configuration changes are made and approved, and b. contain a "Current as at(date)" on each page to indicate the status of the document. 			

Definition: accreditation 2.7.26. Accreditation is the formal acknowledgement of the Accreditation Authority's decision to approve the operation of a particular ICT system:

- processing information classified up to a particular level,
- in a particular security environment, and
- using a particular set of controls.

Accreditation of a specific computer system is defined in terms of:

- a particular configuration,
- operation in a defined site,
- a particular range or type of data, and
- operation in a specific mode.

Accreditation2.7.27. The Accreditation Authority is the official with the authority to formally
assume responsibility for operating a system at an acceptable level of risk.

For	The Accreditation Authority is
Australian Government agencies,	the head of the agency or their
	authorised delegate.
organisations supporting	the head of the supported agency or
Australian Government agencies,	their authorised delegate.
multinational and multi-agency	determined by the formal agreement
systems,	between the parties.

Requirement 2.7.28. Agencies **MUST** accredit all agency systems.

accreditation Agencies **SHOULD** ensure that systems are accredited before they are used operationally.

Documenting 2.7.30. DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies document all system accreditations.

Accreditation2.7.31. Agencies MUST NOT allow an ICT system to process, store or transmitforinformation classified above the classification for which the system is
accredited.

Exception: If the information is transmitted via intermediate systems in a suitably encrypted form then the intermediate systems do not need to be accredited for the classification. **See:** 'Requirements for transit encryption' on page 3-93.

Continued on next page

for

Accreditation for caveats	2.7.32. Agencies MUST process, store or transmit information marked with a caveat only on systems that have been accredited for the relevant caveat.				
	Exception: If the information is transmitted via intermediate systems in a suitably encrypted form then the intermediate systems do not need to be accredited for the caveat.				
	 Examples: Suitably encrypted AUSTEO information may be transmitted between two AUSTEO systems via a public network. SECRET AUSTEO must not be processed on a TOP SECRET system that has not been accredited to process AUSTEO. 				

Accreditation for national and nonnational classifications 2.7.33. Agencies intending to process, store or transmit both nationally and nonnationally classified information **SHOULD** ensure that the accreditation documentation states the highest classification for which the system is accredited in each of the two streams.

Example: An agency with a system accredited for PROTECTED information may also choose to receive and store RESTRICTED information on it. In this case, the system would need to be accredited for "PROTECTED and RESTRICTED".

The table below shows the hierarchy of classifications, based on the general standard of security controls required for each.

Note: The requirements for CONFIDENTIAL and above include some measures that are not required for HIGHLY PROTECTED systems. A system designed to meet HIGHLY PROTECTED standards will not usually be suitable for accreditation to CONFIDENTIAL.

A system built to meet	Will also meet the standards for systems
the standards for	with information classified as
TOP SECRET	All other classifications
SECRET	• CONFIDENTIAL,
	HIGHLY PROTECTED,
	• PROTECTED, and
	• RESTRICTED,
	• IN-CONFIDENCE.
CONFIDENTIAL	• PROTECTED,
	• RESTRICTED, and
	• IN-CONFIDENCE.
HIGHLY PROTECTED	• PROTECTED,
	• RESTRICTED, and
	• IN-CONFIDENCE.
PROTECTED	• RESTRICTED, and
	IN-CONFIDENCE.
RESTRICTED	IN-CONFIDENCE.
IN-CONFIDENCE	No other classifications.

Accreditation is not transferable

able accreditation is not transferable, although the process may be simplified in cases where similar or identical systems are the subject of multiple accreditation requests.

About Accreditations, Continued

Prerequisites	 2.7.36. Accreditation Authorities SHOULD undertake the following activities prior to accreditation: a. review the RMP, b. review any deviations from mandatory requirements specified in this manual and the <i>PSM</i>, and c. confirm that all relevant certifications have been provided. See: 'What is certified?' on page 2-48.
Provisional accreditation	 2.7.37. Provisional accreditation may be granted as an interim measure if one or more requirements for full accreditation have not been met. The Accreditation Authority SHOULD ensure that: a. the provisional accreditation has an expiry date, b. a clear and realistic process to achieve all accreditation requirements has been developed and agreed to, and c. the risk of operating without all required security measures in place is acceptable.
Post- accreditation activities	 2.7.38. The ITSA, in liaison with the System Manager/Administrator and users, promotes and maintains security in the operational environment. The key activities to be undertaken include: ongoing security awareness and training, change management, configuration control and asset management, audit trail monitoring and management, ongoing testing for vulnerabilities, user account management, security management of media, and incident handling. The Accreditation Authority SHOULD conduct reviews of the security of the accredited systems. This may be: as a result of some specific incident, due to a change to the system that significantly impacts on the agreed and implemented security architecture and policy, or as part of a scheduled review of the system. See: 'Chapter 8 – Maintaining ICT Security and Managing Security ' on page 2-58.

Chapter 8 – Maintaining ICT Security and Managing Security Incidents

Overview

Introduction	 2.8.1. Maintaining ICT security is an ongoing task. It involves putting into place mechanisms to protect information and system resources. The ICT areas requiring security maintenance include: confidentiality - ensuring that information is not accessed by unauthorised persons, integrity - ensuring that information is not altered by unauthorised persons in a way that is not detectable by authorised users, availability - ensuring that information is accessible when required by authorised users, authentication - ensuring that users are the persons they claim to be, and access control - ensuring that users access only those resources and services that they are entitled to access and that qualified users are not denied access to services that they legitimately expect to receive.
Why maintain ICT security?	 2.8.2. Information and Communications Technology is continually changing. Methods used to breach ICT security are also continually changing. Once ICT security measures are in place, it is important to maintain them to continue protecting the data being processed. This involves: keeping track of changing technology and security requirements in order to implement changes required to ICT security, performing regular integrity checks, auditing security and implementing any changes required, and identifying breaches of security, responding to them and documenting lessons learnt for future reference.
Compliance with security documents	2.8.3. Effective security management also involves a regular review of compliance with the ICTSP, RMP and SSP.
Staff who maintain security	2.8.4. Agencies SHOULD:a. clearly define the roles and responsibilities for maintaining ICT security, andb. provide the resources required to successfully complete such tasks.
	Continued on next page

Contents 2.8.5. This chapter contains the following sections.

Торіс	See page
Managing Change	2-60
Change Management Process	2-61
Business Continuity	2-62
Detecting Security Incidents	2-63
Managing Security Incidents	2-66
External Reporting of Security Incidents	2-70
Incident Response Plan	2-72

Managing Change

Identifying the need for change	 2.8.6. The need for change may be identified in various ways, including: users identifying problems or enhancements, vendors notifying of upgrades to software or hardware, advances in technology in general, implementing new systems that require changes to existing systems, and identifying new tasks requiring updates or new systems.
Change management standards	 2.8.7. Agencies SHOULD ensure that: a. the change management process as defined in the relevant ICT security documentation is followed, b. the proposed change is approved by the relevant authority, c. any proposed change that may impact the security of the ICT system is submitted to the Accreditation Authority for approval, and d. all associated system documentation is updated to reflect the change. These standards apply equally to urgent changes. The change management process SHOULD define appropriate actions to be followed before and after

urgent changes are implemented.

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Change Management Process

Types of system changes	 an uj an uj the a majo 	pgrade to sy pgrade to sy ddition of a or changes to	hange to a system environment could involve: ystem hardware, ystem or application software, un extra terminal, or o system access controls. one-off or something that occurs periodically.
Change process		The table be nent proces	low describes DSD's RECOMMENDED change s.
	Stage	Who	Description
	1	System	Produce a written change request.
	2	User,	Submit the change request for approval.
	3	System	Document the changes to be implemented.

Stage	Who	Description
1	System	Produce a written change request.
2	User,	Submit the change request for approval.
3	System	Document the changes to be implemented.
	Manager	Note: Up-to-date documentation must be maintained
	or ITSA	and detail the correct configuration of the hardware
		and its operation, and identify the significance of the
		security-related features.
4		Implement and test the approved changes.
5	System	Update the relevant security documentation, including
	Manager,	the:
	ITSA	• RMP,
		• SSP, and
		• SOPs.
6		Notify and educate users of the changes that have been
		implemented as close as possible to the time the
		change is applied.
7		Continually educate users in regards to ICT changes.
		Example: Regular security bulletins via electronic
		mail.

Business Continuity

Definition: business continuity	2.8.11. Business continuity ensures the ongoing availability of identified processes and resources in support of critical business objectives.			
Scope	2.8.12. Business continuity covers a wide range of concepts including business resilience and long term performance, as well as the more traditional areas of risk management, contingency planning, incident and emergency response, and disaster recovery, much of which is outside the scope of pure ICT security policy.			
	The remainder of this section focuses on standards relating to the availability of systems; the following sections address detecting, managing and responding to security incidents.			
Availability requirements	2.8.13. Part C of the <i>PSM</i> requires agencies to determine availability requirements for their systems. Once these have been determined, agencies MUST implement appropriate measures to support these requirements for all ICT systems.			
	 Such measures may include: information backups, remote storage, remote processing, redundant ICT systems, and redundant environmental systems. Example: Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). 			
Backup strategy	 2.8.14. Agencies SHOULD: a. backup all information identified as critical to their business, b. store backups of critical information, with associated documented recovery procedures, at a remote location secured in accordance with the standards for the classification of the information, and c. test backup and restoration processes regularly to confirm their effectiveness. 			
Additional references	 2.8.15. Additional information relating to availability and business continuity is also contained in the: <i>PSM</i>, Part C - Information Security, AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006, 14 Business Continuity Management, and HB 221:2004 - <i>Business Continuity Management</i> 			

Detecting Security Incidents

Definition: security incident	2.8.16. A security incident, in ICT terms, is an event that impacts on the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a system through an act of unauthorised access, disclosure, modification, misuse, damage, loss or destruction.			
Standards	 2.8.17. Agencies MUST develop, implement and maintain tools and procedures, derived from a risk assessment, covering the detection of potential security incidents, incorporating: a. countermeasures against malicious code, See: 'Standards for malicious code counter-measures' on page 3-58. b. intrusion detection strategies, See: 'Intrusion Detection Systems' on page 3-68. c. audit analysis, See: 'Event Logging' on page 3-70. d. system integrity checking, and See: 'System integrity' on page 3-46. e. vulnerability assessments. See: 'Vulnerability Analysis' on page 3-75. 			
User awareness	In general, resources spent on prevention will be more effective than those spent on detection. Agencies SHOULD use the results of the risk assessment to determine the appropriate balance of resources allocated to prevention versus detection. 2.8.18. Many potential security incidents may be noticed by staff rather than software tools, if agency staff are well-trained and aware of security issues. See: 'User Training and Awareness' on page 3-15.			
	Continued on next page			

Tools used 2.8.19. The table below describes some software security tools that can be used to detect activity that may indicate a security incident.

DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies do not build honeypots or honeynets unless the agency is involved in the research or development of intrusion detection products and has resolved any relevant legal issues.

Tools	Description			
Network and	Monitor and analyse network and host activity, usually			
host intrusion	relying on a list of known attack signatures to recognise			
detection	potential security incidents.			
systems	See: 'Intrusion Detection Systems' on page 3-68.			
Intrusion	Some intrusion detection systems are combined with			
prevention	functionality to repel detected attacks. Caution and			
systems	assessment of the potential impact need to be exercised if			
	this capability is to be used.			
	See: 'Host-based intrusion prevention systems' on page			
	3-59.			
System	Used to detect changes to critical system components, such			
integrity	as files, directories or services. These changes may alert			
verification	administrator to:			
	• unauthorised changes that may signify an attack on the system, and			
	• inadvertent system changes that render the system open			
	to attack.			
	See: 'System integrity' on page 3-46, and the subsequent			
	blocks on 'Characterisation'.			
Log analysis	Involves collecting and analysing event logs using pattern			
	recognition to detect anomalous activities.			
	See:			
	• 'Event Logging' on page 3-70, and			
	• 'Auditing' on page 3-74.			

Effectiveness of 2.8.20. Automated tools are only as good as the level of analysis that they perform. If tools are not configured to assess the areas of high risk in a system configuration, then it will not be evident when a weakness emerges.

If the software is not regularly updated to include knowledge of new vulnerabilities, the effectiveness of the tools will be reduced.

Implementa-
tion of tools2.8.21. It is difficult for a security administrator to keep pace with all current and
potential threats to information systems. Appropriately configured and managed
software security tools will present a security administrator with more options to
mitigate identified risks.

Incident management documentation	 2.8.22. Agencies MUST detail security incident, including physical security incident, responsibilities and procedures for each agency system in the relevant SSP and in SOPs. See: 'Chapter 5 – Developing an SSP' on page 2-35. 'Chapter 6 – Developing and Maintaining Security SOPs' on page 2-38. Agencies MUST develop an Incident Response Plan and supporting procedures, and ensure users are aware of these. See: 'Incident Response Plan' on page 2-72.
Internal reporting	2.8.23. Agencies MUST direct staff to report security incidents to the ITSA (and the ASA if physical security is involved) as soon as possible after the incident is discovered, in accordance with agency procedures.
Standards	 2.8.24. Agencies SHOULD: a. encourage staff to note and report any observed or suspected security weaknesses in, or threats to, systems or services, b. establish and follow procedures for reporting software malfunctions, c. put mechanisms in place to enable the types, volumes and costs of incidents and malfunctions to be quantified and monitored, and d. deal with the violation of organisational security policies and procedures by employees through a formal disciplinary process.
DSD assistance	 2.8.25. Agencies may choose to request assistance from DSD for the: analysis of the incident, identification of remedial measures to remove the exploited vulnerability, minimisation of the likelihood of compromise, and overall assessment of the organisation's system security safeguards. DSD RECOMMENDS that any requests for DSD assistance are made as soon as possible after the incident is detected, and that no actions which may affect the integrity of the evidence are carried out prior to DSD involvement. DSD's response will be commensurate with the urgency of the incident; a 24-hour, 7-day service is available if necessary. Contact details for reporting incidents to DSD are: Email incidents@dsd.gov.au Phone 02 6266 0009 (24x7)

Managing Security Incidents, Continued

Recording incidents	2.8.26. Agencies SHOULD ensure that all security incidents are recorded in a register. The purpose of the register is to highlight the nature and frequency of the incidents and breaches so that corrective action may be taken.By recording all ICT security incidents and breaches, the register may then be used as a reference for future risk assessments.		
	 The recorded information SHOULD include, at a minimum: a. the date the incident was discovered, b. the date the incident occurred, c. a description of the incident, including the people and locations involved, d. the action taken, e. to whom the incident was reported, and f. the file reference. 		
Handling data spillages [U, IC, R, P]	2.8.27. Data spillage occurs when, by faulty labelling, incorrect transfer, system failure, or similar process, data actually or potentially becomes accessible to persons not cleared or briefed for access to it.In all cases of spillage, agencies SHOULD assume that the information has or will be compromised.		
	Standard procedures for all personnel with access to the system SHOULD include the requirement to notify the ITSA of:a. any data spillage, andb. access to any data classified above that for which they are authorised.		
	Agencies MUST treat any such spillage as an incident, and follow the Incident Response Plan to deal with it. See: 'Incident Response Plan' on page 2-72.		

Handling malicious code infection 2.8.29. DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies follow the steps described in the table below when malicious code is detected.

Note: Once information on the functionality and impact of the malicious code infection is determined, these steps may be adapted to address the particular issues resulting from the incident.

Step	Action
1	Isolate the infected computer or network.
2	Decide whether to request assistance from DSD. If such assistance is requested and agreed to, delay any further action until advised by DSD to continue. See: 'DSD assistance' on page 3-66.
	Note: This is to ensure that evidence relating to the incident is not accidentally damaged or destroyed.
3	Scan all previously connected systems, and any media used within a set period leading up to the incident, for malicious code. Notes:
	 Consider the infected date of the machine, and the possibility that the record may be inaccurate, when determining the appropriate period. Chematerisation techniques may be used to assist in
	 Characterisation techniques may be used to assist in determining the scope of the infection. See: 'Definition: characterisation' on page 3-46.
4	Isolate all infected systems and/or media to prevent reinfection.
5	Change all passwords and key material stored or potentially accessed from compromised systems.
6	Advise users of any relevant aspects of the compromise, including a recommendation to update all passwords on compromised systems.
7	Use current anti-virus software to remove the infection from the systems and/or media. If this fails:
	 seek advice from the vendor, or perform a complete operating system rainstellation
7	• perform a complete operating system reinstallation. Report the incident and perform any other activities required by the
	 incident response plan. See: 'Reporting of incidents' on page 2-70 for information on reporting requirements and additional assistance available from DSD.
	 'Incident Response Plan' on page 2-72.

Managing Security Incidents, Continued

Allowing continued attacks	2.8.30. Agencies may decide to allow an attacker to continue some actions under controlled conditions for the purpose of seeking further information or evidence. Agencies considering this approach SHOULD seek legal advice.		
Integrity of evidence	2.8.31. Although in most cases an investigation does not directly lead to a police prosecution, it is important that the integrity of evidence such as manual logs, automatic audit trails and intrusion detection tool outputs be protected.		
	 Agencies SHOULD: a. transfer a copy of raw audit trails onto media such as CD-ROM or DVD-ROM for secure archiving, as well as securing manual log records for retention, and b. ensure that all personnel involved in the investigation maintain a record of actions undertaken to support the investigation. 		
	Further information relating to the management of ICT evidence is contained in <i>HB 171:2003 Guidelines for the Management of IT Evidence</i> .		

External Reporting of Security Incidents

Purpose	2.8.32. Reporting security incidents provides a means to assess the overall damage and take remedial action across the Australian Government. Incident reports are the basis for identifying trends in incident occurrences and for developing new policy, procedures, techniques and training measures to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents.
ISIDRAS	2.8.33. The Information Security Incident Detection, Reporting and Analysis Scheme (ISIDRAS) has been established by DSD to collect information on security incidents that affect the security or functionality of Australian Government ICT systems.
	Formal reporting of incidents SHOULD be undertaken using ISIDRAS. Further details, including reporting requirements, are located on the ISIDRAS website. URL: www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/assistance_services/incident.html
Definition: significant	2.8.34. ISIDRAS defines four categories of incidents, of increasing severity. Categories 3 and 4, as defined on the ISIDRAS website, are considered to be "significant".
Reporting of incidents to DSD	2.8.35. Agencies, via their ASA or ITSA, MUST report significant ICT security incidents to DSD without delay. Other incidents may be reported at agency discretion.
	See: 'DSD assistance' on page 3-66 for incident contact details.
Incidents and outsourcing	2.8.36. The requirement to lodge an incident report still applies where an agency has outsourced some or all of its ICT functionality.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that the service provider, in consultation with the agency, lodge the ISIDRAS report on behalf of the agency.
Cryptographic keying material	2.8.37. Reporting any incident involving the loss or misuse of cryptographic keying material is particularly important.
	Agencies MUST notify all system users of any suspected loss or compromise of keying material.
	Continued on next page

External Reporting of Security Incidents, Continued

Additional
references2.8.39. Additional information relating to external reporting requirements is
contained in the *PSM*, Part G - Guidelines on Security Incidents and
Investigations.

Incident Response Plan

Developing the plan	 2.8.40. Each agency MUST develop an Incident Response Plan which, as a minimum, defines: a. broad guidelines on what constitutes an incident, b. the minimum level of training for users and system administrators, See: 'Training' on page 2-73. c. the authority responsible for initiating investigations of an incident, d. the steps necessary to ensure the integrity of information supporting a compromise, e. the steps necessary to ensure that critical systems remain operational, and f. how to formally report incidents.
Developing the plan – additional	2.8.41. The Incident Response Plan SHOULD contain:a. clear definitions of the types of incidents that are likely to be encountered,
standards	 b. the expected response to each incident type, c. the authority within the agency who is responsible for initiating: 1) a formal (a dministration) increation (in the agency in the agency is a formal (a dministration) in the agency in the agency is a formal (a dministration) in the agency i
	 a formal (administrative) investigation, a police investigation of an incident, and
	a) an ASIO investigation of national security incidents, in accordance with Part G of the <i>PSM</i>,
	d. the criteria by which the responsible authority would initiate formal, police or ASIO investigations of an incident,
	e. references to other related agency documents,
	Examples: Business Continuity Plan, Fraud Control Plan.
	f. which other agencies or authorities should be informed in the event of an
	investigation being undertaken, and the details of the system contingency measures, or a reference to these details
	g. the details of the system contingency measures, or a reference to these details if they are located in a separate document.
Definition of incidents	2.8.42. DSD RECOMMENDS that the definition of what constitutes an incident:
	a. be based on the risk management objectives of the organisation, and
	b. include examples of how the incidents may be detected.
Developing the	2.8.43. Agencies SHOULD develop and maintain procedures supporting the
procedures	plan to:
	a. detect potential security breaches, b. establish the cause of any security incident, whether accidental or deliberate
	b. establish the cause of any security incident, whether accidental or deliberate,c. detail the action to be taken to recover and minimise the exposure to a
	system compromise,
	d. report the incident, and
	e. document any recommendations on preventing a recurrence.
	Continued on next page

Training	2.8.44. The minimum level of training to be provided to users and system administrators SHOULD include:a. how to detect possible system compromises, andb. to whom a suspected event should be reported.
	System administrators SHOULD be specifically instructed by ITSAs not to reconfigure or access any systems until: c. management have authorised such changes, and d. all events are recorded.

Chapter 9 – Reviewing ICT Security

Overview

Introduction 2.9.1. A security review:

- identifies any changes to the business requirements for the subject of the review,
- identifies any changes to the risks faced by the subject of the review,
- assesses the effectiveness of the existing countermeasures, and
- reports on any changes necessary to maintain the required level of security.

Note: A security review may be scoped to cover anything from a single system to an entire agency.

Contents

2.9.2. This chapter contains the following sections:

Торіс	See page
About ICT Security Reviews	2-75
Process for Reviewing ICT Security	2-76
Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP)	2-78

About ICT Security Reviews

When to conduct a review	 as a result of a due to a change the agreed and as part of a result of a re	f ICT security may be required: some specific incident, ge to a system or its environment that significantly impacts on d implemented security architecture and policy, or gular or scheduled review. LD undertake and document reviews of the security of their
How frequently to review	least annually. In	OMMENDS that agencies review all aspects of ICT security at addition, some aspects may need to be reviewed more able below covers some specific components in more detail.
	Component	Review
	Security	the following documents and update as necessary:
	documentation	 ICTSP,
	documentation	• RMP,
		• SSP, and
		• SOP.
	Operating	when:
	environment	• an identified threat emerges or changes,
		• an agency gains or loses a function, or
		 the operation of functions is moved to a new physical
		environment.
	Procedures	after an incident or test exercise.
	System	items that may have an effect on the security of the system
	security	on a regular basis.
	Waivers	prior to the identified expiry date.
		See: 'Waivers against "MUSTs" and "MUST NOTs" on page 2-7.

Who can perform a review?		ty reviews may be performed by internal staff, or by I parties such as I-RAP assessors or DSD.
	See: 'Infosec-Reg information on th	gistered Assessor Program (I-RAP)' on page 2-78 for he program.
Audits after reviews	agreed security m	OMMENDS that agencies undertake audits to ensure that neasures identified during security reviews have been are working effectively.

Process for Reviewing ICT Security

Basis of a review	2.9.7. Security reviews SHOULD be based on information that is:a. comprehensive,b. current, andc. reliable.
Elements of a review	2.9.8. In security risk management, the structure under review can be broken down into a set of elements.
	 Examples: A whole-of-agency review might best be approached by a review of each program. A review of one particular program could be approached at the division or branch level. A review of a particular building or installation could be approached by reviewing different groups or types of users separately.
Gathering information for a review	 2.9.9. Depending on the scope and subject of the review, DSD RECOMMENDS gathering current information about areas such as: a. agency priorities, b. business requirements, c. threat data, d. likelihood and consequence estimates, e. effectiveness of existing countermeasures, f. other possible countermeasures, and g. best practice.
	 Information may be gathered from a range of sources, including: the police, DSD, ITSAs of other similar or related agencies publicly available ICT security information sources, and system administrators and users.
Rigour of a review	2.9.10. DSD RECOMMENDS that the rigour of a review be commensurate with the risk environment and the highest level of classified information that is involved.

Process 2.9.11. DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies follow the core ICT security process with reference to the existing documentation when performing an ICT security review.

See: 'The High-Level Process of ICT Security' on page 2-9.

Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP)

Introduction	2.9.12. The Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP) is a DSD initiative designed to register suitably qualified information security assessors to carry out specific types of ICT security assessments to Australian Government standards.
Registration process	 2.9.13. To be registered under I-RAP, an individual is required to: demonstrate relevant experience, attend the I-RAP course, and pass the I-RAP exam.
Policy and procedures	2.9.14. The 'Policy and Procedures for the Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP)' document contains further information on I-RAP, including a definition of the range of activities I-RAP assessors are licensed to perform. It is available via links from DSD's website to the program's current administrator.
	URL: www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/evaluation_services/irap.html

Part 3 **ICT Security Standards**

troduction	2.0.1 This part contains ICT cooperity standards, principles	and advice relating
nounction	3.0.1. This part contains ICT security standards, principles specific aspects of ICT systems, such as hardware, software	-
ontents	3.0.2. This part contains the following chapters:	
	Chapter	See page
	Chapter 1 – Physical Security	3-2
	Chapter 2 – Personnel	3-14
	Chapter 3 – ICT Product Lifecycle	3-19
	Chapter 4 – Hardware Security	3-26
	Chapter 5 – Software Security	3-42
	Chapter 6 – Logical Access Control	3-60
	Chapter 7 – Active Security	3-67
	Chapter 8 – Communications Security (Comsec)	3-76
	Chapter 9 – Cryptography	3-91
	Chapter 10 – Network Security	3-109
	Chapter 11 – Data Transfer	3-126

Chapter 1 – Physical Security

Overview

Introduction

3.1.1. The purpose of this chapter is to:

- define physical security standards for ICT systems, including communications equipment, servers and workstations, and
- assist agencies in developing an appropriate security environment for their ICT systems that meets the guidelines and established minimum standards of the *PSM*.

Contents

3.1.2. This chapter contains the following sections:

Section	See page
Physical Security Fundamentals	3-3
ASIO T4 Protective Security	3-4
Servers and Communication Equipment	3-5
Workstations and Network Infrastructure	3-8
Area Security	3-10
Removable Media	3-11
Tamper Evident Seals	3-12
Emergency Procedures	3-13

Not included 3.1.3. The following subjects are covered elsewhere:

Subject	See
Clearances and	'Clearances and Briefings' on page 3-18.
briefings	
Media security	'Chapter 4 – Hardware Security' on page 3-26.
Logical access controls	'Chapter 6 – Logical Access Control' on page 3-60.
Comsec standards	'Chapter 8 – Communications Security (Comsec)' on
	page 3-76.
Cabling	'Cabling' on page 3-78.
Telephones	'Telephones and Telephone Systems' on page 3-84.
Personal electronic	'Portable Computers and Personal Electronic
devices (PEDs)	Devices' on page 3-39.

Additional references

- 3.1.4. High-level information relating to area security is also contained in the:
- PSM, Part E Physical Security, and
- AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006, 9 Physical and environmental security.

Physical Security Fundamentals

The basics	servers and communication	he entire use separated fro ations equipn	r network, m general user areas conta	aining the
	The measures applied to th equipment are designed to authorisation and requirem unauthorised access.	limit access,	allowing only those with	the
Risk management	3.1.6. Agencies MUST ensincluded in their risk mana	•	1 1 1	urity threats are
Protecting public domain and UN- CLASSIFIED systems	3.1.7. Agencies SHOULD UNCLASSIFIED equipme	-	1 1	
Physical security for Australian sites overseas	3.1.8. These are the minimum standards for the protection of sites located within Australia. Additional requirements may exist for sites located overseas; DFAT is the authority for all such sites.See: 'Other organisations' on page 2-4.			
PSM storage requirements	3.1.9. Much of the policy in this chapter is derived from the table following paragraph E7.62 of the <i>PSM</i> , which sets out the minimum standard of security container or secure room required for the storage of classified information within Australia.			
	The table is reproduced be	low for conv	enience.	
	Classification	Secure	Partially Secure	Intruder Resistant
	PROTECTED	С	С	В
	RESTRICTEDIN-CONFIDENCE	Agency discretion	Lockable commercial grade cabinet	Lockable commercial grade cabinet

ASIO T4 Protective Security Introduction 3.1.10. ASIO T4 Protective Security (T4) provides the following services to the Government on a cost-recovery basis: protective security advice, protective security risk reviews, • security equipment testing, • technical surveillance countermeasures, and physical security certification of sites. **Contact details** 3.1.11. T4 can be contacted via: Phone: (02) 6234 1217 • Fax: (02) 6234 1218 • Email: t4ps@t4.gov.au • T4 Protective Security GPO Box 2176 Canberra ACT 2601 **Contacting T4** 3.1.12. DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies contact T4 for advice prior to the design and construction of a secure room/facility. Security 3.1.13. The Security Construction and Equipment Committee (SCEC) is a Construction standing interdepartmental committee responsible for the evaluation and and Equipment endorsement of security equipment for use by Australian Government Committee departments and agencies. The SCEC is chaired by ASIO and reports directly to the Protective Security Policy Committee (PSPC). Security 3.1.14. The SCEC produces the Security Equipment Catalogue (SEC), which Equipment lists equipment that has been tested and endorsed as meeting relevant SCEC Catalogue standards. Copies of the catalogue can be obtained from T4.

Definition: server	3.1.15. A server is a computer used to run programs that provide services to multiple users.
	 Examples: file server, mail server, and database server.
Definition: communication equipment	3.1.16. Communication equipment includes any device designed to facilitate the transmission of information destined for multiple users. It does not include the cabling itself.
	 Examples: cryptographic devices, firewalls, routers, switches, and hubs.
	See: 'Workstations and Network Infrastructure' on page 3-8 for physical security requirements for cabling.
Separating servers and communication equipment from users	 3.1.17. Servers and any associated communications equipment MUST be separated from general user areas by a clearly defined perimeter. This separation can be achieved by the use of either: appropriate containers, or a purpose-built server room.
	Unescorted access to the space MUST be limited to authorised staff cleared to the highest classification of information stored within the container or server room.
Separation using a container	3.1.18. Where the perimeter is achieved by means of a container, the equipment MUST be secured in accordance with the <i>PSM</i> requirements for the storage of classified information. See: 'PSM storage requirements' on page 3-3.
	The required class of container is determined by the classification of the system and the physical security standard of the area in which the container is located.
	Continued on part page

Continued on next page

Servers and Communication Equipment

Servers and Communication Equipment, Continued

Separation
using a server
room3.1.19. Where the perimeter is achieved by means of a server room, the server
room MUST meet the minimum standard of physical security defined in the
table below. These standards are available from ASIO T4.
See: 'Contacting T4' on page 3-4.

All servers and communications equipment within the server room **MUST** be stored in locked commercial grade or better containers.

Note: The terms "SR1" and "SR2" are no longer in use; they have been replaced in this policy with the more common terms "Secure Area" and "Intruder Resistant Area" respectively. This is a change in terminology only.

If the information is classified	And the outer perimeter is a(n)	Then minimum standard for the server room is
PROTECTED	Intruder Resistant Area	Secure Area
	Secure Area	Intruder Resistant Area
RESTRICTEDIN-CONFIDENCE	Intruder Resistant or Secure Area	Intruder Resistant Area
UNCLASSIFIED	Intruder Resistant or Secure Area	See: 'Protecting public domain and UN- CLASSIFIED systems' on page 3-3.

Definition: No- 3.1.20. A No-Lone-Zone (NLZ) area is an area in which people are not permitted to be left alone. The aim of this is to enforce "two person integrity", where all actions are witnessed by at least one other person.

No-Lone-Zone 3.1.21. DSD **RECOMMENDS** that areas containing particularly sensitive materials and/or equipment be designated and operated as an NLZ area.

Areas designated as an NLZ area **MUST**:

- a. be suitably sign-posted, and
- b. have all entry and exit points appropriately secured.

Servers and Communication Equipment, Continued

Administrative measures	3.1.22. A Site Security Plan and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) MUST be developed for each server room.
	 Subjects to be covered include, but are not limited to: a summary of the protective security threat and risk assessment, roles and responsibilities of Facility or ICT Security Officer, and individual staff, the administration, operation and maintenance of the Electronic Access Control System (EACS) and/or Security Alarm System (SAS), key management, the enrolment and culling of users and issuing of pin codes, staff clearances, security awareness training, and regular briefings, inspection of the generated audit trails and logs, end of day checks and lockup, and reporting of security incidents and breaches. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies contact T4 for advice on the content of these documents.

Workstations and Network Infrastructure

Definition: workstation	3.1.23. A stand-alone or networked single-user computer.
	Workstations can be configured to avoid having official information stored on them during non-business hours. This may be achieved in various ways, including thin client or diskless architectures, or the use of removable hard disks.
Definition: network infrastructure	3.1.24. The infrastructure used to carry information between workstations and servers or other communications equipment.
	Examples:
	• cabling,
	• junction boxes,
	• patch panels,
	• fibre distribution panels, and
	• structured wiring enclosures.
Protecting network infrastructure	3.1.25. Agencies SHOULD locate all patch panels, fibre distribution panels, and all structured wiring enclosures within locked spaces that prevent casual access by general users.
	The ITSA SHOULD control the keys or equivalent access mechanism.

Workstations and Network Infrastructure, Continued

Area type – workstations storing information	3.1.27. Agencies MUST ensure that workstations storing official information during non-business hours are wholly contained within areas of the appropriate standard as shown in the table below.					
	Classification	Minimum area t	vne			
	PROTECTED	Intruder Resistant	<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>			
	RESTRICTED					
	IN-CONFIDENCE					
	UNCLASSIFIED					
Area type – cabling and other workstations	3.1.28. Agencies MUST ensure that cabling and workstations configured to avoid having official information stored on them during non-business hours are wholly contained within areas of the appropriate standard as shown in the table below.					
	Classification	Minimum area type				
	PROTECTED	Intruder Resistant				
	RESTRICTED					
	IN-CONFIDENCE					
	UNCLASSIFIED	Intruder Resistant				
			1			
Removable hard disks	 3.1.32. If removable hard disks are used they MUST be: a. removed for after-hours storage, and b. stored in a container appropriate for the classification of the material on the hard disk. See: 'PSM storage requirements' on page 3-3. 					
Laptops	 3.1.33. Physical security requirements for laptops are covered in Chapter 4 – Hardware Security. See: 'Portable Computers and Personal Electronic Devices' on page 3-39. 					
Protecting against theft of equipment	3.1.34. Agencies SHOULD in internal components, against the		tect equipment, including			

Area Security

Area security requirements	3.1.35. Part E of the <i>PSM</i> contains the requirements for the different types of area security.				
Preventing observation by unauthorised	3.1.41. Agencies SHOULD prevent unauthorised people from observing ICT equipment, and in particular displays and keyboards.				
people	DSD and T4 RECOMMEND that agencies:				
	a. position screens and keyboards so that they cannot be seen by unauthorised people, and/or				
	b. fix blinds or drapes to the inside of windows.				
	Further information is available in the 'Curtains and Overlooking' section of the <i>SEC</i> .				
	See: 'Security Equipment Catalogue' on page 3-4.				

Removable Media

Definition: removable media	3.1.43. Removable media is storage media that can be easily removed from an ICT system and is designed for removal.					
	 Examples: portable hard disks, DVDs, CDs, floppy disks, tapes, smartcards, flashcards, and thumb drives. 					
Storage authority	3.1.44. Removable media containing classified information MUST be stored in accordance with the <i>PSM</i> requirements for information of that classification. The required class of container is determined by the classification of the information on the media and the physical security standard of the area in which the container is located. See: 'PSM storage requirements' on page 3-3.					
	The effective classification level of the media may be reduced by the use of appropriate encryption. See: 'Requirements for storage encryption' on page 3-93.					
Mass storage devices	3.1.46. Devices holding removable media, such as CD and DVD towers, backup devices and RAID arrays, MUST be secured in containers in accordance with the <i>PSM</i> requirements for information of that classification. See: 'PSM storage requirements' on page 3-3.					
	The required class of container is determined by the classification of the system and the physical security standard of the area in which the container is located.					

Tamper Evident Seals

When to use seals	3.1.47. The use of seals is rarely mandated; however, agencies may choose to use seals as an additional risk mitigation method, particularly if other standards defined in this manual cannot be met for a particular environment.					
	 Examples: Apply a wafer seal over USB ports or to hard disk cases to provide a tamper-evident barrier to discourage unauthorised access. Attach network connectors to computers using a roto-seal. 					
Approved seals	3.1.48. The SCEC endorses seals to be used for various sealing requirements. Further information on endorsed seals is available in the <i>SEC</i> . See: 'Security Equipment Catalogue' on page 3-4.					
Recording seal usage	 3.1.49. Agencies SHOULD record the usage of seals in a register that is appropriately secured. The register SHOULD contain information on the: a. issue and usage details of the seals and any associated tools, b. serial numbers of all seals purchased, c. the location or system each seal is used on. 					
Reviewing seal usage	3.1.51. Agencies SHOULD review the seals for differences with the register. DSD RECOMMENDS that the review be done at least annually.					
Purchasing seals	3.1.53. Where the option is available, agencies SHOULD consult with the seal manufacturer to ensure that any purchased seals and/or sealing tools display a unique identifier or image appropriate to the agency.					
	Agencies SHOULD NOT allow contractors to purchase seals and/or associated tools on behalf of the Australian Government.					

Emergency	3.1.54. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies develop a set of policies, plans and
situations	procedures for when staff are required to evacuate a site which covers the:
[U, IC, R, P]	a. securing of classified material and equipment, and
	b sanitisation including destruction as necessary of classified material and

b. sanitisation, including destruction as necessary, of classified material and equipment.

Important: Health and safety is the first priority at all times.

Chapter 2 – Personnel

Overview

Introduction 3.2.1. This chapter contains information on user education, personnel clearance and briefing requirements.

Contents

3.2.2. This chapter contains the following topics:

See page
3-15
3-17
3-18

Not included 3.2.3. The following subjects are covered elsewhere:

Subject	See
Roles and	'Chapter 1 – ICT Security Roles and
responsibilities	Responsibilities' on page 2-2.
Physical security	'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2.
Access control	'Chapter 6 – Logical Access Control' on page 3-60.

Additional references

3.2.4. Additional information relating to personnel training is contained in the: PSM, Part D - Personnel Security, and •

AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006, 8 Human resources security. •

User Training and Awareness

Why have user education programs?	 3.2.5. User training and awareness programs are designed to help users: become familiar with their roles and responsibilities, understand and support security requirements, and learn how to fulfil their security responsibilities. See: 'Chapter 1 – ICT Security Roles and Responsibilities' on page 2-2. Ensuring that users are security aware can be a relatively cheap and effective method of preventing or minimising the impact of security incidents. 			
Training responsibility	3.2.6. Agency management is responsible for ensuring that an appropriate information system security training program is provided to staff.			
Security education	 3.2.7. Agencies MUST: a. ensure that all personnel who have access to the agency's ICT systems have sufficient training, and b. provide ongoing ICT security training and awareness for the staff on topics such as responsibilities, potential security risks and countermeasures. 			
Degree and content of security training	 3.2.9. The exact degree and content of security training will depend on the security policy objectives of the organisation and SHOULD be aligned to user responsibilities. DSD RECOMMENDS that the security training includes, at a minimum, information on: a. the purpose of training or awareness program, b. agency security appointments and contacts, c. how to recognise an anomaly that may indicate a possible security incident, d. contacts in the event of a real or suspected security incident, e. the legitimate use of system accounts, f. configuration control, g. access and control of system media, h. the security of accounts, including sharing passwords, i. authorisation requirements for applications, databases and data, j. the destruction and sanitisation of media and hardcopy output, and k. the risks associated with accessing information from non-agency systems, particularly the Internet. 			

Promoting user
awareness3.2.10. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies promote user awareness of ICT
security. Some possible methods include:

- logon banners,
- system access forms, and
- departmental bulletins or memoranda.
- **Example:** The ITSA could distribute security bulletins via electronic mail to remind users of password responsibilities.

Training Resources

Training requirements and resources

3.2.11. The table below identifies potential topics and resources for training.

For	DSD RECOMMENDS that training cover	And possible training providers and resources are
senior management,	 appreciation of computer security issues, and security problems and solutions, 	 the Attorney-General's Department, and DSD-sponsored seminars for SES officers. Note: These can be tailored to meet specific requirements.
system administrators and security administrators,	 specialist training in implementing and monitoring systems, and security features of the systems, 	 formal in-house courses, third party vendor programs, self paced tuition manuals, and user groups.
ICT users,	 general and specific security requirements, potential risks and countermeasures, and system implementation, 	 formal in-house courses, customised training programs, and external training organisations.

3.2.12. Agencies SHOULD advise personnel attending courses along with nonagency personnel not to disclose any details that could be used to compromise agency security.

Disclosure of

information

while on

courses

Clearances and Briefings

Standards	3.2.13. Agencies MUST specify in the SSP the level of security clearance and any briefings required for each type of user given system access/accounts.						
	 Examples: privileged users, permanent staff, contractors, and visitors. 						
	Note: The policy for granting and maintaining security clearances is set out in Part D of the <i>PSM</i> .						
Responsibilities	3.2.14. Agencies MUST ensure users have the appropriate clearance and need-to-know as in Part D of the <i>PSM</i> before they are permitted to access a system.						
Clearances for privileged users	 3.2.15. DSD RECOMMENDS clearing privileged users to a level one classification above the classification of the system to which they have privileged access. Example: A system administrator on a PROTECTED system could be cleared to HIGHLY PROTECTED. 						
	If there are frequent transfers of data from a more highly classified system on to the system, then DSD RECOMMENDS that at least one system administrator on the lower system be cleared to the classification of the higher system. Example: If a CONFIDENTIAL system frequently has CONFIDENTIAL data transferred to it from a SECRET system then one of the system administrators on the CONFIDENTIAL system could be cleared to SECRET.						

Chapter 3 – ICT Product Lifecycle

Overview

Introduction	3.3.1. This chapter contains information on selection, acquisition, installation, use and disposal of ICT products.3.3.2. This chapter contains the following topics:				
Contents					
	Торіс	See page			
	Evaluated Products List	3-20			
	Product Selection	3-21			
	Acquiring Products	3-23			
	Installing and Using Products	3-24			
	Disposing of Products	3-25			

Evaluated Products List

Definition: Evaluated Products List	3.3.3. The Evaluated Products List (EPL) consists of products that have completed Common Criteria (CC), Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) or some other form of DSD approved evaluation, as well as products in evaluation in the AISEP.								
	The EPL is maintain URL: www.dsd.gov	-						on the I	nternet.
Definition: AISEP	3.3.4. The Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP) exists to ensure that a range of evaluated ICT products is available to meet the needs of Australian and New Zealand Government agencies.								
	 The AISEP performs the following functions: evaluation and certification of ICT products using the Common Criteria (CC) and Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), continued maintenance of the assurance of evaluated products, and recognition of products evaluated by a foreign scheme with which AISEP has an agreement. 				EC), SEP				
Evaluation level mapping	 URL: www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/evaluation_services/aisep_pages/aisep.html 3.3.5. The ITSEC and CC assurance levels are similar but not identical in their relationship. The table below shows the relationship between the two evaluation criteria. This manual refers only to CC assurance levels. The table maps ITSEC levels to CC levels. 					their luation			
	Common Criteria	N/A	EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
	ITSEC	E0	N/A	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6
Benefits of selecting an	3.3.6. Choosing prod				-				

selecting an EPL product

3.3.6. Choosing products listed on the EPL provides a level of assurance to agencies that the specified security functionality of the product will operate as claimed by the developer in the Security Target (ST) or similar document.

Product Selection

Product selection standard	3.3.7. Agencies SHOULD select products from the EPL whenever the product is required to enforce a security function related to the protection of official information and systems.
	Important: Policy stated elsewhere in this manual may override this product selection standard by specifying more rigorous requirements for particular functions.
Selection preference order	 3.3.8. The following order of preference applies to the selection of products: a. products from the EPL listed as having completed CC, ITSEC or other DSD approved evaluation, with a DSD cryptographic evaluation either completed or identified as not required, b. products from the EPL listed as having completed CC, ITSEC or other DSD approved evaluation, with a DSD cryptographic evaluation shown as "underway", Note: Where an evaluation assurance level (EAL) is mandated for an encryption product, products that have not completed a DSD cryptographic evaluation do not satisfy this requirement. c. products from the EPL listed as being either in evaluation in the AISEP, or as a certified product on the Common Criteria Portal website, d. products that are in evaluation by a foreign scheme with which the AISEP has a recognition agreement, and e. products that have had no formally recognised evaluation.
Documenting product choice	 3.3.9. When choosing a product, agencies MUST document: a. the desired degree of assurance in the product's key functions, b. the actual degree of assurance provided by the chosen product, based on the level of evaluation it has received for its key functions, c. justification for any decisions to drop to the next level in the defined selection order of preference, and d. acknowledgement and acceptance of any risk introduced by the use of a product of lower assurance than desired, particularly if using a product that has not, and may never, complete all relevant evaluation processes.

Additional guidance	 3.3.10. DSD RECOMMENDS that, prior to purchase: a. agencies intending to use products that are listed only on the Common Criteria Portal website discuss with DSD the option of sponsoring the product through the DSD compliance process, b. agencies intending to use unevaluated products contact the product vendor to discuss having the product formally evaluated, and incorporate the requirement for successful evaluation into any contracts made with the vendor, c. agencies intending to use a product that the vendor claims is in evaluation in a DSD-recognised foreign scheme contact DSD to confirm this claim, if such evidence is not readily available from the foreign scheme's website.
Ongoing maintenance	3.3.11. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies choose EPL products from developers that have made a commitment to the on-going maintenance of the assurance of the product.
	Note: These products will be indicated as such within the EPL.
Assessing the suitability of EPL products	 3.3.12. In assessing an EPL product for its suitability to meet the security objectives of the agency, the agency SHOULD review the product's Security Target (ST) and Certification Report (CR) or similar documents, and any caveats contained in the product's entry on the EPL, for the following: a. its applicability to the intended environment, b. that the version and configuration of the product matches that of the evaluated product, c. that the required functionality was evaluated and certified, d. that the level of assurance is adequate for its needs, and e. for any constraints or caveats DSD may have placed on the product's implementation and use.
	Note: Products that are in evaluation will not have a CR and may not have a published ST.
High Grade Equipment	3.3.13. Agencies intending to use High Grade Equipment (HGE) SHOULD contact DSD.

Acquiring Products

Purchasing and delivery	3.3.14. When acquiring products for use in a sensitive environment, it may be important to limit opportunities for the products to be accidentally or maliciously replaced or altered during the purchase and delivery process.	
Delivery of EPL products	3.3.15. Agencies SHOULD ensure that EPL products are delivered in a manner consistent with any delivery procedures defined in associated documentation.	
	Note: For ITSEC products, and products evaluated under the CC at EAL2 or higher, delivery information is available from the developer in the delivery procedures document.	
Delivery of non-EPL products	3.3.16. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies ensure that products purchased without the delivery assurances provided through the use of formally evaluated procedures are delivered in a manner that provides confidence that they receive the product they expect to receive.	
Leasing arrangements	 3.3.17. Agencies SHOULD ensure that leasing agreements for ICT equipment take into consideration the: a. difficulties that may be encountered when the equipment requires maintenance, b. sanitisation of the equipment prior to its return, and c. possible requirement for destruction of the equipment if sanitisation cannot be performed. 	

Installing and Using Products

Introduction	3.3.18. This section discusses the installation, configuration, administration and use of ICT products.
Installing and configuring EPL products	3.3.19. Agencies SHOULD ensure that products are installed and configured in a manner consistent with the evaluated configuration of the product.
L	Note: For products evaluated under the CC and ITSEC, this information is available from the developer in the installation, generation and start-up documentation. Further information is also available in the ST and CR.
Use of EPL products in unevaluated configurations	 3.3.20. An EPL product is outside of its evaluated configuration if: functionality is used that was not within the scope of the evaluation, functionality is used that was within the scope of evaluation but is not implemented in the specified manner, patches not covered by a formal assurance continuity process are applied to resolve vulnerabilities, and/or the environment does not comply with assumptions and/or Organisational Security Policies stated in the product's ST or similar document.
	Products that have a High Grade level of assurance MUST NOT be used in unevaluated configurations.
	 If an agency intends to use an EPL product in an unevaluated configuration the agency MUST undertake a risk assessment. To be effective, the risk assessment MUST, at a minimum, be based on the following considerations: a. the necessity of the functionality or patch, b. the testing of the functionality or patch, and c. the environment in which the product is to be used.
Operation of EPL products	3.3.21. Agencies SHOULD ensure that products are operated and administered in accordance with the user and administrator guidance. This guidance is generally available from the developer.
	Agencies MUST ensure that High Grade products are configured, operated and administered in accordance with all DSD standards applicable to the product. These standards are usually contained in a separate, product-specific ACSI.
	administered in accordance with all DSD standards applicable to the product.

Disposing of Products

Secure disposal	3.3.22. It is important to dispose of equipment and media in a manner that does not compromise Australian Government information or capabilities.See: 'Disposing of Hardware' on page 3-30.
High Grade Equipment	3.3.23. Agencies MUST contact DSD for advice on the disposal of HGE.
TEMPEST rated equipment	3.3.24. Agencies SHOULD:a. reuse the equipment within the agency, orb. offer the equipment to another Australian Government agency for reuse.
	Agencies MUST contact DSD for advice if: a. the above are unsuccessful, or b. the equipment is non-functional.

Chapter 4 – Hardware Security

Overview

Introduction	3.4.1. This chapter contains information on the handling, maintenance and disposal of hardware.		
Definition: hardware	3.4.2. Hardware is a generic te equipment, including periphera	rm for the physical components of al equipment.	computer
Definition: media	3.4.3. Media is a generic term for the components of hardware that are used to store information. The information storage may be short or long term.		
		formation when power is removed, on when power is removed.	or non-volatile,
Contents	3.4.4. This chapter contains the following sections:		
	Se	ection	See page
	Classifying, Labelling and Re	gistering	3-27
	Repairing and Maintaining Ha	ardware	3-29
	Disposing of Hardware		3-30
	Media Sanitisation		3-32
	Media Destruction		3-36
	Portable Computers and Perso	onal Electronic Devices	3-39
Not included	3.4.5. The following subjects a		
	Subject	See	
	Physical security	'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' of	on page 3-2.
	Cabling	'Cabling' on page 3-78.	
Additional references	 3.4.6. Additional information 1 <i>PSM</i>, Part C - Information AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2 		ntained in the:

Classifying, Labelling and Registering Hardware

Definition: media reclassification	 3.4.7. Reclassification is an administrative decision to change the classification of the media, based on an assessment of relevant issues including: the consequences of damage from unauthorised disclosure or misuse, the effectiveness of any sanitisation procedure used, and the intended destination of the media.
Definition: media declassification	 3.4.8. Declassification is an administrative decision to remove all classifications from the media, based on an assessment of relevant issues including: the consequences of damage from disclosure or misuse, the effectiveness of any sanitisation procedure used, and the intended destination of the media.
Classifying hardware	3.4.9. Hardware containing media MUST be classified at or above the classification of the media.
Classifying non-volatile media	3.4.10. Non-volatile media MUST be classified to the highest classification stored on the media since any previous reclassification.
Classifying volatile media with continuous power supply	3.4.12. Volatile media that has a continuous power supply MUST be classified to the highest classification stored on the media while the power is on.
Classifying volatile media	3.4.13. In general, volatile media may be treated as UNCLASSIFIED once the power is removed from the media.
	Continued on next page

Classifying, Labelling and Registering Hardware, Continued

Labelling hardware and media	3.4.15. Agencies MUST ensure that the classification of all media is readily visually identifiable. Agencies SHOULD achieve this by labelling media with a protective marking that states the maximum classification and set of caveats applicable to the information stored on the media.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that, where possible, media be labelled so that the classification is visible when the media is mounted in the unit in which it is used and when it has been removed.
	Exception: Labels are not required for internally mounted media if the hardware containing the media is labelled.
Labelling of High Grade Equipment and	3.4.16. In order to maintain their tamper-evident design, HGE MUST NOT have any non-essential labels applied to external surfaces.
High Grade Cryptographic	HGCE MUST NOT have any labels applied to external surfaces without DSD authorisation.
Equipment	Important: This overrules any other labelling requirements stated elsewhere within this manual.
Registering media	3.4.18. All removable media SHOULD be registered with a unique identifier in an appropriate register.

Repairing and Maintaining Hardware

On-site repairs	3.4.21. Repairs and maintenance for hardware containing classified media SHOULD be carried out on-site by appropriately cleared and briefed personnel.	
On-site repairs using an uncleared technician	 3.4.22. If hardware is to be repaired or maintained by a technician without an appropriate security clearance, the technician MUST be escorted by someone who is: a. appropriately cleared and briefed, and b. sufficiently familiar with the hardware to understand the repair work being performed. 	
	Agencies SHOULD ensure that the ratio of supervising escorts to technicians allows for an appropriate oversight of all activities.	
Off-site repairs [U]	3.4.23. Agencies may have hardware from UNCLASSIFIED systems repaired off-site at the agency's discretion provided due care is taken to protect official information.	
Off-site repairs [IC, R, P]	 3.4.24. Agencies having hardware from IN-CONFIDENCE, RESTRICTED, or PROTECTED systems repaired off-site MUST: a. use a repair company approved for that purpose by the agency, or b. use any other company if: the media within the hardware is sanitised and declassified, or the hardware is escorted at all times by an appropriately cleared and briefed escort who is sufficiently familiar with the hardware to understand the repair work being performed, and due care is taken to ensure that official information is not compromised. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies conceal the origin and nature of the system. 	

Disposing of Hardware

Standards 3.4.26. Agencies MUST NOT dispose of hardware containing classified information; the hardware must first be sanitised or destroyed using an approved method. Agencies SHOULD NOT dispose of hardware containing information marked as UNCLASSIFIED until it has been authorised for public release. Approved methods for sanitising and destroying media are contained in this chapter. See: • 'Media Sanitisation' on page 3-32. 'Media Destruction' on page 3-36. • Occupational 3.4.27. All sanitisation and destruction activities must be undertaken in Health and accordance with any applicable OH&S requirements. Safety (OH&S) Faulty media 3.4.28. Where the media cannot effectively be accessed due to faults in the and hardware hardware or the media itself, agencies MUST: a. repair the equipment before sanitisation, b. maintain the media at its highest classification, or c. destroy the media. See: 'Media Destruction' on page 3-36.

Disposal
process3.4.30. Agencies MUST have a documented process for the disposal of
hardware.

The process **RECOMMENDED** by DSD is described in the table below.

Step	Action
1	Does the hardware contain any media?
	• If yes, then go to step 2.
	• If no, then go to step 7.
2	Determine whether the media should be either sanitised or
	destroyed, and the most appropriate method of doing so.
	Factors to be considered include:
	• Does an approved sanitisation procedure exist for the specific media involved?
	• What are the relative costs of sanitising versus destroying (and replacing where necessary) the media?
	• What is the classification and sensitivity of the data?
	• What level of control, if any, will the agency have over the
	hardware after disposal?
	• What is the acceptable level of risk associated with the
	recovery of data from the media?
3	Seek approval for the chosen sanitisation or destruction process
	from the ITSA.
	Note: For frequently used processes, this approval may be in the form of an authorised SOP.
4	Apply the agreed sanitisation or destruction process to the media.
5	Determine if the media has been satisfactorily sanitised or
	destroyed.
	• If yes, go to step 6.
	• If no, return to step 2.
6	Seek approval for declassification from the information owner.
	Note: For frequently used processes, this approval may be in the
	form of an authorised SOP.
7	Remove or obliterate all labels indicating the higher classification,
	caveats and owner.
8	Update any relevant documentation and registers.
9	Dispose of the hardware.

Media Sanitisation

Definition: media sanitisation	3.4.31. Media sanitisation is the process of erasing or overwriting data stored on media.
	The process of sanitisation does not automatically change the classification of the media, nor does sanitisation involve the destruction of the media. See:
	• 'Definition: media reclassification' on page 3-27.
	• 'Definition: media declassification' on page 3-27.
	• 'Definition: media destruction' on page 3-36.
Requirements for sanitising media	3.4.32. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies sanitise all media prior to reuse in a new environment.
	Agencies MUST use an approved method, as described within this Media
	Sanitisation section, whenever the media is moving from:
	a. a higher classification to a lower classification, or
	Note: This includes moving from UNCLASSIFIED to public domain.a CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET environment to a non-national security environment.
	Where the new classification of the media will be equal to or higher than the previous classification, DSD RECOMMENDS that the media undergo at least a basic form of sanitisation.
	Examples: Basic forms of sanitisation include formatting magnetic media and clearing Erasable Programmable ROM.
Media that cannot be sanitised	 3.4.33. The following media types cannot be sanitised and MUST be destroyed prior to disposal if they contain or may have contained classified information: a. microfiche, b. microfilm,
	c. optical disks, including CDs and DVDs and all variations,
	Note: Includes those that are classed as "rewritable".
	d. printer ribbons and the impact surface facing the platen,
	e. Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM), and
	f. Read-Only Memory (ROM).
	Continued on next page

Approved media sanitisation methods [IC, R, P] 3.4.34. The table below describes the approved methods for sanitising media classified as IN-CONFIDENCE, RESTRICTED and PROTECTED.

Media type	Sanitisation method
Magnetic media	Overwrite or use a degausser. See: • 'Magnetic media sanitisation products' on page
	3-34,
	• 'Procedure: overwriting magnetic media' on page 3-34, or
	• 'Degaussers' on page 3-35.
Erasable	Erase as per the manufacturer's specification,
Programmable ROM (EPROM)	increasing the specified UV erasure time by a factor of three.
Electrically Erasable	Erase as per the manufacturer's specification, or
Programmable ROM (EEPROM) and flash	using a third party tool.
memory	Agencies SHOULD verify the effectiveness of the
Examples:	erasure process before approving it for use as a
Memory sticks	sanitisation method. If no effective process is
• Thumb drives	available, then the media SHOULD be destroyed.
	Note: Many manufacturers' "erasure" processes
	merely obscure the data, and tools designed to
	recover such data are readily available.
Electrostatic memory	Print at least 3 pages of UNCLASSIFIED text with
devices within printers	no blank areas on each colour cartridge within the
and photocopiers	device.
Examples:	
• Laser printer	If the print cycle cannot be completed due to a
cartridges,	malfunction, an appropriately trained person
• Copier drums.	SHOULD take out the device and wipe the total
	drum surface with a lint-free non-abrasive cloth.
	Manually turn drums within their cartridges to
	achieve this.
Video screens	Visually inspect the screen by turning up the
	brightness to the maximum to determine if any
	classified information has been etched into the
	surface. If the functionality exists, alter the intensity
	on a colour-by-colour basis.
	Destroy the screen if classified information is
	present.

Media Sanitisation, Continued

Magnetic media sanitisation products	3.4.37. Agencies SHOULD use an EPL product for the sanitisation of magnetic media.
	See: 'Evaluated Products List' on page 3-20.
	Exception: This does not apply to software used to format media in cases where the formatting of media is allowed as a means of sanitisation.
Procedure: overwriting magnetic media	3.4.39. The table below describes the approved procedure for overwriting magnetic media.
	 Legend: X = a value determined from the table in 'Overwriting procedure: determining X' on page 3-35

- C = a character/bit pattern
- -C = the bit-wise complement/inverse of C

Example: If C = 00101101 then -C = 11010010

Step		Action		
1	Determine the appropriate value of X using the table in 'Overwriting procedure: determining X ' on page 3-35.			
	If <i>X</i> is	Then		
	a number	go to step 2.		
	'F'	format the media. End of procedure. Important: Do not use a 'quick' format method.		
2	• Overwrite the entire media with <i>C</i> .			
	• Verify that all areas of the media have been overwritten with <i>C</i> .			
	• Overwrite the entire media with - <i>C</i> .			
	• Verify that all areas of the media have been overwritten with - <i>C</i> .			
	proceed with o	there are any errors, such as defective sectors, do not verwriting as it will be ineffective. In these cases the D be destroyed.		
3	Do the following	ng X times:		
	• overwrite the entire media with <i>C</i> , then			
	• overwrite the entire media with - <i>C</i> .			
	-	equals 0 (zero) then this step is skipped, however, if the sequence would be <i>C</i> , <i>-C</i> , <i>C</i> , <i>-C</i> .		
4		entire media with random data.		
4				

Overwriting	3.4.40. The value of X reflects the degree of rigour required when sanitising
procedure:	media in preparation for reclassification. Use the table below to determine the
determining X	value of X to be used in the 'Procedure: overwriting magnetic media' on page
	3-34.

Important: If the media is to be disposed of in an uncontrolled manner, such as at a public auction or thrown in the garbage, then the public domain (PD) column is to be used to determine the value of X.

Note: The value of X as shown below **does not** equal the total number of passes required. Using X in the overwriting procedure results in 3 + 2(X) passes in total.

		То				
		PD	U	IC	R	Р
From	U	0	F	F	F	F
	IC	0	0	F	F	F
	R	0	0	0	F	F
	Р	1	1	0	0	F

Degaussers3.4.41. When sanitising with a degausser, agencies MUST use a degausser of
sufficient field strength for the coercivity of the media being sanitised.Important: Coercivity varies between media types, and between brands and
models of the same type. Care is needed when determining the required
coercivity as a degausser of insufficient strength will not be effective.

The degaussers listed on the National Security Agency's *Degausser Products List* are deemed to be DSD Approved Products for the purposes of this manual. **URL:** www.nsa.gov/ia/government/mdg.cfm

Agencies using a product on NSA's list **MUST** comply with the directions provided within the list by NSA.

Note: Agencies are advised to consult DSD where these directions appear to conflict with policy within this manual.

Media Destruction

Definition: media destruction	3.4.44. Media destruction is the process of physically damaging the media with the objective of making the data stored on it inaccessible.
	To destroy media effectively, only the actual material within which the data is stored requires destruction. Examples: The metal casing of a hard disk platter and the plastic substrate of a
	CD do not need to be destroyed.
Media destruction requirements	3.4.45. Agencies MUST destroy unsanitised classified media prior to disposal in accordance with the table below.

Reasons for not sanitising media include:

- no approved sanitisation method exists,
- a risk assessment identifies destruction as the preferred treatment,
- the sanitisation method cannot be applied due to defective hardware, or
- the cost of sanitising the media outweighs the benefits.

See: 'Disposal process' on page 3-31.

M - P - 4	Destruction required?
Media type	IC, R, P
Electrostatic memory devices within printers and	No
photocopiers.	
Examples:	
• laser printer cartridges,	
• photocopier drums.	
Magnetic and optical media.	Yes
Examples:	
• floppy disks,	
• hard disks,	
• tapes,	
• CDs.	
Non-volatile semi-conductor memory.	Yes
Volatile semi-conductor memory.	No ⁽²⁾

(1) No destruction required if the toner has been removed from the surface of the device.

(2) No destruction required once all power supplies, including batteries, are removed.

Media	3.4.46. To destroy media, agencies MUST :		
destruction	a.	break up the media, or	
methods	b.	heat the media until it has either burnt to ash or melted.	

Agencies **SHOULD** use approved methods as shown in the table below, and employ equipment approved by the SCEC for the purpose. **See:** 'Security Equipment Catalogue' on page 3-4.

	Methods					
Item	Furnace/ incinerator	Hammer mill ⁽¹⁾	Dis- integrator ⁽¹⁾	Grinder / sander ⁽¹⁾	Cut ⁽¹⁾	
Electrostatic memory devices	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Floppy disk	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
Hard disk	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Optical disk	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Semi-conductor memory	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	
Tape	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	

(1) The size of the particles resulting from the application of this destruction method MUST be appropriate for the intended waste handling and storage procedures, with respect to the media's initial classification.

See: 'Media waste particles – storage and handling' on page 3-38.

Supervision 3.4.47. Agencies **MUST** perform the destruction of classified material under the supervision of an officer cleared to the highest level of media being destroyed.

The officer **MUST**:

- a. supervise the handling of the material to the point of destruction, and
- b. ensure that the destruction is complete.

Supervision for
accountable
material3.4.48. Agencies MUST perform the destruction of accountable material, as
defined in Part C of the *PSM*, under the supervision of two officers cleared to the
highest level of media being destroyed.

The officers MUST:

- a. supervise the handling of the material to the point of destruction,
- b. ensure that the destruction is complete, and
- c. sign a destruction certificate.

Media waste particles – storage and handling [IC, R, P] 3.4.49. When the media is reduced to particles able to pass through a screen of the specified aperture, the resulting waste may be stored and handled as for the classification given in the table below.

Important: This table affects the storage and handling requirements only; it does not reduce the requirement for complete destruction prior to disposal. However, if the resulting classification is given as "U", then the requirement for complete destruction has been met, and the particles may be disposed of. **See:** 'Media disposal' on page 3-38.

If the initial classification	Then, with a screen of this aperture, waste can be stored and handled as for			
İS	<= 9mm	<= 12mm		
IN-CONFIDENCE	U	U		
RESTRICTED	U	U		
PROTECTED	U	IC		

Media disposal 3.4.51. Agencies disposing of classified media MUST ensure that the recording media has been:

- a. burnt to ash,
- b. melted, or
- c. reduced to a particle size that meets the requirements for UNCLASSIFIED storage and handling based on the media's **initial** classification.

Agencies **SHOULD** dispose of UNCLASSIFIED media waste in a manner that does not attract undue attention to it.

Further advice 3.4.52. Agencies are encouraged to contact ASIO T4 for further information on the selection of protective security equipment used to destroy media.

See: 'Contact details' on page 3-4.

Portable Computers and Personal Electronic Devices

Introduction	3.4.53. This section contains information about security requirements for portable computers (e.g. laptops) and Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs).		
Definition: PED	3.4.54. For the purposes of this manual, PEDs are defined as portable devices that can process, store and/or transmit data electronically.		
		tiated from a portable computer by its lack of tures including user identification, authentication,	
Examples of PEDs Related topics	 3.4.55. PEDs include, but a Personal Digital Assista mobile telephones, two-way pagers, digital cameras, and audio recorders. 		
	Topic	See	
	Physical security standards	'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2.	
	Wireless communications Telephones and pagers	'Wireless Communications' on page 3-83.'Telephones and Telephone Systems' on page 3- 84.	
	Cryptography	'Chapter 9 – Cryptography' on page 3-91.	
	Data transfers	'Chapter 11 – Data Transfer' on page 3-126.	
Certification and accreditation	and PEDS may be considered or grouped by functional rec	certification and accreditation, portable computers ed to form part of an ICT system either individually quirements. g and Accrediting ICT Systems' on page 2-45. <i>Continued on next page</i>	

Portable Computers and Personal Electronic Devices, Continued

Storage and handling	 3.4.59. Agencies MUST protect portable computers and PEDs storing classified information to at least the same level as hardcopy material of the same classification, in accordance with the <i>PSM</i> requirements for access, storage and handling. Exception: Some storage and handling requirements may be reduced by the use of encryption products. See: 'Requirements for storage encryption' on page 3-93.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies encrypt data on all portable computers and PEDs.
	Even UNCLASSIFIED portable computers and PEDs have some intrinsic value and therefore require protection against theft. See: 'Protecting public domain and UNCLASSIFIED systems' on page 3-3.
Operation	 3.4.61. Portable computers and PEDs containing classified information SHOULD be: a. operated in physically protected areas classed as intruder resistant or better, b. kept under continual, direct supervision when in use, and c. stored in physically protected areas appropriate for that classification when not in use.
	See: 'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2.
Device configuration	 3.4.63. If intending to use portable computers or PEDs to process classified information, agencies SHOULD ensure that all data collection and communications functions of the devices not identified as business requirements are removed or disabled as effectively as possible within the limitations of the particular device. Examples: Bluetooth, infrared, cameras, microphones.
	See: 'Product Selection' on page 3-21 for information on selecting products.
	 See: 'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2. 3.4.63. If intending to use portable computers or PEDs to process classified information, agencies SHOULD ensure that all data collection and communications functions of the devices not identified as business requirements are removed or disabled as effectively as possible within the limitations of the particular device. Examples: Bluetooth, infrared, cameras, microphones.

Portable Computers and Personal Electronic Devices, Continued

Labelling portable computers and PEDs	3.4.64. Agencies SHOULD put a protective marking on all portable computers and PEDs.
	Agencies SHOULD put a label warning against unauthorised use on all portable computers and PEDs.
	An additional label SHOULD be affixed asking the finders of a lost portable computer or PED to hand the equipment in to any Australian police station or, if overseas, an Australian Embassy, Consulate or High Commission.
Emergency destruction	3.4.65. Agencies SHOULD develop an emergency destruction plan for any portable computer or PED used in high risk situations.
	See: 'Emergency Procedures' on page 3-13 for more information.

Chapter 5 – Software Security

Overview

Introduction	3.5.1. This chapter contains information about handling malicious code and anti- virus software, using software applications and software development.		
Types of software	 3.5.2. Software includes: operating systems, data, programs and applications, utilities, email systems, and web applications. 		
Why have software security controls?	 3.5.3. Software security controls are established to: protect the confidentiality of information on a need-to-know basis, ensure appropriate levels of user authentication, and protect the availability of the system from malicious code attacks. 		
Software security standards	3.5.4. All application server and client security mechanisms SHOULD:a. comply with the general standards outlined in this chapter, andb. be documented in the relevant SSP.		
Contents	3.5.5. This chapter contains the following sections:		
	Section	See page	
	Software Fundamentals	3-44	
	Software Development	3-48	
	Database Security	3-49	
	Web Application Security	3-50	
	Electronic Mail Security	3-52	
	Electronic Mail – Protective Marking Policy	3-55	
	Malicious Code and Anti-Virus Software	3-58	

Торіс	See
Security incidents	'Chapter 8 – Maintaining ICT Security and
	Managing Security Incidents' on page 2-58.
Physical security	'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2.
Access control	'Chapter 6 – Logical Access Control' on page 3-60.
Logging and auditing	'Chapter 7 – Active Security' on page 3-67.
Networks, including	'Chapter 10 – Network Security' on page 3-109.
data transfer	

Not included 3.5.6. The following subjects are covered elsewhere:

Software Fundamentals

Documentation	3.5.7. All server and workstation security objectives and mechanisms SHOULD be documented in the relevant SSP or similar document.	
Hardening during installation	 3.5.8. Agencies SHOULD reduce potential vulnerabilities on their systems by: a. removing unneeded software, b. removing unused accounts, c. removing unnecessary file shares, d. renaming required default accounts, e. replacing default passwords, f. ensuring patching is up-to-date, g. disabling unused features on installed software and operating systems, and h. disabling access to all unnecessary input/output devices at the BIOS level. Examples: CD-ROMS, floppy disks, USB drives, wireless network interfaces. 	
	Many more techniques for hardening systems exist. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies consider seeking and applying additional information on hardening techniques relevant to their specific system software.	
Server environments [U, IC, R, P]	 3.5.10. In addition to the requirements for hardening during installation defined above, DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies: a. limit information that could be disclosed outside the agency about what software is installed, and Examples: 	
	 User Agent on web requests disclosing the web browser type, network and mail client information in mail headers, and mail server software headers. b. implement access controls on relevant objects to limit users and programs to the minimum access required to perform their duties. Examples: Objects may include directories, files, programs, databases, and communications ports. 	
Workstation environments [U, IC, R, P]	 3.5.12. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies develop a hardened Standard Operating Environment (SOE) for workstations, covering the: a. requirements for hardening during installation, See: 'Hardening during installation' on page 3-44. b. implementation of access controls on relevant objects to limit users and programs to the minimum access required to perform their duties, c. installation of workstation firewalls, and d. configuration of either remote logging or the transfer of local event logs to a central server. 	

Software Fundamentals, Continued

Ongoing patching and hardening	 3.5.14. Agencies SHOULD: a. monitor relevant sources for information about new vulnerabilities, patches and hardening methods in software and hardware used by the agency, b. take corrective action, including a risk assessment as necessary, when vulnerabilities that could affect agency systems are discovered, See: 'Use of EPL products in unevaluated configurations' on page 3-24 for policy specific to evaluated products. c. follow their documented change management procedures when applying patches or hardening systems, including the testing of patches and updates prior to their application to live systems, and See: 'Managing Change' on page 2-60. d. replace obsolete software and hardware with products for which ongoing support is available. As part of the requirement for corrective action defined above, DSD RECOMMENDS that all relevant security-related patches are tested and applied as soon as possible.
Other mitigations	3.5.15. Where known vulnerabilities cannot be patched, agencies SHOULD use other protective measures as determined from a risk assessment.
	Appropriate protective measures may include:
	a. controls to resolve the vulnerability:
	1) engaging a software developer to correct the software (if the source code is available),
	 consider moving to a different product with a more responsive vendor,
	3) asking the vendor for an alternate method of managing the vulnerability,
	b. controls to prevent attacks from succeeding:
	1) mail filters that strip potentially harmful content to mail clients,
	2) web proxy filters that strip harmful content to web browsers,
	3) additional access controls on file and configuration settings,
	4) firewalls configured to block high risk traffic,
	c. controls to detect attacks:
	 virus, spyware and malware scanners, and other machanisms as appropriate for the detection of exploits using the
	 other mechanisms as appropriate for the detection of exploits using the known vulnerability.

Server separation	 3.5.16. Where high risk servers, such as web, email, file and IP telephony servers, have connectivity to public domain networks, agencies SHOULD: a. maintain effective functional separation between servers allowing them to operate independently, b. minimise communications between servers at both the network and filesystem level, as appropriate, and c. limit users and programs to the minimum access required to perform their duties.
	 DSD RECOMMENDS that this separation be achieved either: d. physically, using single dedicated machines for each function, or e. using virtualisation technology to create separate virtual machines for each function.
	Separation may also be achieved through the use of techniques to restrict a process to a limited portion of the file system, but this is less effective.
System integrity	 3.5.17. System integrity mechanisms are designed to: minimise the likelihood of unauthorised tampering of information, and detect attempts or incidents of unauthorised tampering or access.
Definition: characteris- ation	3.5.18. Characterisation is a technique used to analyse a system's characteristics. It is important to security as it can be used to verify the system's integrity at a later date.
	Unfortunately, there are known techniques for defeating basic characterisations, therefore other methods of intrusion detection are also needed, particularly in situations where it is impractical to use a trusted environment for the generation of the characterisation data. However, it is very useful in post-intrusion forensics investigations where an infected disk can be compared to stored characterisation data in order to determine what files have been changed or introduced.
	 Files and directories may be characterised by: performing a cryptographic checksum on the files/directories when they are known to be virus/contaminant free, either manually or using a commercial product, documenting the name, type, size and attributes of legitimate files and directories, along with any changes to this information expected under normal system operation, or for a Windows system, taking a SYSDIFF snapshot.

Software Fundamentals, Continued

Requirement for characteris- ation	 3.5.19. Agencies SHOULD: a. characterise all servers whose functions are critical to the agency, and those identified as being at high risk of compromise, b. store the characterisation information securely on read-only media, c. update the characterisation information after every legitimate change to the system, d. as part of the agency's ongoing audit schedule, compare the stored characterisation information against current characterisation information to determine whether a compromise, or a legitimate but incorrectly completed system modification, has occurred, e. perform the characterisation from a trusted environment rather than the standard operating system wherever possible, and Example: Restart the system from a boot disk. f. resolve any detected changes in accordance with the agency's incident management procedures. See: 'Managing Security Incidents'' on page 2-66. DSD RECOMMENDS agencies meet the requirement for characterisation using a DACA to perform cryptographic checksums. See: 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)' on page 3-95.
Firmware updates	3.5.20. Agencies MUST ensure that any firmware updates are performed in accordance with their change management procedures, and in a manner that verifies the integrity and authenticity of the updating process.
Sourcing software [U, IC, R, P]	 3.5.21. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies: a. obtain software from verifiable sources and verify its integrity using vendor supplied checksums, and b. scan the software for malicious code.
"Phone home" functionality	3.5.23. Agencies SHOULD review all commercial software applications to determine whether they are configured to connect back to the vendor.
	If such functionality is included, then agencies SHOULD make a business decision to determine whether to permit or deny these connections, including an assessment of the risks involved in doing so.
	 Example: Some applications include: "phone home" functionality, initiating a connection to the vendor site over the Internet, and inbound remote management.

Software Development

Introduction	3.5.24. These requirements apply to all systems that require development, upgrade or maintenance for the operating system or application software.
Software development environments	 3.5.25. Agencies SHOULD ensure that software development environments are configured such that: a. there are at least 3 ICT environments covering: development, testing, and production, b. information flow between the environments is strictly limited according to a defined and documented policy, with access granted only to users with a clear business requirement, new development and modifications only take place in the development environment, and write-access to vendor's distribution media or integrity copies of operational software is disabled.
Secure programming	 3.5.27. Agencies SHOULD ensure that software developers use secure programming practices when writing code, including: a. designing software to use the lowest privilege level required to achieve its task, b. deny access by default, c. check return values of all system calls, and d. validate all user input.
Software testing	3.5.28. Software SHOULD be reviewed and/or tested for security vulnerabilities before it is used in a production environment.Software SHOULD be reviewed and/or tested by an independent party, and not by the developer.
Additional references	3.5.29. Additional information relating to software development is contained in the AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006, 12.5 Security in development and support processes.

Database Security

Data labelling	 3.5.30. Agencies SHOULD ensure that all information stored within a database is associated with an appropriate protective marking if the information: a. may be exported to a different system, or b. contains differing classifications and/or different handling requirements. Agencies SHOULD ensure that these protective markings are applied with a level of granularity sufficient to clearly define the handling requirements for any information retrieved or exported from the database. Examples: Protective markings may be applied to records, tables, or to the level of a sufficient to clearly define the records.
	database as a whole, depending on structure and use. Query results will often require a protective marking to reflect the aggregate of the information retrieved.
Database files	3.5.32. Agencies SHOULD protect database files from access that bypasses the database's normal access controls.
Accountability	3.5.34. Agencies SHOULD ensure that databases provide accountability of users' actions.
	See: 'Chapter 6 – Logical Access Control' on page 3-60.
Search engines	3.5.35. Agencies SHOULD ensure that users who do not have sufficient clearance to access a file cannot see the file title in a list of results from a search engine query.
	If this requirement is not met, then agencies MUST ensure that all file titles are appropriately sanitised to meet the minimum security clearance of system users.

Web Application Security

Web usage	3.5.36. Agencies that allow staff to browse the Internet:a. MUST have a policy governing web use, andb. SHOULD ensure that users are informed of the associated dangers.
	See: 'Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)' on page 3-99 for policy relating to SSL connections, including the use of SSL whitelists.
Whitelisting HTTP sites	3.5.37. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies consider the option of implementing whitelists for all HTTP traffic transiting their gateway.
	Defining a whitelist of permitted HTTP sites, and blocking all unlisted sites, effectively removes one of the most common data delivery and exfiltration techniques used by malware. However, if agency staff have a legitimate requirement to access a numerous and rapidly changing list of websites, agencies will need to consider the costs of such an implementation.
Applying controls	3.5.38. Web security controls apply to all web applications that access HTML documents on web servers.
	Example: Client browsers.
Components of a web application	 3.5.39. The web application may include: a web server, a web browser, HTML or XML documents, active content (such as scripts or code), Uniform Resource Locator (URL), and cookies.
	Continued on next page

Web Application Security, Continued

Anonymity and privacy problems	 3.5.40. A browser provides information to every site it visits. Privacy and security problems arise because the web server may keep details of the: IP address that requested the page, URL accessed on the site, user's name or client browser's identity, amount of information transmitted to and from the site, status of the request, user's email address, operating system of the browser's host system, and the URL of the referring page.
Cookies	3.5.41. DSD RECOMMENDS agencies consider blocking inbound cookies, noting that such a decision may restrict legitimate agency staff activity.Where cookies are allowed, DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies limit the
A 10 /0	lifetime of cookies to the current session.
Applications and plug-ins	3.5.42. Web browsers can be configured to allow the automatic launching of downloaded files. This may occur with or without the user's knowledge thus making the computer vulnerable to attack.
	Agencies SHOULD block the automatic launching of files downloaded from external websites.
Client-side active content	3.5.43. Client-side active content is software that enhances the user's interactive functionality with the website. The software is automatically transferred from the web server to the user's computer when the user visits the website. Examples: Java and ActiveX.
	DSD RECOMMENDS agencies consider blocking client-side active content, noting that such a decision may restrict the legitimate activity of the agency's users.
Website content	 3.5.44. Agencies SHOULD: a. establish formal procedures to manage the publication of material on the agency's website(s) and changes to existing content, and b. review all active content on web servers for security issues.

Electronic Mail Security

Email usage

3.5.45. Agencies that allow staff to email externally:

- a. **MUST** have a policy governing the use of email, and
- b. SHOULD ensure that users are informed of the associated dangers.

See: 'Chapter 11 – Data Transfer' on page 3-126 for additional policy on the transfer of data between networks.

Components of 3.5.46. The table below identifies the main components of an email system. **email system**

Component	Description
Mail server	A software tool that receives, routes or stores email messages
	from clients and other servers.
Mail client	A software tool run by the end-user to view messages and
	attachments.
Message	The content of the email, either in raw text, HTML or XML,
_	including any attachments.
Attachment	Files included with the message.
	See: 'Malicious Code and Anti-Virus Software' on page 3-58.

Server auditing 3.5.47. Agencies **SHOULD** perform regular email server auditing to detect threats such as denial of service attacks and use of the server as a mail relay.

See: 'Event logs for software components' on page 3-71.

Web-based
email services3.5.48. Agencies SHOULD NOT allow staff to send and receive email using
web-based public email services.

Automatic3.5.49. Agencies MUST ensure that the standards for blocking unmarked and
outbound emails are also applied to automatically forwarded emails.Freeived emailsSee:

- 'Blocking of unmarked emails' on page 3-56.
- 'Blocking of outbound emails' on page 3-57.

Agencies **SHOULD** warn staff that the automatic forwarding of email to another staff member may result in the new recipient seeing material that:

- a. they do not have a need-to-know, or
- b. the intended recipient and/or sender considered private.

Electronic Mail Security, Continued

Centralised email gateway	3.5.51. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies route email through a centralised email gateway.
Email security documentation standards	 3.5.52. Agencies MUST: a. develop and maintain a set of email policies, plans and procedures, derived from a risk assessment, covering topics such as: integrity of the email's content, authentication of the source, non-repudiation of the message, verification of delivery, confidentiality of the email's content, and retention of logs and/or the email's content, and make their users aware of the agency's email policies, plans and procedures.
	See: 'Electronic Mail – Protective Marking Policy' on page 3-55 for standards relating to the protective marking policy for email.
Email technical standards	 3.5.53. Agencies SHOULD: a. restrict access to email servers to administrative users, b. ensure that email servers available to the public are separated from the agency's internal systems, c. disable open mail relaying so that mail servers will only relay messages destined for the agency's domain(s) and those originating from within the domain, and d. ensure that account names cannot be determined from external mail servers.
Email server transport encryption [U]	 3.5.54. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies: a. enable Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption on incoming and outgoing email connections on email servers. TLS encryption between email servers is defined in RFC 3207 (and its obsolete predecessor RFC 2487) and has been implemented by most email server products, See: 'Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)' on page 3-99. b. configure TLS to negotiate a DACA in preference to an unapproved algorithm, finally reverting to unencrypted email transmission if no algorithm can be negotiated, and See: 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)' on page 3-95. c. implement TLS authentication between email servers where significant volumes of official information is passed via email to other agencies.

Technical standards for blocking emails	 3.5.55. Agencies SHOULD block: a. inbound and outbound email, including any attachments, that contain: malicious code, content in conflict with the agency's email policy, and content that cannot be identified by the system, b. emails addressed to internal email aliases with source addresses located from outside the domain, and all emails arriving via an external connection where the source address uses an internal agency domain name.
	See: 'Blocking of unmarked emails', 'Blocking of outbound emails', and

See: 'Blocking of unmarked emails', 'Blocking of outbound emails', and 'Blocking of inbound emails' on page 3-57 for further standards on blocking emails based on their protective markings.

Electronic Mail – Protective Marking Policy

Marking classified emails	 3.5.56. Agencies MUST ensure that protective markings are applied to all emails containing classified information that have been: a. written or forwarded by agency staff, or b. automatically generated by an agency system and are leaving the agency. Agencies SHOULD ensure that all automatically generated emails remaining within the agency are marked with a protective marking. Agencies MUST ensure that the protective marking identifies the maximum classification and set of caveats for all information in the email, including any attachments.
Marking unclassified emails [U, IC, R]	3.5.57. Agencies SHOULD ensure that all agency-originated emails that do not contain any classified information are given a protective marking to indicate this.Examples:
	 UNCLASSIFIED may be used for official information that is not classified, but has not been endorsed for public release. UNCLASSIFIED PUBLIC may be used for official information that is not classified, and has been endorsed for public release. PERSONAL or UNOFFICIAL may be used when the email contains no official information is present.
Marking unclassified emails [P]	3.5.58. Agencies MUST ensure that all agency-originated emails that do not contain any classified information are given a protective marking to indicate this.
Protective marking standard	3.5.60. The standard for the application of protective markings to emails is promulgated by the Australian Government Information Office (AGIMO), and is available from their website. Compliance with this standard will facilitate email interoperability between agencies.
	URL: www.agimo.gov.au/publications/2005/october/protective_markings
	Continued on part page

Electronic Mail – Protective Marking Policy, Continued

Marking tools	3.5.61. Agencies SHOULD NOT allow a protective marking to be inserted into user-generated emails without user intervention.
	If an agency provides a tool that allows users to select from a list of protective markings, then the list SHOULD NOT include protective markings for which the system is not accredited.
Emails from outside the Australian Government	3.5.62. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies encourage external organisations that send email to the agency to adopt the protective marking system described in this manual.
Receiving unmarked emails	3.5.63. DSD RECOMMENDS that the receiving gateway label all unmarked emails to inform the intended recipient that no protective marking was present. The recipient will have to apply a protective marking to the email before it can be forwarded elsewhere. Agencies SHOULD provide guidance to staff on how to determine an appropriate protective marking in consultation with the originator of the email.
Checking emails for a protective marking	3.5.64. Agencies SHOULD ensure that the protective marking is used as the basis for any decisions to permit or block the email.
Blocking of unmarked emails	 3.5.65. Agencies SHOULD prevent staff from sending unmarked emails by blocking the email at: a. the user's computer, and/or b. the email server.
	Commued on next page

Electronic Mail – Protective Marking Policy, Continued

Blocking of outbound emails	 3.5.66. Agencies MUST configure systems to block any outbound emails with a valid protective marking indicating that the content of the email exceeds the classification of the: a. receiving system, and/or b. the path over which the email would be transferred. Note: This may need to take into consideration any encryption applied to the email.
	 Agencies SHOULD configure systems to: c. block any emails with missing or invalid markings, and d. log every occurrence of a blocked email. DSD RECOMMENDS that the sender be notified of any blocked emails.
Blocking of inbound emails	 3.5.67. Agencies SHOULD configure email systems to reject and log inbound emails with protective markings indicating that the content of the email exceeds the accreditation of the receiving system. DSD RECOMMENDS that the intended recipient be notified of the blocked
Printing	email. 3.5.68. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies configure systems so that the protective marking appears at the top and bottom of every page when the email is printed.

Definition: malicious code	 3.5.69. Malicious code is any software that attempts to subvert the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a system. Types of malicious code include: logic bombs, trapdoors, Trojan programs, viruses, and worms.
Methods of infections or delivery	 3.5.70. Malicious code can spread through a system from a number of sources including: files containing macro viruses or worms, email attachments and web downloads with malicious active content, executable code in the form of applications, security weaknesses in a system or network, and contact with an infected system or media.
Standards for malicious code counter- measures	 3.5.71. Agencies MUST: a. develop and maintain a set of policies, plans and procedures, derived from a risk assessment, covering how to: minimise the likelihood of malicious code being introduced into the system(s), detect any malicious code installed on the system(s), b. make their users aware of the agency's policies, plans and procedures, and ensure that all instances of detected malicious code outbreaks are handled according to the procedures. See: 'Chapter 8 – Maintaining ICT Security and Managing Security Incidents' on page 2-58.
Anti-virus scanners	 3.5.72. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies, for all servers and workstations: a. install agency-approved anti-virus scanners, b. ensure that users do not have the ability to disable the scanner, c. check vendor virus pattern signatures for updates daily, d. apply virus pattern signature updates as soon as possible after vendors make them available, and e. regularly scan all disks. See: 'Data import' on page 3-131 for mandatory malicious code countermeasures required when transferring data between systems.

Malicious Code and Anti-Virus Software

Host-based intrusion prevention systems	3.5.73. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies install host-based intrusion prevention systems (HIPS) on high risk servers.
Active content blocking	 3.5.74. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies use: a. filters to block: unwanted content, and exploits against applications that cannot be patched, settings within the applications to disable unwanted functionality, and digital signatures to restrict active content to trusted sources only.
Containment and recovery	 3.5.75. The capacity to contain and recover from malicious code is primarily reliant on the ability to: isolate infected systems, purge malicious code from a system, restore the integrity of a system, and recover data from backup media.
Handling malicious code infection	3.5.76. The procedure for handling a malicious code infection is located in 'Managing Incidents'.See: 'Handling malicious code infection' on page 2-68.

Malicious Code and Anti-Virus Software, Continued

Chapter 6 – Logical Access Control

Overview

Introduction	3.6.1. This chapter contains information on logical access control.			
Documentation	 3.6.2. Agencies MUST: a. develop and maintain a set of policies, plans and procedures, derived from a risk assessment, covering user: identification, authentication, and authorisation, and b. make their users aware of the agency's policies, plans and procedures in part (a) above. 			
Contents	ts 3.6.3. This chapter contains the following sections:			
		Section	See page	
	User Identification and A	uthentication	3-61	
	Privileged and System A	ccounts	3-64	
	Access and Authorisation		3-65	
Not included	and 3.6.4. The following subjects are covered elsewhere:			
	Subject	See		
	Physical access	'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on pa		
	Clearances	'Chapter 2 – Personnel' on page 3-14		
	Network security	'Chapter 10 – Network Security' on p	age 3-109.	
Additional references	3.6.5. Additional informat AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:	tion relating to access control is contain 2006, 11 Access control.	led in the	

User Identification and Authentication

Standards	 3.6.6. Agencies MUST ensure that all users of classified systems are: a. uniquely identifiable, and b. authenticated on each occasion that access is granted to the system. DSD RECOMMENDS that all users of UNCLASSIFIED systems be: c. uniquely identifiable, and d. authenticated on each occasion that access is granted to the system.
Methods for user identification and authentication	 3.6.7. User authentication can be achieved by various means, including: passwords, passphrases, cryptographic tokens, smartcards, and biometrics. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies combine the use of multiple methods when identifying and authenticating users. Agencies MUST NOT use a numerical password (often defined as a Personal Identification Number (PIN)) as the sole method of authorising a user to access a classified system.
Protecting stored authentication information	3.6.8. Agencies MUST NOT allow staff to store unprotected authentication information that grants access to a system, or decrypts an encrypted data storage device, on or with the system or device to which the authentication information grants access.
Protecting authentication information in transit	 3.6.9. Agencies MUST ensure that authentication information is transmitted securely, protected from all other users. See: 'Cryptographic Requirements' on page 3-92 for minimum encryption assurance levels for authentication information that grants access to a classified system passing over a network of lower classification.

Password 3.6.11. Agencies **SHOULD** implement a password policy enforcing either: selection a. a minimum password length of 12 characters with no complexity requirement, or b. a minimum password length of 7 characters, consisting of at least 3 of the following character sets: 1) lowercase characters (a-z), 2) uppercase characters (A-Z), 3) digits (0-9), and 4) punctuation and special characters. Examples: ! @ # \$ % ^ & * Password 3.6.13. Agencies SHOULD: management a. require passwords to be changed at least every 90 days, b. prevent users from changing their password more than once a day, c. check passwords for compliance with the password selection policy, where the operating system cannot be configured to enforce complexity requirements. d. force the user to change an expired password on initial logon or if reset, e. **NOT** allow predictable reset passwords, Example: "Password1" or a user's SID. f. NOT reuse passwords when resetting multiple accounts, g. NOT allow passwords to be reused within 8 password changes, and h. NOT allow users to use sequential passwords. DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies require users to physically present themselves to the person who is resetting their password. Screen and 3.6.15. Agencies SHOULD: session locking a. configure systems with a screen and/or session lock, b. configure the lock to activate after a maximum of 15 minutes of user inactivity. c. configure the lock to completely conceal all information on the screen, d. ensure the screen does not appear to be turned off while in the locked state,

e. require the user to reauthenticate to unlock the system, andf. deny users the ability to disable the locking mechanism.

Continued on next page

User Identification and Authentication, Continued

User Identification and Authentication, Continued

Displaying when a user last logged in	3.6.17. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies configure systems to display the date and time of the user's previous login during the login process.
Suspension of access [U, IC, R, P]	 3.6.18. Agencies SHOULD: a. lock user accounts after a specified number of failed logon attempts, b. remove or suspend user accounts as soon as possible after the user no longer requires access due to changing roles or leaving the agency, and c. suspend inactive accounts after a specified number of days.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that:d. a limit of 3 failed logon attempts be permitted, ande. account resets can only be performed by an administrator.

Privileged and System Accounts

Definition: privileged access	 3.6.20. Privileged access is defined as access which may give the user: the ability to change key system configurations, the ability to change control parameters, Examples: Routing tables, path priorities, addresses on routers, multiplexers, and other key system equipment. access to audit and security monitoring information, the ability to circumvent security measures, access to data, files and accounts used by other users, including backups and media, and special access for troubleshooting the information system. Note: Users with privileged access are called privileged users. Examples: Users with "superuser", "root", system administrator or database administrator access are privileged users.
	See: 'Chapter 1 – ICT Security Roles and Responsibilities' on page 2-2.
Use of privileged accounts	 3.6.21. Agencies SHOULD: a. ensure that the use of privileged accounts is controlled and accountable, Example: UNIX administrators login using their own userid and then 'sudo' to perform privileged actions. b. ensure that administrators are assigned an individual account for the performance of their administration tasks, c. keep privileged accounts to a minimum, and d. allow the use of privileged accounts for administrative work only.
Shared accounts	3.6.27. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies avoid the use of shared, non-user specific accounts.
	If agencies choose to allow non-user specific accounts, agencies MUST ensure that some other method of determining the identification of the user is implemented.

Access and Authorisation

Access and authorisation standards	 3.6.29. Agencies SHOULD: a. limit user access on a need-to-know basis, b. provide users with the least amount of privileges required for them to do their job, and c. require any requests for access to a system to be authorised by the user's supervisor or manager.
Logon banner	3.6.31. Agencies SHOULD have a logon banner that requires a user response before access to a system is granted. DSD RECOMMENDS seeking legal advice on the exact wording of the banner.
	 The banner may cover issues such as: access being permitted to authorised users only, the user's agreement to abide by relevant security policies, the user's awareness of the possibility that system usage is being monitored, the definition of acceptable use for the system, and legal ramifications of violating the relevant policies.
Definition: access control list	3.6.35. An access control list (ACL) is a list of entities, together with their access rights, which are authorised to have access to a resource.A collection of access control lists is sometimes referred to as an access control matrix.

Developing an 3.6.36. The table below describes a process for developing an ACL. ACL

Stage	Description
1	Establish groups of all system resources based on similar security
	objectives.
	Examples: Resources include files, directories, data, applications,
	and services.
2	Determine the data owner for each group of resources.
3	Establish groups encompassing all system users based on similar
	functions or security objectives.
4	Determine the group owner or manager for each group of users.
5	Determine the degree of access to the resource for each user group.
	Examples: Possible degrees of access are read, write, delete, and
	execute.
6	Decide on the degree of delegation for security administration,
	based on the internal security policy.
	Example:
	• Delegate group membership to identified group managers.
	• Delegate resource access control to identified data owners.

Example of an
access control3.6.37. The table below is an example of an access control matrix.matrixNote: The matrix associates identified user groups with specific system

Note: The matrix associates identified user groups with specific system resources.

Legend: R=read; W=write; X=execute; N=no access; F=full access.

		Reso	urces	
User Groups	HRMS	Payroll	Personnel	Forms
	Application	database	drive	database
	Data owner =	Data owner =	Data owner =	Data owner =
	Personnel mgr	Payroll mgr	Registry mgr	Registry mgr
Personnel group	WX	R	W	R
Group manager =				
Personnel manager				
Payroll group	RX	W	W	R
Group manager =				
Payroll manager				
Registry group	Ν	Ν	R	R
Group manager =				
Registry manager				
Archives group	Ν	Ν	F	F
Group manager =				
Personnel manager				

Chapter 7 – Active Security

ntroduction	anomalous ICT activity. T	e capability to predict, detect, and hese capabilities include processe ns (IDSs), event logging, audit an nerability analysis.	es and tools such as
Contents	3.7.2. This chapter contain	ns the following topics:	
		Торіс	See page
	Intrusion Detection Syste	ms	3-68
	Event Logging		3-70
	Other Logs		3-73
			2 74
	Auditing		3-74
	Auditing Vulnerability Analysis		3-74
ot included		ect is covered elsewhere:	
ot included	Vulnerability Analysis	ect is covered elsewhere:	

Intrusion Detection Systems

Definition: intrusion detection system	3.7.4. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a product designed to detect inappropriate or malicious activity occurring on a network or host by analysing the activity for suspicious patterns and anomalies.		
Intrusion detection strategy	 3.7.5. Agencies SHOULD develop, implement and maintain an intrusion detection strategy, based on the results of a risk assessment, that includes: a. appropriate intrusion detection mechanisms, including network-based IDS (NIDS) and host-based IDS (HIDS) as required, b. the audit analysis of event logs, including IDS logs, c. a periodic audit of intrusion detection procedures, d. user training and awareness programs, and See: 'User Training and Awareness' on page 3-15. e. a documented incident response procedure. See: 'Incident Response Plan' on page 2-72. 		
IDSs on Internet gateways	3.7.7. Agencies SHOULD deploy IDSs in all gateways between the agency's networks and the Internet. DSD RECOMMENDS that an IDS be located within the gateway environment, immediately inside the outermost firewall.When signature-based intrusion detection is used, agencies SHOULD keep the signatures up-to-date.		
IDSs on other gateways	3.7.8. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies deploy intrusion detection systems at all gateways between the agency's networks and any network not managed by the agency.When signature-based intrusion detection is used, agencies SHOULD keep the signatures up-to-date.		
Configuring the IDS	 3.7.9. In addition to agency-defined configuration requirements, DSD RECOMMENDS that an IDS located inside a firewall be configured to generate a log entry, and an alert if desired, for any information flows that contravene any rule within the firewall ruleset. Example: If the firewall is configured to block all traffic on a particular range of port numbers, then the IDS should inspect traffic for these port numbers and alert if they are detected. 		
	Continued on next page		

Intrusion Detection Systems, Continued

Event management and correlation	3.7.10. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies deploy tools for:a. the management and archival of security event information, andb. the correlation of events of interest across all agency networks.
Additional references	 3.7.11. Additional information relating to intrusion detection and audit analysis is contained in the: AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006, 15.3 Information systems audit considerations, and HB 171:2003 <i>Guidelines for the Management of IT Evidence</i>.

Logging requirements	 3.7.12. Agencies MUST develop and document logging requirements reflecting the overall audit objectives derived from the ICTSP and RMP, covering: a. the logging facility, including: log server availability requirements, and the reliable delivery of log information to the log server, b. the list of events associated with a system or software component to be logged, and event log protection and archival requirements.
	Continued on next page

Event logs for software components 3.7.13. The types of events and information to be recorded **SHOULD** be based on a risk assessment.

DSD **RECOMMENDS** that agencies log the events listed in the table below for specific software components.

If the	Then the RECOMMENDED events to log include
software	
component	
is a(n)	
database	• user access to the database,
	• attempted user access that is denied,
	Example: Access denial due to incorrect password.
	• changes to user roles or database rights,
	• addition of new users, especially privileged users,
	• modifications to the data, and
	• modifications to the format of the database.
email	all email sent to an external system.
system	Note: If required, the email system should allow full audit of email content for a specific user or the entire system.
multilevel	• downgrade of classification of data, and
network	• any attempt to release data to a system with a lower
. 1/	classification.
network/	• successful and failed attempts to logon and logoff,
operating	• changes to system administration and user accounts,
system	• failed attempts to access data and system resources,
	• attempts to use special privileges,
	• use of special privileges,
	• user or group management,
	• changes to the security policy,
	• service failures and restarts,
	• system startup and shutdown, and
	• changes to system configuration data.
	Additional events that could be recorded are:
	• access to sensitive data and processes, and
	• data export operations.
	Examples: email, ftp transfer, prints and floppy disk transfers.
web	• user access to the web application,
application	 attempted user access that is denied,
11	 user access to the web documents, and
	 search engine queries initiated by users.
	• search engine queries initiated by users.

Event log facility	 3.7.16. For each event identified as needing to be logged, agencies MUST ensure that the log facility records at least the following details, where applicable: a. date and time of the event, b. relevant user(s) or process, c. event description, d. success or failure of the event, e. event source (e.g. application name), and f. terminal location/identification.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies establish an accurate time source and use it consistently throughout the agency's ICT systems to assist with the correlation of logged events across multiple systems.
Event log protection and archival	 3.7.17. Event logs MUST be: a. protected from modification and unauthorised access, b. archived and retained for future access, and c. protected from whole or partial loss within the defined retention period. Important: The retention of event logs may be subject to the <i>Archives Act</i> 1983.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that:

- d. systems be configured to save event logs to a separate, secure log server, ande. event log data be archived onto write-once media.

User logs	 3.7.19. Retention of past and present user account information can be of significant value during an incident investigation. Therefore, agencies SHOULD: a. maintain a secure log of all authorised users, their user identification and who provided the authorisation and when, and Note: In many cases this could be achieved by retaining the account application form filled in by the user and/or their supervisor. b. maintain the log for the life of the system. Important: The retention of user logs may be subject to the <i>Archives Act 1983</i>.
System management log information	 3.7.20. A system management log SHOULD be manually updated to record the following information: a. sanitisation activities, b. system startup and shutdown, c. component or system failures, d. maintenance activities, e. housekeeping activities, f. system recovery activities, and g. special or out-of-hour activities.
System management logs [U, IC, R, P]	3.7.21. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies maintain system management logs for the life of the system.

Auditing

Purpose	3.7.24. The purpose of auditing is to assist in the detection and attribution of any violations of agency security policy, including security breaches and intrusions. The frequency, depth and specific objectives of audit analyses, derived from the ICTSP and the RMP, may be unique to each system.
Responsibilities	3.7.25. Agencies SHOULD NOT assign system audit responsibilities to staff with system administrator privileges.
	The ITSA SHOULD be responsible for managing and auditing the event logs.
	The System Manager and/or information owner, and not the ITSA, are responsible for determining the audit requirements of a system, consistent with the requirements of the ICTSP and RMP.
Audit requirements	 3.7.26. Agencies MUST develop and document audit requirements reflecting the overall audit objectives derived from the ICTSP and RMP, covering: a. the scope of audits, b. the audit schedule, c. action to be taken when violations are detected, d. reporting requirements, and e. specific responsibilities.

How to audit an
event log3.7.27. The table below describes the steps **RECOMMENDED** by DSD for the
audit analysis of an event log.

Step	Action
1	Collate relevant audit trail information from the operating system,
	networks or applications.
2	Examine the logged information for events of interest.
3	Examine trends from past audits for correlations, patterns or
	anomalous events.
4	Inform appropriate System Managers of relevant security issues.
5	Transfer files to an appropriate location for archiving.

Resources

3.7.28. Agencies **SHOULD** ensure that a sufficient number of appropriately trained personnel and tools are available to analyse all logs for potential violations of agency security policy.

Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerability analysis strategy	 3.7.29. Agencies SHOULD implement a vulnerability analysis strategy by: a. monitoring public domain information about new vulnerabilities in operating systems and application software, b. considering the use of automated tools to perform vulnerability assessments on agency systems in a controlled manner, c. running manual checks against system configurations to ensure only allowed services are active and that disallowed services are prevented, and Example: "Netstat" commands to check the status of open sessions against the configuration parameters. d. using security checklists for operating systems and common applications.
Authorisation	3.7.30. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies require the authorisation of the System Manager before a vulnerability assessment is conducted on a system.
When to perform	 3.7.31. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies perform security vulnerability assessments: a. before the system is first used, b. after every significant change to the system, and c. as required by the ITSA and/or System Manager. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies perform the analysis at a time that minimises possible disruptions to agency systems.
Resolving vulnerabilities	 3.7.32. Agencies SHOULD analyse and treat any risks to its systems identified during a vulnerability analysis. See: 'Chapter 4 – Risk Management' on page 2-22. Agencies SHOULD follow the change process when implementing changes to mitigate the risks. See: 'Change Management Process' on page 2-61. In some cases, a vulnerability may have been introduced as a result of poor security practices, or accidental or malicious activities. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies consider this when investigating and resolving vulnerabilities. See: 'Managing Security Incidents' on page 2-66.

Chapter 8 – Communications Security (Comsec)

Overview

Introduction	3.8.1. This chapter contains information about comm (Comsec) standards.	nunications security
DSD advice	3.8.2. Contact DSD for further information regardin	g all Comsec issues.
	See: 'Contacting DSD' on page 2-3.	
Constants	3.8.3. This chapter contains the following topics:	
Contents	3.8.3. This chapter contains the following topics:	
Contents	3.8.3. This chapter contains the following topics: Topic	See page
Contents		See page 3-77
Contents	Торіс	
Contents	Topic About Comsec	3-77
Contents	Topic About Comsec Cabling	3-77 3-78
Contents	Topic About Comsec Cabling Cable Distribution Systems	3-77 3-78 3-79
Contents	Topic About Comsec Cabling Cable Distribution Systems Labelling and Registration	3-77 3-78 3-79 3-82
Contents	Topic About Comsec Cabling Cable Distribution Systems Labelling and Registration Wireless Communications	3-77 3-78 3-79 3-82 3-83

Not included 3.8.4. The following subjects are covered elsewhere:

Subject	See
Certification of	'Comsec Certification' on page 2-53
communications security	
Physical security of cabling	'Workstations and Network Infrastructure'
	on page 3-8
Cryptography	'Chapter 9 – Cryptography' on page 3-91

About Comsec

Definition: Comsec	 3.8.5. Comsec is an abbreviation of "communications security", which covers the measures and controls taken to: deny unauthorised persons access to information derived from electronic communications, and ensure the authenticity of such communications.
	 Comsec includes: cryptosecurity, transmission security, personnel security, emanations security (including TEMPEST), and physical security.
Comsec Handbook	 3.8.6. Agencies concerned with the control, handling and/or maintenance of accountable cryptographic communications security material are referred to ACSI 53 – Communications Security Handbook (Rules and Procedures for the Agency Comsec Officer and Custodian), available from DSD. Accountable Comsec material is defined as classified material bearing the CRYPTO caveat. It applies primarily to cryptographic keying material used in securing HGCE systems.
	Agencies operating HGCE should note that information contained in <i>ACSI 53</i> supersedes that in this manual. See: 'Contacting DSD' on page 2-3.

Cabling

Cabling standards 3.8.7. Agencies **MUST** install all cabling in accordance with the relevant Australian Standards.

References:

- Telecommunications Act (1997)
- AS/ACIF S009:2001 Installation Requirements for Customer Cabling (Wiring Rules)
- AS/NZS 3080:2000 Telecommunications installations Generic cabling for commercial premises

Cable Distribution Systems

Introduction	3.8.13. This topic discusses cable distribution systems. It contains information on:	
	 important definitions, 	
	• types of conduit,	
	• standards for conduit that penetrates walls,	
	• sealing conduit,	
	• suspending conduit, and	
	• connecting conduit to equipment cabinets.	
Using cable distribution	3.8.14. Cable distribution systems are used to distribute cabling around a facility in a controlled manner.	
systems		
	DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies use separate cabling distribution systems for classified cabling.	
Definition: conduit	3.8.15. Conduit is a tube, duct, or pipe used to protect cables from tampering, sabotage or accidental damage.	
Cables sharing a common conduit	3.8.16. The table below shows the combinations of cable classifications that are approved by DSD to share a common conduit.	
conduit	Agencies MUST NOT deviate from the approved combination(s).	
	Agencies worst wor deviate nom the approved combination(s).	
	Group Approved combination	
	1. any combination of:	
	• public domain,	
	• UNCLASSIFIED,	
	• IN-CONFIDENCE,	
	• PROTECTED,	
	HIGHLY PROTECTED, and	
	RESTRICTED.	


Cable Distribution Systems, Continued

Fibre optic
cables sharing a
common
conduit3.8.18. With optical fibre cables, the cable's protective sheath can be considered
to be a conduit and therefore the fibres within the sheath MUST only carry a
single Group.See: 'Cables sharing a common conduit' on page 3-79.

If a cable contains subunits, as shown in Figure 4, then each subunit **MUST** only carry a single Group, however each subunit within the cable may carry a different Group.

Example: The cable shown in Figure 4 could carry UNCLASSIFIED and HIGHLY PROTECTED in one subunit and CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET in another subunit.

The diagrams below represent a sample of fibre cross-sections.







Figure 2

Cable Distribution Systems, Continued



Labelling and Registration

Installing conduit labelling	3.8.27. Conduits installed in public or visitor areas SHOULD be labelled in a manner that does not attract undue attention by people who may not have the appropriate security clearances or a need-to-know of the existence of such cabling.
SOPs	3.8.29. Site conventions for labelling and registration SHOULD be recorded in the SOPs.
Cable register	 3.8.31. Agencies SHOULD maintain a register of cables. The register SHOULD record at least the following: a. cable identification number, b. classification, c. source, d. destination, and e. floor plan diagram.
Cable inspections	3.8.33. Agencies SHOULD inspect cables for inconsistencies with the cable register on a regular basis.The frequency of the inspections SHOULD be defined in the SSP.

Wireless Communications

Introduction	 3.8.39. Some examples of wireless communications technologies and protocols include: IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth, Infrared, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Global System for Mobile communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), and Short Message Service (SMS). 				
Not included	3.8.40. The following subject	is covered elsewhere:			
	Subject	See page			
	Policy for mobile and cordless telephones	'Cordless and mobile telephones' on page 3-85.			
Standards	 3.8.41. Agencies SHOULD NOT use wireless communications for the transmission of classified information. Agencies MUST, where they have a requirement to use wireless communications for the transmission of classified information, ensure that the information is protected by DSD Approved Cryptography that meets the assurance level required for the transmission of the information over public domain networks. See: 'Cryptographic Requirements' on page 3-92. 				
Pointing devices	3.8.43. As an exception to the general policy on wireless communications defined above, agencies may use wireless pointing devices.				
	Examples : Mice and track bal	lls.			
Infrared keyboards [U, IC, R, P]		general policy on wireless communications use infrared keyboards if the following policy is			
	-	ers to ensure that infrared ports are positioned to cations travelling into uncontrolled spaces.			

Telephones and Telephone Systems

Introduction	3.8.49. This topic discusses the secure use of fixed, cordless and mobile telephones, and the systems used to transmit the information.
	Policy specific to technologies such as Voice Over IP (VOIP) is covered later. See: 'IP Telephony' on page 3-87.
	Transmission over the Internet of classified information, including voice calls, is covered by encryption policy. See: 'Requirements for transit encryption' on page 3-93.
Definition: telephone	3.8.50. A telephone is a device that converts between sound waves and electronic signals that can be transmitted over a distance.
	Examples:
	 standard, wired handsets,
	 cordless phones,
	 mobile phones,
	 stand-alone VOIP handsets, and
	• computer-based VOIP "softphones".
Definition: telephone system	3.8.51. For the purposes of this manual, a telephone system is defined as an ICT system designed primarily for the transmission of voice traffic.
U U	Examples:
	 a private branch exchange, and
	• the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).
	Note: The Internet is not considered to be a telephone system.
User awareness	3.8.52. Agencies MUST advise users of the maximum permitted levels of classified conversations for both internal and external telephone connections, as determined by the accreditation of the internal telephone system and the level of the encryption, if any, on external connections.
	Agencies SHOULD advise users of the audio risk posed by using telephones in areas where classified conversations may occur.
	Continued on next page

Visual indication	3.8.53. Agencies permitting different levels of conversation for different kinds of connections SHOULD use telephones that give a visual indication of what kind of connection has been made.
	 Examples: If an agency has accredited their internal system to carry PROTECTED conversations, but external calls are only permitted up to IN-CONFIDENCE, then they may use telephones with displays that show a four-digit number for internal calls, and eight digits for external calls. Users would then be advised to double-check this display before talking at a classified level. If an agency has chosen to implement encryption on some calls, then they may use phones that display an icon to indicate when a call is encrypted.
Use of telephone systems for classified information [IC, R]	 3.8.54. Agencies intending to use telephone systems for the transmission of IN-CONFIDENCE or RESTRICTED information MUST ensure that: a. the residual risks, as identified by a risk assessment, have been documented and accepted, and either b. the caller and receiver are both located within Australia, or c. all classified traffic that passes over external telephone systems is encrypted in accordance with the level of encryption required for the classification of the information being transmitted. See: 'Requirements for transit encryption' on page 3-93.
	Policy relating to the use of cordless and mobile phones is defined below.
Use of telephone systems for classified information [P]	 3.8.55. Agencies intending to use telephone systems for the transmission of PROTECTED information MUST ensure that: a. the system has been accredited for the purpose, including the completion of a risk assessment and formal acceptance of the residual risks, and b. all classified traffic that passes over external systems is encrypted in accordance with the level of encryption required for the classification of the information being transmitted. See: 'Requirements for transit encryption' on page 3-93.
Cordless and mobile telephones	3.8.57. Agencies MUST NOT use cordless or mobile telephones for the transmission of classified information unless the security they use has been approved by DSD for that classification. See: 'Chapter 9 – Cryptography' on page 3-91.
	Exception: If the cordless or mobile phone user is located within Australia, and it is included in the formal acceptance of the risk assessment for the agency's telephone system, IN-CONFIDENCE voice traffic may be transmitted.
	Continued on next page

Telephones and Telephone Systems, Continued

Cordless telephones with Secure Telephony Devices	3.8.58. Agencies MUST NOT use cordless telephones in conjunction with Secure Telephony Devices such as Speakeasy or Sectera.
Definition: Off- hook audio protection	3.8.60. Off-hook audio protection mitigates the possibility of an active, but temporarily unattended handset inadvertently allowing discussions being undertaken in the vicinity of the handset to be heard by the remote party.This may be achieved through the use of a hold feature, mute feature, push-to-talk handset, or equivalent.
Definition: Push-To-Talk	3.8.61. Push-To-Talk (PTT) handsets have a button which must be pressed by the user before audio can be transmitted, thus providing fail-safe off-hook audio protection.
Requirement for off-hook audio protection [P]	3.8.62. DSD RECOMMENDS that off-hook audio protection features are used on all telephones that are not accredited for the transmission of PROTECTED data in areas where PROTECTED information may be discussed.
Emergency services	3.8.66. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies route calls to emergency services (e.g. 000) through the local Private Branch Exchange (PBX).
Paging services	3.8.67. Agencies MUST NOT use paging services to transmit classified information.
	Note: This includes Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) and Short Message Service (SMS).

IP Telephony

	3.8.68. IP Telephony (IPT) is the transport of telephone calls over Internet Protocol (IP) networks. It may also be referred to as Voice Over IP (VOIP) or Internet Telephony.					
Definition: IP Telephony						
General guidance	3.8.69. IPT traffic may, with appropriate logical separation, flow over an agency's internal network, and be accredited to carry conversations classified up to the level of the network's accreditation if so desired.					
	If the internal IPT system is connected to the PSTN, then a secure voice-aware gateway is required, just as a connection from the internal data network requires a secure gateway to connect to the Internet.					
	In addition, users will need procedures and training to ensure that they do not exceed the maximum permitted levels of classified conversations for internal and external telephone connections. See: 'User awareness' on page 3-84.					
IPT standards	 3.8.70. Agencies MUST ensure that IPT networks meet: a. all the standards defined in this manual for a generic system of equal classification, as well as any relevant caveats, and b. the standards for telephones and telephone systems. See: 'Telephones and Telephone Systems' on page 3-84. 					
Gateways	3.8.71. Where the gateway policy defined in this manual specifies the use of a firewall, agencies implementing IPT SHOULD use a firewall capable of understanding the telephony protocols in use within the agency.					
	See: 'Gateways' on page 3-114.					
Connection to the PSTN	 3.8.72. Agencies MUST install a firewall of sufficient assurance between the agency's IP network and the voice gateway that converts the IPT traffic into a form suitable for connection to the PSTN. See: 'Firewalls' on page 3-116. Note: The PSTN is to be regarded as a public network for the purposes of 					
	determining the required level of assurance.					
	This firewall MUST be configured to permit only the IPT traffic, including management traffic, through the interface that connects to the PSTN.					
	Continued on next page					

IP Telephony, Continued

Network separation	3.8.73. Agencies MUST NOT run an IPT network over the same physical medium as a data network of a different classification.
	Note: An agency's internal IPT network may be accredited to the same classification as the internal data network if all appropriate security controls are in place for that classification, including a secure gateway. See: 'IPT standards' on page 3-87.
Traffic separation	3.8.74. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies separate the IPT traffic from other data traffic, either physically or logically.
Vendor recommenda- tions	3.8.77. Agencies SHOULD implement all relevant security measures recommended by the vendor of the IPT products.
	Note: In the event of conflict, statements within this manual have precedence over vendor recommendations.
IP phone set up [U, IC, R, P]	 3.8.78. Agencies SHOULD: a. configure IP phones to authenticate themselves to the call controller upon registration, b. disable auto-registration of IP phones after initial rollout, and c. disable all unused ports.
Call authentication and authorisation	3.8.80. Agencies SHOULD route outgoing call connection requests via a call controller for authentication and authorisation before calls can be established.
Phone to workstation connections [U, IC, R, P]	3.8.81. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies do not connect workstations to IP phones unless the computer and/or the phone, as appropriate for the configuration, uses VLANs or similar mechanisms to maintain separation between IPT and other data traffic.
Definition: softphone	3.8.84. A softphone is a software application that allows a computing device, such as a desktop computer, to act as an IP phone, using either a built-in or an externally connected microphone and speaker. It may also be known as a software IP phone.
	Continued on next page

IP Telephony, Continued

Softphone standards	3.8.85. Agencies SHOULD NOT use software phones.
[U, IC, R, P]	If an agency deviates from this standard, then DSD RECOMMENDS that the agency have a separate, dedicated Network Interface Card (NIC) on the host for voice network access.

Facsimile Machines

Definition: facsimile machine	3.8.87. Within this section, the term "facsimile machine" is used to describe a device that allows copies of documents to be sent over a telephone system.				
	Examples:Stand-alone fax machines.				
	• "Multifunction devices" capable of, among other things, the sending and receiving of faxes.				
	See: 'Multifunction Devices' on page 3-124 for additional policies and standards.				
Use for the transmission of classified information	 3.8.88. Agencies intending to use facsimile machines for the transmission of classified information MUST ensure that: a. all of the standards for the use of telephone systems are met at both ends for the level of classification to be sent, and See: 'Telephones and Telephone Systems' on page 3-84. b. the sender makes arrangements for the receiver to: collect the information from the facsimile machine as soon as possible after it is received, and notify the sender if the facsimile does not arrive within an agreed amount of time. Note: DSD RECOMMENDS that this be no longer than 10 minutes. 				

Chapter 9 – Cryptography

Overview		
Introduction	3.9.1. This chapter contains information on cryptography.	
Purpose of cryptography	 3.9.2. Cryptography can be used to provide: confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. 	
Contents	3.9.3. This chapter contains the following topics:	
Contents	3.9.3. This chapter contains the following topics: Topic	See page
contents		See page 3-92
ontents	Торіс	
Contents	Topic Cryptographic Requirements	3-92
Contents	Topic Cryptographic Requirements DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)	3-92 3-95
contents	TopicCryptographic RequirementsDSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security(SSL/TLS)	3-92 3-95 3-97
Contents	TopicCryptographic RequirementsDSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security(SSL/TLS)Secure Shell (SSH)	3-92 3-95 3-97 3-99 3-100
Contents	TopicCryptographic RequirementsDSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security(SSL/TLS)	3-92 3-95 3-97 3-99

Cryptographic Requirements

Use of EPL products	 3.9.4. Where this manual expresses a minimum assurance requirement for a cryptographic product as an EAL, agencies MUST use an EPL product that has completed a DSD cryptographic evaluation in addition to meeting the stated assurance level. See: 'Evaluated Products List' on page 3-20.
EPL products, DACAs and DACPs	3.9.5. Agencies SHOULD use an EPL product that has completed a DSD cryptographic evaluation whenever cryptography is being used to protect official information. This applies even when the use of a DACA or DACP is given as the minimum assurance level required to satisfy a "MUST" statement.
	Example: An agency using an unevaluated product employing SSL to encrypt PROTECTED information travelling over an IN-CONFIDENCE network is complying with the "MUST" statement requiring the use of a DACP for this scenario, avoiding the need for a waiver. However, they are not using an EPL product, and are therefore required to complete the documentation relating to deviations from a "SHOULD" statement.
	 See: 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)' on page 3-95.

• 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)' on page 3-97

Cryptographic Requirements, Continued

Requirements for storage encryption 3.9.6. Agencies **MUST** use encryption products or protocols that meet the minimum level of assurance as shown in the following table if they wish to use encryption to reduce the physical handling requirements for media that contains classified information.

Note: The use of approved encryption will generally reduce the likelihood of an unauthorised party gaining access to the encrypted information. However, it does not reduce the consequences of a successful attack.

Important: Care must be taken with encryption systems that do not encrypt the entire media content to ensure that either all of the classified data is encrypted or that the media is handled in accordance with the highest classification of the unencrypted data.

If the classification of the unencrypted	Then media holding information encrypted by a product or algorithm with the given assurance level may be stored and handled as for						
information is	Unapproved/ no encryption	DACA	EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	HG
IC	IC	U	U	U	U	U	U
R	R	R	R	U	U	U	U
Р	Р	Р	IC	U	U	U	U

Requirements for transit encryption [IC, R, P]

3.9.7. The table below provides the **minimum** levels of assurance that agencies **MUST** use for the encryption of IN-CONFIDENCE, RESTRICTED and PROTECTED information whilst in transit over a network.

If the information is classified	And the network it will be travelling over is	Then the minimum assurance requirement is
IN-CONFIDENCE,	 public domain, or UNCLASSIFIED,	a DACP. Exception: 'Transit encryption for email' on page 3-94.
RESTRICTED,	 public domain, or UNCLASSIFIED, IN-CONFIDENCE, PROTECTED, or HIGHLY PROTECTED, 	EAL2. a DACP.
PROTECTED,	 public domain, or UNCLASSIFIED, IN-CONFIDENCE, 	EAL2. a DACP.

Transit encryption for email [IC]	 3.9.11. In certain limited circumstances, agencies finding the requirement to use a DACP impractical when emailing IN-CONFIDENCE information to private citizens or small businesses may decide to use either unapproved encryption, or no encryption at all. Doing so in accordance with the policy below will not require any "MUST" statements to be waived, but does require documentation addressing the deviation from the "SHOULD" statement requiring the use of EPL products. See: 'EPL products, DACAs and DACPs' on page 3-92.
	 Where information is sent to a private entity via email, either unencrypted or encrypted using non-DSD approved cryptography, agencies MUST ensure that, prior to sending: a. the sending and receiving entities are aware of and have accepted the risk, b. the entity to whom the information relates is aware of and has accepted the risk, and c. the agency holds documented risk acceptances of all relevant entities.
	This risk acceptance may cover ongoing communications; it is not required prior to each individual email.

Important: The protection of IN-CONFIDENCE information may be subject to the *Privacy Act 1988*. DSD **RECOMMENDS** agencies seek legal advice before implementing this option.

DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)

Introduction	3.9.12. This section explains the cryptographic algorithms that DSD has	
approved for the protec	approved for the protection of classified information. There are three types of	
	algorithms:	

- asymmetric/public key algorithms,
- hashing algorithms, and
- symmetric encryption algorithms.

Important: The fact that a product or protocol uses one or more DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs) does not automatically mean that it is "DSD Approved."

Asymmetric/
public key3.9.13. The table below identifies the approved asymmetric/public key
algorithms. For each algorithm it lists their approved uses, conditions of use and
one or more references.

Algorithm	Approved uses	Conditions of use	Reference(s)
Diffie-Hellman	Agreeing on	The modulus MUST be at least	W. Diffie and M. E.
(DH)	encryption session keys.	1024 bits.	Hellman, <i>New</i> <i>Directions in</i> <i>Cryptography</i> , IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vIT-22, n.6, Nov
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)	Digital signatures.	The modulus MUST be at least 1024 bits.	1976, 644-654. FIPS 186.
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)	Agreeing on encryption session keys.	The field/key size MUST be at least 160 bits.	ANSI X9.63ANSI X9.42
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)	Digital signatures.	The field/key size MUST be at least 160 bits.	 FIPS PUB 186-2 + Change Notice ANSI X9.63 ANSI X9.62
Rivest-Shamir- Adleman (RSA)	 Digital signatures. Passing encryption session keys or similar keys. 	The modulus MUST be at least 1024 bits. Note: The public keys used for passing encryption session keys MUST be different to the keys used for digital signatures.	Public Key Cryptography Standards PKCS#1, RSA Laboratories.

Hashing3.9.14. The table below identifies the approved hashing algorithms, and one or
more references for each of the algorithms.

Note: DSD RECOMMENDS the SHA family of hashing algorithms.

Algorithm	Reference(s)
Message Digest v5	• AS 2805.13.3
(MD5)	• RFC 1321
Secure Hashing Algorithms	• AS 2805.13.3
(SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)	• FIPS 180-2

Symmetric encryption algorithms 3.9.15. The table below identifies the approved symmetric encryption algorithms, their conditions of use and one or more references.

Note: Symmetric encryption using AES or 3DES **SHOULD NOT** use Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode.

Algorithm	Conditions of use	Reference(s)
Advanced Encryption	AES supports key lengths of 128,	FIPS 197
Standard	192 and 256 bits, all of which are	
(AES)	suitable.	
Triple DES	Triple DES MUST use either:	• AS 2805.5.4
(3DES)	• 2 distinct keys in the order key1, key2, key1, or	• ANSI X9.52
	• 3 distinct keys.	

DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)

Approved protocols	3.9.16. In general, DSD only approves the use of cryptographic products that have passed a formal evaluation. However, DSD approves the use of some commonly available cryptographic protocols even though their implementations within specific products have not been formally evaluated by DSD. This approval is limited to cases where the system is used in accordance with the guidelines in this manual.
Before using DACAs and DACPs	 3.9.17. Before using an unevaluated product that implements a DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocol (DACP), agencies MUST: a. investigate EPL products, and systems such as Fedlink, that provide greater security assurance, b. ensure that the minimum requirements as stated in the 'Cryptographic Requirements' section on page 3-92 will be met, and c. consider and accept the risks.
Some risk considerations	3.9.18. It is possible that there are security flaws in the DACPs or in the products that implement them. This possibility should be taken into account when deciding whether to use a DACP.
	If a product implementing a DACP has been inappropriately configured, it is possible that relatively weak cryptographic algorithms may be selected without the user's knowledge. In combination with an assumed level of security confidence, this can represent a significant level of risk.
	While many DACPs support authentication, agencies should be aware that these authentication mechanisms are not foolproof. To be effective, these mechanisms must also be securely implemented and protected.
	This can be achieved:
	 by providing an assurance of private key protection, by ensuring the correct management of certificate authentication processes
	 including certificate revocation checking, and through the use of a legitimate identity registration scheme.
	Continued on next page

DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs), Continued

Implementing DACPs	3.9.19. When using an unevaluated product that implements a DACP, agencies MUST ensure that only DACAs can be used.	
	 Agencies could achieve this by: disabling the unapproved algorithms within the products (preferred advising users not to use them via a policy. 	erred), or
	See: 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs)' on pa	ge 3-95.
Links	3.9.20. The table below lists the DACPs and provides links to the standards.	relevant
	Protocol	See page
	Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)	3-99
	Secure Shell (SSH)	3-100
	Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME)	3-102

Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)

Introduction	3.9.21. DSD approves the use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encryption only when configured and implemented in accordance with the standards provided below.		
Risk considerations	3.9.22. SSL and TLS do not protect data during storage. As a result, there is usually a greater risk that data will be accessed while stored at either end of the communication path, where SSL/TLS does not protect it.		
Standards	3.9.23. Agencies SHOULD NOT use versions of SSL prior to version 3.0. Note: TLS is newer than SSL version 3.0.		
	Agencies MUST ensure that the standards for the use of DACPs are met. See: 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)' on page 3-97.		
Securing encrypted connections	 3.9.24. Agencies permitting SSL or TLS through their gateways SHOULD implement: a. a product that decrypts and inspects the SSL traffic, and/or b. a whitelist specifying the external addresses to which encrypted connections are permitted, with all other addresses blocked. Note: Whitelist addresses may be specified by domain name or IP address. 		

What is Secure Shell?	 3.9.25. Secure Shell (SSH) can be used for: logging into a remote machine, executing commands on a remote mach transferring files. 		
	Both commercial and open-source impleme available.	entations of the SSH protocol are	
SCP and SFTP	3.9.26. Secure Copy (SCP) and Secure FTP also covered by this section.	(SFTP) use SSH and are therefore	
Standards	3.9.27. Agencies MUST ensure that the standards for the use of DACPs are met. See: 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)' on page 3-97.		
	Note: The configuration directives are based on the OpenSSH implementation of SSH. Agencies implementing SSH may need to adapt these settings to suit other SSH implementations.		
	Configuration description	Configuration directive	
	Disallow the use of SSH version 1	Protocol 2	
	On machines with multiple interfaces, configure the SSH daemon to listen only on the required interfaces	ListenAddress xxx.xxx.xxx	
	Disable connection forwarding	AllowTCPForwarding no	
	Disable gateway ports	Gatewayports no	
	Disable the ability to login directly as root	PermitRootLogin no	
	Disable host-based authentication	HostbasedAuthentication no	
	Disable rhosts-based authentication	RhostsAuthentication no	
		IgnoreRhosts yes	
	Don't allow empty passwords	PermitEmptyPasswords no	
	Allow either password-based or public	PasswordAuthentication yes	
	key-based authentication or both	PubkeyAuthentication yes	
	Configure a suitable login banner	Banner/directory/filename	
	Configure a login authentication timeout	LoginGraceTime xx	

Continued on next page

X11Forwarding no

of no more than 60 seconds

Disable X forwarding

Secure Shell (SSH), Continued

Passwordless logins	3.9.28. Some implementations of SSH allow logins without the use of a password. This capability can be used for automated processes such as backups.
	Agencies that use passwordless logins SHOULD use the "forced command" option within the authorised_keys file to specify what command is executed upon logging in.
SSH-agent	3.9.29. Agencies SHOULD NOT use "ssh-agent" or other similar key caching programs.

Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME)

Introduction	3.9.30. DSD has approved the use of Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME) for the confidentiality and integrity of message content only when implemented in accordance with the standards provided below.
Risk considerations	3.9.31. Agencies choosing to implement S/MIME should be aware of the inability of many content filters to inspect encrypted messages and any attachments for inappropriate content, and for server-based anti-virus software to scan for viruses and other malicious code.
Standards	3.9.32. Agencies SHOULD NOT allow versions of S/MIME earlier than 3.0 to be used.
	Agencies MUST ensure that the standards for the use of DACPs are met. See: 'DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs)' on page 3-97.
	Agencies SHOULD: a. install anti-virus scanners on user workstations, and b. ensure that the signatures are regularly updated. See: 'Malicious Code and Anti-Virus Software' on page 3-58.

What is FIPS 140?	3.9.33. The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 is a United States standard for the validation of cryptographic modules, both hardware and software.
	URL: www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
What FIPS 140 is not	3.9.34. FIPS 140 is not a substitute for the evaluation of ICT security products under the Common Criteria. FIPS 140 is concerned solely with the cryptographic functionality of a module and does not consider any other information security functionality.
Versions of FIPS 140	3.9.35. FIPS 140 is in its second iteration and is formally referred to as FIPS 140-2. This policy refers to the standard as FIPS 140 but applies to both FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2.
Cryptographic evaluations	3.9.36. Cryptographic evaluations of products will normally be conducted by DSD. Where a product's cryptographic functionality has been validated under FIPS 140, DSD may, at its discretion and in consultation with the vendor, reduce the scope of a DSD cryptographic evaluation.
	DSD will review the FIPS 140 validation report to confirm compliance with Australia's national cryptographic policy.
	Note: This policy also applies to products evaluated overseas and submitted to the AISEP for Mutual Recognition.
Approved algorithms	3.9.37. Some algorithms approved for use under FIPS 140 have not been evaluated and are not currently approved by DSD for the protection of classified information.
	Modules that have been FIPS 140 validated, but do not include any DSD approved algorithms in the validation, will not be approved by DSD for the protection of classified information.

Key Management

Introduction 3.9.38. Key management covers the use and management of cryptographic keys and associated hardware and software in accordance with policy. It includes their:

- generation,
- registration,
- distribution,
- installation,
- usage,
- protection,
- storage,
- archival,
- recovery,
- deregistration,
- revocation, and
- destruction.

References 3.9.39. The table below provides additional references.

Grade of cryptography	Reference
commercial grade	AS 11770.1-2003 Information technology – Security techniques – Key management.

Definition: cryptographic system	3.9.41. A cryptographic system is a related set of hardware and/or software used for cryptographic communication, processing or storage, and the administrative framework in which it operates.
Definition: cryptographic system material	3.9.42. Cryptographic system material includes, but is not limited to, key, equipment, devices, documents, and firmware or software that embodies or describes cryptographic logic.
Cryptographic system requirements	3.9.43. In general, the requirements specified for ICT systems apply equally to cryptographic systems. Where the requirements for cryptographic systems are different, the variations are contained within this chapter, and overrule all requirements specified elsewhere within this manual.

Key Management, Continued

Cryptographic system administrator access	 3.9.44. Cryptographic system administrator access is privileged access. Before an individual is granted cryptographic system administrator access, individuals at a minimum SHOULD: a. have a demonstrated need for access, b. read and agree to comply with the relevant KMP for the cryptographic system they are using, See: 'Definition: Key Management Plan' on page 3-106. c. possess a security clearance at least equal to the highest classification of information processed by the system, d. agree to protect the authenticators for the system at the highest level of information it secures, Example: Passwords for a cryptographic system administrator account securing HIGHLY PROTECTED data. e. agree not to share authenticators for the system without approval, f. agreed to report all potentially security-related problems to the ITSA.
Access register	 3.9.45. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies hold and maintain an access register that records cryptographic system information such as: a. details of those with administrator access, b. details of those whose administrator access was withdrawn, c. details of system documents, d. accounting activities, and e. audit activities.
Accounting	3.9.46. Agencies SHOULD be able to readily account for all transactions relating to cryptographic system material including identifying hardware and software, and who has been issued with the equipment.
Audits	 3.9.47. Agencies SHOULD conduct audits of cryptographic system material: a. on handover/takeover of administrative responsibility for the system, b. on change of individuals with access to the cryptographic system, and c. at least annually. DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies perform audits: d. to check all cryptographic system material as per the accounting documentation, and e. to confirm that agreed security measures documented in the KMP are being followed.
	DSD RECOMMENDS that these audits be conducted by two individuals with cryptographic system administrator access.

Key Management, Continued

Area security and access control	 3.9.48. Cryptographic system equipment SHOULD be stored in a room that meets the server room security level appropriate for the classification of data the system processes. See: 'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2.
	Areas in which cryptographic system material is used SHOULD be separated from other classified and unclassified areas and designated as controlled areas. Example: A locked cabinet containing the cryptographic system is within the server room, with the key held by a cryptographic system administrator.
	Cryptographic system material remains in the custody of an individual who has been granted cryptographic system administrator access.
Key recovery	3.9.49. In July 1998, Cabinet directed that, where practical, encryption products must provide a means of key or data recovery to allow recovery of data in circumstances where the encryption key is unavailable due to loss, damage or failure.
Definition: Key Management Plan	3.9.50. A Key Management Plan (KMP) describes how cryptographic services are securely deployed within an agency. It documents critical key management controls to protect keys and associated material during their life cycle, along with other controls to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability of keys.
Requirement for KMP	3.9.51. Agencies SHOULD develop a KMP where they have implemented a cryptographic system in hardware or software.

KMP contents 3.9.53. The table below describes the minimum contents which **SHOULD** be documented in the KMP.

Note: The level of detail included with the KMP must be consistent with the criticality and classification of the information to be protected.

Торіс	Content
Objectives	Objectives of the cryptographic system and KMP,
	including organisational aims.
References	Relevant ACSIs.
	• Vendor documentation.
	Related policies.
Classification	Classification of the cryptographic system:
	• hardware,
	• software, and
	• documentation.
System	• Maximum classification of information protected.
Description	• The use of keys.
	• The environment.
	Administrative responsibilities.
	• Key algorithm.
	• Key length.
	• Key lifetime.
Topology	Diagram(s) and description of the cryptographic system
	topology including data flows.
Key Management	• Who generates keys.
	• How keys are delivered.
	• How keys are received.
	• Key distribution, including local, remote, central.
	• How keys are installed.
	• How keys are transferred.
	• How keys are stored.
	• How keys are recovered.
	• How keys are revoked.
	• How keys are destroyed.
Accounting	• How accounting will be undertaken for the
-	cryptographic system.
	• What records will be maintained.
	• How records will be audited.

KMP contents (continued)

Торіс	Content
Maintenance	• Maintaining the cryptographic system software and/or hardware.
	• Destroying equipment and media.
Security incidents	 A description of the conditions under which compromise of key material should be declared. References to procedures to be followed when reporting and dealing with security incidents.

Chapter 10 – Network Security

Introduction	3.10.1. This chapter contains informanetworks.	tion on securing connection	ns between
Contents	3.10.2. This chapter contains the follo	owing topics:	
	Торіс		See page
	Network Management		3-110
	Internetwork Connections		3-112
	Gateways		3-114
	Firewalls		3-116
	Diodes		3-119
	Remote Access		3-120
	Peripheral Switches		3-121
	Virtual LANs		3-122
	Multifunction Devices		3-124
Not included	3.10.3. The following subject is cove	red elsewhere:	
	Subject	See	
	Data transfer 'Cha	pter 11 – Data Transfer' on	page 3-126.
Additional references	3.10.4. Additional information relation AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2006:	ng to network security is con	ntained in the
	• 10.6 Network security manageme	ent and	

Network Management

Configuration management	3.10.5. Agencies SHOULD keep the network configuration under the control of a central network management authority.
	All changes to the configuration SHOULD be:a. approved through a formal change control process,b. documented, andc. comply with the network security policy and security plan.
	Agencies SHOULD regularly review the configuration to ensure it conforms to the documented configuration.
Network diagrams [U, IC, R, P]	3.10.6. Agencies MUST have, for each network they manage:a. a high level diagram showing all connections into the network, andb. a logical network diagram showing all network devices.
	These diagrams SHOULD : c. be updated as network changes are made, and d. include a "Current as at <date>" on each page.</date>
LAN configuration	3.10.8. Agencies SHOULD configure networks to limit opportunities for unauthorised access to information transiting the network infrastructure.
	Options to achieve this include the use of:
	• switches rather than hubs,
	 routers and firewalls isolating parts of the network on a need-to-know basis, encryption on the LAN, and
	application-level encryption.
Management traffic	3.10.9. Agencies SHOULD ensure that all ICT management traffic travelling across a network is transmitted securely, protected from unauthorised access.
	Continued on next page

Limiting	3.10.10. Where no system within a physical location is classified above
network access	IN-CONFIDENCE or RESTRICTED, DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies
[U, IC, R]	implement network access controls on all networks.

Examples:

- Use of network access control protocols such as 802.1x on all network ports.
- For networks using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), implement static MAC to IP address assignments.
- Implement port security on network switches to limit access based on MAC address and disable all unused ports.

Internetwork Connections

Internetwork connections	3.10.12. Internetwork policies and standards enable controlled secure information flow and/or access between networks.
Internetwork security standards	 3.10.14. Agencies MUST ensure that: a. the information flow over the connection is consistent with the ICTSPs for all relevant networks, b. the use of the connection is limited to authorised users, c. all users are advised of their responsibilities and held accountable for their actions in relation to the connection and the connected networks, and d. all users operate over the connection within the limits of their required rights and privileges.
Determining the classification of other networks	 3.10.15. Agencies MUST determine the effective classification of other networks before implementing an internetwork connection to them. If the other network is not under the agency's control, then agencies SHOULD: a. obtain certification and accreditation details from the network owner, and b. review the details to determine the appropriate classification of the network, and any additional security controls required to effectively manage the connection. If no details are available, or the details cannot be effectively mapped to the
	standards of this manual, then agencies SHOULD treat the other network as if it were public domain.
Definition: cascaded connections	3.10.16. Cascaded connections occur when one network is connected to another, which has a connection to a third network, and so on.
	Continued on next page

Internetwork Connections, Continued

Risk of undesirable cascaded connections 3.10.17. When intending to connect an agency network to another non-public domain network, agencies SHOULD: a. obtain a list of networks to which the other network is connected from the other network's: 1) Accreditation Authority, and 2) System Manager,

- b. examine the information from both sources to determine if any unintended cascaded connections exist, and
- c. consider the risks associated with any identified cascaded connections prior to connecting the agency network to the other network, particularly where a connection to a public domain network such as the Internet may exist.

Once connectivity is established, agencies **SHOULD** become information stakeholders in the change management process for the other network in order to retain visibility of any increase in the level of risk introduced by changes to the other network.


Gateways

Definition: gateway	3.10.18. A gateway is a secured connection between two networks.
Definition: one-way gateway	3.10.19. One-way gateways are gateways through which data can only flow in one direction. This is generally achieved by breaking the electrical or optical connection on the return path.
	 Depending on the requirements, a one-way gateway can be deployed two different ways. They can be configured to allow either: data from a less trusted system to be pushed up into a more trusted system whilst preventing data in the more trusted system from entering the less trusted system, or data from a more trusted system to be pushed down into a less trusted system whilst preventing data in the less trusted system from entering the more trusted system.
Gateway standards	 3.10.20. Agencies MUST ensure that: a. all agency networks are protected from other networks by gateways, b. all gateways contain a network device to control the data flow that meets the relevant standards, and See: 'Firewalls' on page 3-116 for bi-directional gateways, and 'Diodes' on page 3-119 for one-way gateways. c. for gateways between networks of different classifications, any shared components are managed by the owners of the more highly classified network, d. the data flow is controlled in accordance with the relevant standards, and See: 'Chapter 11 – Data Transfer' on page 3-126. e. all gateway components are physically located within a server room. See: 'Separation using a server room' on page 3-6.
	 Agencies SHOULD ensure that gateways: f. are the only communications routes into and out of internal networks, g. by default, deny all connections into and out of the network, h. allow only explicitly authorised connections, i. are managed via a secure path, j. provide sufficient audit capability to detect gateway security breaches and attempted network intrusions, and k. provide real-time alarms.

k. provide real-time alarms.

Cascaded 3.10.23. Agencies **MUST** ensure that the combination of the devices protecting the path linking the most highly classified network to the least classified network meets the minimum assurance requirement of a direct connection between the two.

Example: An agency has an IN-CONFIDENCE internal network with a gateway to the Internet, labelled as Gateway A in the diagram below. Within the internal network is a PROTECTED enclave, protected from the IN-CONFIDENCE network by Gateway B. Gateway A requires an EAL2 firewall as a minimum. Gateway B requires an EAL3 firewall as a minimum. However, a direct connection between a PROTECTED network and the Internet would require an EAL4 firewall, therefore a firewall of this assurance level must be included at either Gateway A or Gateway B.



See:

- 'Definition: cascaded connections' on page 3-112.
- 'Firewalls' on page 3-116.
- 'Diodes' on page 3-119.

Demilitarised3.10.25. A Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) may be achieved by placing the external
network, public information servers, and internal network on three different
physical ports of a single firewall or by the use of multiple firewalls.

Agencies **SHOULD** use DMZs to separate externally accessible systems, such as web servers, from both the public and from the agency's internal networks.

Firewalls

Definition: firewall	3.10.26. A firewall is a network device that filters incoming and outgoing network data, based on a series of rules.
Definition: traffic flow filter	3.10.27. A traffic flow filter is a device configured to automatically filter and control the flow of network data.
Selecting a traffic flow filter	 3.10.28. When selecting a traffic flow filter, agencies SHOULD use one or more of the following, with the order of preference as shown: 1. A firewall selected from the EPL. 2. A firewall or proxy that is not listed on the EPL. 3. A router with appropriate access control lists configured. See: 'Product Selection' on page 3-21.
Firewall assurance level example	3.10.29. The following tables define firewall assurance level requirements. They are formulated on the assumption that the policy requiring all networks to be protected from other networks by gateways has been followed. See: 'Gateway standards' on page 3-114.
	Example: (Using the information in the following table.) A gateway exists between your IN-CONFIDENCE network and another agency's PROTECTED network (and you have confirmed that their network meets the security requirements for a network of that classification). Since their network is relatively secure, you only require a traffic flow filter to control the flow of data from it into your network. The other agency, however, requires an EAL3 firewall to control data flowing into its network from yours.
	IN-CONFIDENCE Network PROTECTED Network
	Gateway with Traffic Filter EAL3 Firewall

Firewall	3.10.30. Agencies MUST use devices that meet the minimum level of assurance
assurance levels [U, IC, R, P]	as shown in the following table.

- See:
- 'Firewall assurance level example' on page 3-116 if you need help interpreting this table.
- 'Selecting a traffic flow filter' on page 3-116 if, according to the table, your gateway requires a traffic flow filter.
- 'Inter-connecting networks within an agency' on page 3-118 for exceptions relating to networks managed by the same agency.

If your network is	And the other network is	Then your gateway requires
UNCLASSIFIED,	 public domain, UNCLASSIFIED, IN-CONFIDENCE, PROTECTED, HIGHLY PROTECTED, or national security, 	a traffic flow filter.
IN-CONFIDENCE,	public domain,UNCLASSIFIED,	an EAL2 firewall.
	 IN-CONFIDENCE, PROTECTED, HIGHLY PROTECTED, or national security, 	a traffic flow filter.
RESTRICTED,	 public domain, UNCLASSIFIED, or IN-CONFIDENCE, 	an EAL2 firewall.
	 PROTECTED, HIGHLY PROTECTED, or national security, 	a traffic flow filter.
PROTECTED,	 public domain, or UNCLASSIFIED,	an EAL4 firewall.
	IN-CONFIDENCE, orRESTRICTED,	an EAL3 firewall.
	PROTECTED,	an EAL2 firewall.
	 HIGHLY PROTECTED, or national security above RESTRICTED, 	an EAL1 firewall.

Inter- connecting networks within an agency	 3.10.34. If the networks connected by the gateway are managed by the same agency then a firewall is not mandatory for the protection of: either network if the networks are of the same classification and are accredited for the same set of caveats, or the less classified of the networks, if it is accredited for the same or fewer caveats than the more highly classified network. Note: the requirements for the protection of the more highly classified network from the less classified network must still be met.
	In these situations, DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies use at least a traffic flow filter.
Personal firewalls	 3.10.35. Wherever it is practical to do so, DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies implementing firewalls for the protection of individual machines use separate hardware devices in preference to software-based personal firewall applications. Example: Home-based workers who require remote access to agency systems.

Diodes

Definition: diode	3.10.36. A device that allows data to flow in only one direction.
Content and volume checks	 3.10.37. Agencies deploying a diode to control data flow within a one-way gateway SHOULD monitor the volume of the data being transferred to ensure that it conforms to expectations. In addition, data transfer controls are required to manage the data flow. See: 'Chapter 11 – Data Transfer' on page 3-126.
Assurance requirements [PD, U, IC, R, P]	3.10.38. For controlling the data flow of one-way gateways where the classifications of the interconnected networks are no higher than PROTECTED or RESTRICTED, agencies SHOULD use a diode with some level of formal assurance.

Remote Access

Definition: remote access	3.10.42. Remote access is any access to an agency system from a location not within the physical control of that agency. This includes access to devices such as routers, firewalls and IPT components.			
Standards [U]	 3.10.43. Agencies allowing users remote access to UNCLASSIFIED systems SHOULD ensure that: a. users are authenticated on each occasion that access is granted to the system, b. users are given the minimum system access necessary to perform their duties, and c. data relating to any actions requiring the use of privileged access is protected during transmission as for IN-CONFIDENCE. See: 'Requirements for transit encryption [IC, R, P]' on page 3-93. 			
Standards for classified systems	 3.10.44. Agencies that allow users remote access to systems containing classified information MUST ensure that: a. the users are authenticated at the start of each session, Note: DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies use more stringent measures to authenticate remote users than it would for users accessing the systems from sites under the physical control of the agency. b. the users are given the minimum system access necessary to perform their duties, Note: DSD RECOMMENDS that agencies do not allow the use of privileged access remotely. c. the remote users cannot view or download information that exceeds the classification of the remote user's system, and d. any data transferred is appropriately protected during transmission and at the remote user's end. See: 'Chapter 1 – Physical Security' on page 3-2. 'Cryptographic Requirements' on page 3-92. 			

Peripheral Switches

Definition: peripheral switch	3.10.45. Peripheral switches are used to share a set of peripherals between a number of computers. The most common type of peripheral switch is the Keyboard/Video/Mouse (KVM) Switch.

KVM assurance requirements 3.10.46. The table below provides the minimum level of assurance that agencies **SHOULD** have when using a KVM switch.

If the KVM is for more than two systems then the level is determined by the highest and lowest of the system classifications involved.

Key:		
Grade	Assurance Level	
D	EAL2	
Е	None	

_	PD	U	IC	R	Р
PD	E				
U	Е	Е			
IC	E	Е	Е		
R	D	D	Е	Е	
Р	D	D	Е	Е	Е

Virtual LANs

Introduction

- 3.10.48. Many Layer 2 switches can provide a Virtual LAN (VLAN) capability that allows:
 - multiple Layer 3 networks to exist separately on a switch, and
 - a network of computers to behave as if they are connected to the same wire even though they may actually be physically located on different segments of the LAN.

Important: The VLAN capability within switches is not designed to enforce security and a number of vulnerabilities have been documented that may allow traffic to pass between the VLANs.

Connectivity3.10.49. The table below represents the connectivity standards for VLANs
sharing a common switch.

Exceptions:

- A single network, managed in accordance with a single SSP, for which some separation is required for administrative or similar reasons, may use VLANs to achieve that separation.
- VLANs may be used to separate IP telephony traffic. **See:** 'IP Telephony' on page 3-87.

Key:

Where the entry in the following table is a(n)	The standard is
А	DSD does NOT RECOMMEND
В	Agencies SHOULD NOT
С	Agencies MUST NOT

	PD	U	IC	R	Р
PD	А	В	С	С	С
U	В	А	В	С	С
IC	С	В	Α	В	В
R	С	С	В	А	С
Р	С	С	В	С	А

Virtual LANs, Continued

administration standardsnetwork as determined by the Accreditation Authority.Staff with administrative access or unsupervised physical access to the switch MUST have a security clearance of at least the classification of the highest	
classified network carried on the switch.	
The physical security of the switch MUST meet the requirements for the highest classified network carried on the switch.	
Agencies SHOULD implement all security measures recommended by the vendor of the switch. Note: If any of the recommendations conflict with this manual then this manual has precedence.	
Unused ports on the switches SHOULD be disabled.	
Trunking 3.10.52. Using a technique known as trunking, a VLAN may exist across two or more connected switches.	
This capability MUST NOT be used on switches managing VLANs of differing classifications.	

Multifunction Devices

Definition: multifunction devices	3.10.53. Within this manual, the term "multifunction devices" (MFDs) refers to the class of devices that combines printing, scanning, copying, faxing and/or voice messaging functionality within the one device. These devices are designed to connect to a computer and telephone network simultaneously.
	 See: 'Telephones and Telephone Systems' on page 3-84, and 'Facsimile Machines' on page 3-90.
Risks with MFDs	 3.10.54. The three main risks associated with MFDs are: a user faxing a classified document when their intention was to either print, copy or scan the document, a user assuming that because the capability exists, it is acceptable to fax a classified document from their PC, and an attacker entering the system via the telephone network connection.
Copying documents	3.10.55. Agencies MUST NOT permit network-connected MFDs to be used to copy documents classified above the level of the connected network.
Usage [IC, R]	 3.10.56. Agencies SHOULD NOT enable a connection from an MFD to a telephone network of a lower classification unless the MFD: a. has been evaluated to EAL2, and the scope of the evaluation includes: information flow control functions to prevent unintended and unauthorised data flows, data export controls capable of blocking information based on protective markings, authentication, and audit data generation and protection, is configured to use the evaluated functionality in accordance with the relevant policies. Yuser Identification and Authentication' on page 3-61, 'Event Logging' on page 3-70, and 'Chapter 11 – Data Transfer' on page 3-126.
Usage [P]	3.10.57. Agencies SHOULD NOT enable the facsimile functionality of MFDs unless the telephone network is accredited to at least the same classification as the computer network.

Policies, plans
and procedures3.10.59. Agencies deploying MFDs MUST develop a set of policies, plans and
procedures governing the use of the equipment.

Chapter 11 – Data Transfer

Overview

 3.11.1. This topic contains information about securing the transfer of data between systems. Unless stated otherwise, these requirements apply to all methods of transferring data, including: bi-directional gateways using a firewall, one-way gateways using a diode, manual procedures that use software applications to check the data on a media item during transfer, and manual procedures that rely on a human to review the data.
 3.11.2. Agencies SHOULD ensure that data transfers are either: a. individually approved by the ITSA, or b. performed in accordance with processes and/or procedures approved by the Accreditation Authority.
 3.11.4. Agencies MUST ensure that users: a. are held accountable for the data they transfer, and b. are instructed to perform the following checks prior to initiating the data transfer: protective marking check, visual inspection, and metadata check, if relevant.
 3.11.5. A trusted source is: a person or system formally identified as being capable of reliably producing information meeting certain defined parameters, such as a maximum data classification, or a person formally identified as being capable of reliably reviewing information produced by others to confirm compliance with certain defined parameters. Examples: Trusted sources may include: trained sanitisation officers tasked with sanitising data for release to less classified systems, competent releasing officers tasked with reviewing data submitted by others for release to less classified systems, an accredited system that automatically generates messages designed for release to less classified systems, and an automated database replication tool known to operate in an assured

Contents	3.11.6. This chapter contains the	e following topics:
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Торіс	See page
Content Filtering	3-128
Temporary Connections	3-129
Data Import	3-131
Data Export	3-132

Content Filtering

Definition: 3.11.7. A filter controls the flow of data in accordance with a security policy. **filter**

Examples: Email content scanners and "dirty word" checkers.

Filtering techniques 3.11.8. The table below identifies some filtering techniques used to control data transfer.

Technique	Purpose
Anti-virus scan	Scans the data for viruses and other malicious code.
Data format	Inspects all data to ensure that it conforms with
check	expected/permitted format(s).
Data range	Checks the data within each field to ensure that it falls within
check	the expected/permitted range.
Data type check	Inspects each file header to determine the file type.
File extension	Checks file extensions to ensure that they are permitted.
check	Examples: .txt, .doc, .jpg, .pdf.
Keyword	Searches the data for keywords or "dirty words" that may
search	indicate the presence of classified or inappropriate material.
Metadata check	Inspects files for metadata to be removed prior to release.
	Examples: revision history, userids and directory paths.
Protective	Validates the protective marking of the data to ensure that it
marking check	complies with the permitted classifications and caveats.
Visual	Manually inspects the data for over-classified information
inspection	and other suspicious content that an automated system may
	miss; particularly important for the transfer of image files.

Limiting transfers by file types [U, IC, R, P]	3.11.9. Agencies SHOULD strictly define and limit the types of files that may be transferred, based on business requirements and the results of a risk assessment.
	 The level of risk will be affected by the degree of assurance agencies can place in the ability of their data transfer filters to: confirm the file type by examination of the contents of the file, confirm the absence of malicious content, confirm the absence of inappropriate content, confirm the classification of the content, and handle compressed files appropriately.
Blocking suspicious data	3.11.11. Agencies MUST block or drop any data identified by a data filter as suspicious until/unless reviewed and approved for transfer by a trusted source other than the originator.

Temporary Connections

Introduction	3.11.12. Interconnecting networks are protected from each other by secure connections known as gateways. In general, however, the temporary connection of a single device will not occur through a traditional gateway. Security controls are therefore needed to ensure that only authorised information flows over the connection.In addition to the policy defined here, data transfer controls are required.See: 'Data Import' on page 3-131, and 'Data Export' on page 3-132.
Definition: temporary connection	3.11.13. A temporary connection occurs when a system can communicate directly with another device or removable media item via a temporary, human-initiated link.
	 Examples: reading to and writing from removable media inserted into a workstation, connecting a PED to a system to update information, and connecting a laptop to a network to send a few emails.
Airgapped transfers	 3.11.14. Agencies transferring data manually between two agency systems SHOULD use: a previously unused piece of media, b a pool of media items used only for data transfer between the two relevant systems, or c a media item which has been sufficiently sanitised to permit its reuse on the less classified of the systems between which the data transfer is occurring. See: 'Media Sanitisation' on page 3-32.
Over- classification of media	3.11.15. Agencies MUST NOT insert media of any classification into a system of a lower classification.
Classification of media [IC, R, P]	 3.11.16. Agencies intending to classify a media item below the classification of the system in which it is inserted SHOULD ensure that: a. the media is read-only, b. the media is inserted into a read-only device, or c. all data transfers to the media are performed in accordance with agency policy on data export. See: 'Data Export' on page 3-132.
	Agencies not meeting the above requirement SHOULD classify all removable media interacting with a system at the classification of that system.

Connection of portable	3.11.19. Agencies intending to allow portable computers or PEDs to be temporarily connected to a system of a different classification MUST ensure that
computers and PEDs [U, IC, R, P]	a firewall of the appropriate assurance is used to protect the more highly classified side of the connection.

This requirement does not apply when a device is using a network purely as a carrier for appropriately encrypted traffic to a remote system. **Example:** An IN-CONFIDENCE laptop does not require a firewall when it is using the Internet to carry only an approved VPN connection back to the agency's IN-CONFIDENCE network.

If the high side is	And the low side is	Then the minimum firewall assurance is
UNCLASSIFIED,	public domain,	a traffic flow filter.
IN-CONFIDENCE,	• public domain,	an EAL2 firewall.
	• UNCLASSIFIED,	
RESTRICTED,	• public domain,	an EAL2 firewall.
	• UNCLASSIFIED, or	
	• IN-CONFIDENCE,	
PROTECTED,	• public domain, or	an EAL4 firewall.
	• UNCLASSIFIED,	
	• IN-CONFIDENCE, or	an EAL3 firewall.
	• RESTRICTED,	

Unaccredited devices

3.11.22. Agencies **SHOULD NOT** allow unaccredited portable computers and PEDs to connect to agency ICT systems or store official information.

Data Import

Additional policy	3.11.23. Where the data import occurs via a connection between networks, as opposed to a temporary connection, policy relating to gateways, firewalls and diodes also applies.See: 'Chapter 10 – Network Security' on page 3-109.
Data import [U]	3.11.24. Agencies importing data to an UNCLASSIFIED system SHOULD ensure that the data is scanned for malicious and active content.
Data import to a classified system	3.11.25. Agencies importing data to a classified system MUST ensure that the data is scanned for malicious and active content.
	 Exceptions: Malicious content may be imported to isolated systems specifically designed for the storage, analysis and/or transmission of such content. Where the type of data cannot be effectively scanned, and the source and/or content of the data is strictly limited to known safe states, the Accreditation Authority may choose to approve the importation of unscanned data. Example: Importing automatically generated image files from a fully certified and accredited system known to operate in an assured manner.

Data Export

Additional policy	3.11.27. Where the data export occurs via a connection between networks, as opposed to a temporary connection, policy relating to gateways, firewalls and diodes also applies.
	See: 'Chapter 10 – Network Security' on page 3-109.
Data export to a less classified system [IC, R, P]	3.11.28. Agencies SHOULD restrict the export of data to a less classified system by filtering data using at least protective marking checks.

Abbreviations, Glossary and Index

Abbreviations

ACL	Access Control List
ACSI	Australian Communications - Electronic Security Instruction
AGAO	Australian Government Access Only
AGD	Attorney-General's Department
AISEP	Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
AS/NZS	Australian Standard/New Zealand Standard
ASA	Agency Security Adviser
AUSTEO	Australian Eyes Only
CC	Common Criteria
CDMA	Code Division Multiple Access
CR	Certification Report
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
DACA	DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithm
DACP	DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocol
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
DSD	Defence Signals Directorate
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EPL	Evaluated Products List
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GSM	Global System for Mobile communications
HG	High Grade
HGCE	High Grade Cryptographic Equipment
HGE	High Grade Equipment
I-RAP	Infosec-Registered Assessor Program
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
ICTSP	Information and Communications Technology Security Policy
IP	Internet Protocol
IPT	Internet Protocol Telephony
IR	Infrared
ISIDRAS	Information Security Incident Detection, Reporting and Analysis Scheme
IT	Information Technology
ITSA	Information Technology Security Adviser
ITSEC	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
KMP	Key Management Plan
KVM	Keyboard/Video/Mouse
LAN	Local Area Network

MAC	Media Access Control
MFD	Multifunction Device
MMS	Multimedia Messaging Service
NLZ	No-Lone-Zone
PBX	Private Branch Exchange
PD	Public Domain
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant
PED	Personal Electronic Device
PM&C	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
PP	Protection Profile
PROM	Programmable Read-Only Memory
PSM	Protective Security Manual
PSPC	Protective Security Policy Committee
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
PTT	Push-To-Talk
RF	Radio Frequency
RMP	Risk Management Plan
ROM	Read-Only Memory
S/MIME	Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension
SAS	Security Alarm System
SCEC	Security Construction and Equipment Committee
SEC	Security Equipment Catalogue
SIC	SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE
SMS	Short Messaging Service
SOE	Standard Operating Environment
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SR	Server Room
SSH	Secure Shell
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
SSP	System Security Plan
ST	Security Target
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSCM	Technical Surveillance Counter Measures
VOIP	Voice Over Internet Protocol
VLAN	Virtual Local Area Network
VPN	Virtual Private Network

Glossary

IMPORTANT	This glossary is included for quick reference and does not replace ACSI 1(B) - Information Systems Security Glossary.
Accreditation	The formal acknowledgement of the Accreditation Authority's decision to approve the operation of a particular ICT system.
Accreditation authority	The official with the authority to formally assume responsibility for operating a system at an acceptable level of risk.
AGAO	Australian Government Access Only (AGAO) is a caveat used by the Department of Defence and ASIO. The <i>Inter-Agency Security Supplement to the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual</i> states that AGAO material received in other agencies must be handled as if it were marked AUSTEO.
AISEP	The Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP) is a program under which evaluations are performed by impartial companies against the Common Criteria and ITSEC. The results of these evaluations are then certified by DSD, which is responsible for the overall operation of the program.
Audit	An independent review of ICT event logs and related activities performed to determine the adequacy of current system measures, to identify the degree of conformance with established policy, and/or to develop recommendations for improvements to the measures currently applied.
AUSTEO	Australian Eyes Only (AUSTEO) is a caveat indicating that the information is not to be passed to or accessed by foreign nationals.
Availability	Ensures that authorised users have access to information and associated assets when required.
Business continuity	Ensures the ongoing availability of identified processes and resources in support of critical business objectives.
Caveat	A marking that indicates that the information has special requirements in addition to those indicated by the classification. The term covers codewords, source codewords, releasability indicators and special-handling caveats.
	Continued on next page

Certification	The assertion by a Certification Authority that compliance with a standard has been achieved, based on a comprehensive evaluation. Certification is generally a prerequisite for accreditation.
Certification authority	An entity with the authority to assert that ICT systems comply with the required standards.
Certification report	The Certification Report contains the findings of the certification for a system, site or product.
	For products evaluated under the Common Criteria or ITSEC, the Certification Report is the definitive document for product specific guidance and provides detailed security information such as a clarification of the scope of the evaluation and recommendations on use of the product.
Common Criteria	An ISO standard (ISO 15408) for ICT security evaluations.
	The purpose of the Common Criteria is to ensure that ICT security evaluations world-wide are:
	performed against a common set of requirements, andthat the security claims are expressed unambiguously.
	URL: www.commoncriteriaportal.org
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement	A mutual recognition arrangement for Common Criteria evaluations among a group of participating countries, including Australia and New Zealand.
Comsec	Communications Security (Comsec) is the measure and controls taken to deny unauthorised persons information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications.
Communica- tions security	See: Comsec.
Control	A measure that is taken to mitigate risks.
	Continued on next page

Control register	A document used in the RMP to record the controls required for a site.
Controlled space	 A controlled space, as defined in <i>ACSI 61</i>, is the three dimensional space surrounding equipment or facilities that process classified information within which: unauthorised personnel are denied unrestricted access, and positive measures are taken to control the movement of personnel and materials including vehicles.
Counter- measure	See: Control.
Cryptographic hash	An algorithm (the hash function) which takes as input a string of any length (the message), and generates a fixed length string (the message digest or fingerprint) as output. The algorithm is designed to make it computationally infeasible to find any input which maps to a given digest, or to find two different messages that map to the same digest.
Cryptographic system	A related set of hardware and/or software used for cryptographic communication, processing or storage, and the administrative framework in which it operates.
Cryptography	The art or science concerning the principles, means, and methods for rendering plain information unintelligible and for restoring encrypted information to intelligible form.
Cryptoperiod	The time span during which each key setting remains in effect.
DAP	DSD Approved Product. The term is now obsolete.
Declassifi- cation, media	The administrative decision to remove all classifications from the media, based on an assessment of relevant issues including the consequences of damage from disclosure or misuse, the effectiveness of any sanitisation procedure used, and the intended destination of the media.
Degaussing	The process of applying a magnetic force to remove information from media.
	Continued on next nage

Destruction, media	The process of physically damaging the media with the objective of making the data stored on it inaccessible.		
Diode	A device that allows data to flow in only one direction.		
DMZ	A Demilitarised zone (DMZ) is a small network with one or more servers that is kept separate from an organisation's core network, either on the outside of the organisation's firewall, or as a separate network protected by the organisation's firewall. DMZs usually provide public information to less trusted networks, such as the Internet.		
EAL	The Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) is a standard assurance level, ranging from EAL1 to EAL7, under the Common Criteria. EAL1 offers the least assurance, while EAL7 offers the highest assurance. Each assurance level comprises a number of assurance components, covering aspects of the product's design, development and operation.		
Emanations security	 Emanations security includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: audio, visual, infrared, and electromagnetic emissions. TEMPEST security is a subset of emanations security.		
Encryption	The art or science concerning the principles, means, and methods for rendering plain information unintelligible.		
EPL	 The Evaluated Products List identifies products that: have completed a CC, ITSEC and/or some other DSD approved evaluation, are currently undergoing CC or ITSEC evaluation within the AISEP, or some other form of evaluation within DSD, or have completed a CC or ITSEC evaluation through a recognized overseas scheme 		
	It is available on the DSD website. URL: www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/evaluation_services/epl/epl.html		

Evaluation assurance level	See: EAL.
Firewall	A network device that filters incoming and outgoing network data, based on a series of rules.
Firmware	Software embedded in a hardware device.
Foreign national	A person who is not an Australian citizen.
Foreign system	An ICT system that is not solely owned and managed by the Australian Government.
	Note: A foreign system could be located within Australia.
Gateway	A secured connection between two networks.
Gateway certification	A certification that a gateway environment meets the relevant standards. Gateway certification may be performed by the agency's ITSA, or by an independent third-party such as DSD or an I-RAP assessor.
General user	A user who can, with their normal privileges, make only limited changes to a system and generally cannot bypass system security.
	Note: General users are normally those users who are not privileged users.
Hardware	The physical components of computer equipment including peripheral equipment.
	 Examples: personal and mainframe computers, laptops, printers, routers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and mobile phones.

High GradeCryptographic equipment that adheres to high grade cryptographic standards.CryptographicEquipment	
Host-based IntrusionAn intrusion prevention system that is installed on individual servers or workstations to protect systems from intrusions and malicious code.Prevention System	
I-RAP The Infosec-Registered Assessor Program (I-RAP) is a DSD initiative designed to register suitably qualified information security assessors to carry out specific types of ICT security assessments to Australian Government standards.	
URL: www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/evaluation_services/irap.html	
 ICT system For the purposes of this manual, an ICT system is: a related set of hardware and software used for the communication, processing and storage of information, and the electronic form (not content) of the information that they hold or process. 	
ICTSP An Information and Communications Technology Security Policy (ICTSP) is a document that describes the information security policies, standards and responsibilities for an agency.	
IP telephony The transport of telephone calls over Internet Protocol (IP) networks. It may also be referred to as Voice-Over-IP (VOIP) and Internet Telephony.	
ISIDRAS The Information Security Incident Detection, Reporting and Analysis Scheme (ISIDRAS) is a scheme established by DSD to collect information on security incidents that affect the security or functionality of Australian Government computer and communication systems.	
ITSA The Information Technology Security Adviser (ITSA) is the person appointed by an agency to manage the security of the agency's information and ICT systems.	-

ITSEC	The Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) is an older national security evaluation criteria developed by European countries in the early 1990's.
	The ITSEC specifies seven levels of assurance, known as E0 (Inadequate assurance) to E6 (highest assurance).
Key	A sequence of random or pseudo random bits used:
	• initially to set up and periodically change the operations performed in crypto-equipment for the purpose of encrypting or decrypting electronic signals,
	 for determining electronic counter-countermeasure patterns, or Example: frequency hopping or spread spectrum for producing other keys.
Malicious code	Any software that attempts to subvert the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a system. Malicious code includes:
	• logic bombs,
	• trapdoors,
	• Trojan programs,
	viruses, andworms.
Media	The component of hardware that is used to store information.
Multifunction devices	The class of devices that combine printing, scanning, copying, faxing and/or voice messaging functionality within the one device. These devices are designed to connect to a computer and telephone network simultaneously.
Need-to-know	The principle of telling a person only the information that they require to fulfil their role.
Non-volatile media	A type of media which retains its information when power is removed.
	Continued on next page

Peripheral switches	Devices used to share a set of peripherals between a number of computers. The most common type of peripheral switch is the Keyboard/Video/Mouse (KVM) switch.
Privileged user	A user who can alter or circumvent system security protections. This may also apply to users who may have only limited privileges, such as software developers, who can still bypass security precautions.
	A privileged user may have the capability to modify system configurations, account privileges, audit logs, data files or applications.
	Examples: System administrators, ICT security staff, Helpdesk staff.
Protection profile	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of ICT products that meets specific consumer needs.
Provisional certification	Provisional certification may be granted by a Certification Authority when the system is lacking compliance in some non-critical aspect(s) of the design, policy or management.
	It is issued to indicate that full certification can be expected, subject to successful completion of the provisions identified in the certification report.
Push-to-talk	Push-to-talk handsets prevent the possibility of an idle handset inadvertently allowing discussions being undertaken in the vicinity of the handset to be heard by the remote party.
Reclassifi- cation, media	The administrative decision to change the classification of the media, based on an assessment of relevant issues including the consequences of damage from unauthorised disclosure of misuse, the effectiveness of any sanitisation procedure used, and the intended destination of the media.
Remote access	Any access to an agency's system from a location not within the physical control of that agency.
	Continued on next page

Removable media	Storage media that can be easily removed from an ICT system and is designed for removal.
	Examples: Hard disks, CDs, floppy disks, tapes, smartcards, and flashcards.
Risk	The Australia/New Zealand Risk Management Standard (AS/NZS 4360:2004) defines risk as 'the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.'
Risk management plan	The complete documentation package generated by following the risk management process.
Risk register	A list, or database, of the risks faced by an agency.
Risk treatment plan	Documents how risk treatment controls should be implemented.
Sanitisation, media	The process of erasing or overwriting information stored on media. Note: The process of sanitisation does not automatically change the classification of the media, nor does sanitisation involve the destruction of the media.
	See: Glossary entries for 'Declassification', 'Reclassification'.
SCEC	The Security Construction and Equipment Committee (SCEC) approves security equipment for Australian Government use.
SEC	The <i>Security Equipment Catalogue (SEC)</i> lists equipment that has been tested and endorsed as meeting relevant SCEC standards.
Seconded foreigner	A representative of a foreign government on exchange or long-term posting to an Australian Government agency.
	Note: These people are often referred to as "Integrees" within Defence.
	Continued on next page

Security incident	An event that impacts on the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a system through an act of unauthorised access, disclosure, modification, misuse, damage, loss or destruction.
Security target	 The security target for a product is a document defining the: security claims of the TOE, scope of the evaluation, and the intended operational environment of the TOE. The security claims are divided into: a set of security requirements, and
	• details of the security functions which meet those requirements.
Server	A computer used to run programs that provide services to multiple users.
	Examples: File servers, mail servers, and database servers.
Session key	A key used only for the duration of a particular communications session.
System administrator	The person responsible for the day-to-day operation of the system.
System manager	The manager responsible for maintaining the technical and operational effectiveness of a system on behalf of the system owner.
System owner	The senior agency manager with formal responsibility for the information resource. Usually has accreditation authority for the system.
Target of evaluation	The part of the product or system that is subject to an evaluation.
Traffic flow filter	A device that has been configured to automatically filter and control the flow of network data.
	Continued on next page

 A trusted source is: a person or system formally identified as being capable of reliably producing information meeting certain defined parameters, such as a maximum data classification, or a person formally identified as being capable of reliably reviewing information produced by others to confirm compliance with certain defined parameters.
Technical surveillance counter measures (TSCM) are searches for covert electronic surveillance devices. TSCM are also known as 'sweeps'.
A user is anyone with access to a system. Note: A user is not necessarily an employee of the organisation that owns the system.
See: Malicious code.
Volatile media is media which loses its information when power is removed.
 A whitelist defines a set of accepted items. This set is inclusive, confirming that the item being analysed is acceptable. It is the opposite of a blacklist which confirms that items are not acceptable. Examples: A spam filter may use an email whitelist to specify email addresses, IP addresses or domain names from which emails will be accepted. A locked down computer may have a software whitelist defining which programs may be executed on the system.

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